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Preface
Public job training programs funded by the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) are now 40 years old. Since their inception, the programs have
evolved from strong federal control to significant local autonomy, from nar-
rowly targeted to broadly available services, and from prescribed training
options to significant customer choice. The evolution has been marked by four
distinct stages. The 1962 Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA)
provided funding administered by regional offices of USDOL directly to job
training providers delivering classroom training in local areas. The first ele-
ments of decentralized decision making were introduced by the Comprehen-
sive Employment and Training Act (CETA), which superceded MDTA in
1973. CETA required establishment of local administrative entities, called
“prime sponsors,” to coordinate programs and competitively finance training
providers. MDTA and CETA each targeted job training services to economi-
cally disadvantaged workers and youth. CETA was supplanted by the Job
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in 1982. JTPA continued the decentralization
trend that CETA had begun by significantly reducing the federal and state role
and replacing it with a well-developed performance management system.
JTPA was a results-driven job training program, which added dislocated
workers as an eligible client group.
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 replaced JTPA. WIA
retained local administration but created a customer focus to programs with
universal access and a greater reliance on market mechanisms. It expanded the
array of job training, education, and employment services that could be
accessed by customers, and mandated that one-stop centers for employment
services be created in every labor market throughout the country. Universal
access to programs has welcomed a wide variety of customers into the system,
many of whom are served through core and intensive services. The provision
of training services changed radically with the introduction of vouchers (indi-
vidual training accounts) to provide training, and choices limited to training
providers certified as eligible by the local WIA administrator. To inform their
choice, voucher recipients have access to performance information about
potential training providers—including job placement rates—through a sys-
tem of consumer reports on past performance of job training participants. 
WIA included a sunset provision, with funding beyond five years after
enactment of the original program requiring WIA reauthorization. The Bush
administration proposed a number of incremental changes to the current pro-
gram, the most important of which is the consolidation of all adult programs:
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disadvantaged adult, dislocated worker, and the employment service funded
under the Wagner-Peyser Act. This change would incorporate the public labor
exchange into the basic WIA system.
This book looks at federally funded training programs as they exist today.
It reviews what job training is and how training programs have been imple-
mented under WIA. More specifically, it examines training service providers
and methods of delivering training services, including the use of individual
training accounts and eligible training provider lists. Performance manage-
ment under WIA is examined, as well as the effectiveness of training pro-
grams. Public training programs are compared to private training provided in
the United States and to public training programs provided in other industrial-
ized nations.
We intend for this book to serve as a ready companion to two other vol-
umes published by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research:
Unemployment Insurance in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues
(1997), and Labor Exchange Policy in the United States (2004). Previous
overviews of research on public job training programs have concentrated
mainly on the cost effectiveness of programs, rather than on their operations
and institutional framework. 
In 2000, Burt Barnow and Christopher King edited and authored Improv-
ing the Odds: Increasing the Effectiveness of Publicly Funded Training, pub-
lished by the Urban Institute. That book examined evidence about what works
in job training for a variety of adult and youth populations. However, from the
beginning of WIA implementation, questions were raised about the way pub-
licly funded job training was being chosen, and about the nature of incentives
for local administrators. Indeed, an expert panel, convened soon after WIA
enactment to propose a broad five-year plan for research and evaluation,
emphasized the need to learn more about the intermediaries who deliver job
training and other employment services for the one-stop centers. This book
supplements Barnow and King (2000) by delving into the institutional details
of job training service delivery. 
Draft chapters for this book were prepared for a conference jointly spon-
sored by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and USDOL,
held in September 2002 at Brook Lodge in Augusta, Michigan. At the confer-
ence, authors presented overviews of their chapters, and discussants provided
constructive critiques aimed at improving the coverage and exposition of
chapters. Other employment program and policy experts in attendance added
further suggestions from the floor. In addition to all conference participants
(listed at the back of this book), we thank others who contributed to this effort,
including publications and administrative staff at the Upjohn Institute: Claire
Black, Allison Hewitt Colosky, Kevin Hollenbeck, and Phyllis Molhoek. 
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As editors, we are responsible for errors of fact or policy judgment. The
authors and editors have been free to express their own opinions. Conse-
quently, the text does not necessarily reflect the positions or viewpoints of the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, USDOL, or other organiza-
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Job training is a pervasive aspect of American life. Wage and sal-
ary employment is the single largest source of aggregate personal
income in the United States. Every person holding a job has benefited
from job training. Although most job training in the United States is
undertaken by private employers in their normal course of doing busi-
ness, each year hundreds of thousands of Americans in precarious eco-
nomic conditions use publicly funded job training as a path to
employment.
The focus of this book is on the government role in job training. To
place this examination in perspective, the book also includes reviews
of private job training efforts and an international comparison of gov-
ernment job training programs. The chapters review the effectiveness
of major federal job training programs, examine important features of
current programs, and speculate about directions for future job training
programs. 
This book is directed mainly to employment policymakers and
practitioners at the local, state, and federal levels. The exposition is rel-
atively concise and nontechnical. However, sufficient detail is included
in footnotes and references to make the book a useful resource for stu-
dents, researchers, consultants, and policy scholars. 
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TYPES OF JOB TRAINING 
Job training involves teaching someone the skills required to do a
job competently. It is distinct from general education because of the
exclusive focus on preparation for employment. Job training can range
from remedial training, which teaches people the skills they need to
learn other skills, to very sophisticated occupation specific training,
which teaches people detailed procedures to perform at a high level in
a specific occupation. An overview of job training types is provided in
Table 1.1. 
Job training usually refers to short-term occupational skill training
to increase job readiness. The popular notion of job training comes
from the common experience in a school classroom. However, general
occupational job skills training in an institutional classroom setting
away from the workplace is only one of many types of job training
which are used in a wide variety of settings. 
Ideally, job training is selected to address the component of aggre-
gate unemployment resulting from a structural mismatch between job
seekers and job vacancies, so that training is targeted to occupations
with local job vacancies. Classroom job training may be customized to
fill the request of an employer with available job slots; such training
could either be privately or publicly funded. Alternatively, choice of
the training type and provider may be exercised by the participant
through a publicly funded job training voucher program. When vouch-
ers are used, choice for eligible training participants is framed by rules
regarding eligible training provider quality and local occupational
labor demand.
Job skill training may also be provided in an experiential private
sector workplace setting through on-the-job training (OJT). Learning
by watching someone else is one of the oldest types of occupational
skill training. Such training may be paid for either privately or publicly,
and may provide skills valued only in the context of the particular
establishment or more generally in the job market. When OJT is pri-
vately financed, costs may be shared by trainees through lower wages
(Barron, Berger, and Black 1997). When OJT is provided by a public
agency, it is sometimes called work experience. Work experience may
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Table 1.1  Types of Job Training
Occupational skill training
Provided in group setting is called institutional or classroom training and 
usually for occupations in general demand. 
Customized is designed to suit the specific requests of an employer with 
available job slots or employees already on-board. 
Vouchers are a vehicle to allow participants to choose among approved 
topics and training providers.
Skill training provided in an experiential workplace setting is referred to 
as on-the-job training (OJT). 
When OJT is provided through a public agency it is sometimes called 
work experience.
Remedial training
General training which seeks to remedy basic gaps in reading and 
mathematics skills to make job seekers ready for skill training. 
Classroom soft skills training
Conveys knowledge about proper workplace behavior or job search 
skills.  
Postemployment training  
Combines classroom and practical activities intended to promote 
retention and advancement within a given career path. 
Youth training programs 
Basic skills training in a workplace context, support for further general 
education and credentials, mentoring, school-to-work and school-to-
apprenticeship transition services, intensive residential education and 
occupation and job training.
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be either volunteer or paid, and it may be either unsubsidized or pub-
licly subsidized. 
Direct job creation programs also have a training dimension in that
they provide knowledge and practice in basic workplace behaviors
such as punctuality, cleanliness, and cooperation. Practice in such
behaviors through community service employment can be valuable to
both new workforce entrants and to prevent deterioration of such estab-
lished skills among the long term unemployed (Cook, Adams, and
Rawlins 1985). 
When job seekers possess neither the occupational skills in
demand locally, nor the fundamental abilities required to acquire such
skills, often remedial training is appropriate—that is, general training
which seeks to remedy basic gaps in reading and mathematics skills to
make job seekers ready for skill training. It is common for such train-
ing to be provided through local school districts with funding from fed-
eral, state, and local sources. However, increasingly employers have
found it profitable to provide such training in classroom settings at the
job site (Hollenbeck 1993). 
In addition to occupational skill training, OJT, and remedial educa-
tion, short-term job readiness training may include what is sometimes
called “classroom soft skill training.” This includes knowledge about
workplace behavior skills or job search skills. Such training is often
publicly funded and available through arrangement with the public
employment service. 
A relatively recent form of publicly funded job training is called
postemployment training. It may combine classroom, laboratory, and
related activities which are directly linked to continued employment
and advancement in a specific job or occupational field. Such retention
and advancement efforts have become more prominent as welfare pol-
icy has become focused on employment as a means of economic self
sufficiency (Rangarajan, Schochet, and Chu 2002).
Publicly funded job training programs in the United States also
often provide supportive services for training participants. These
include help with child care, transportation, health care, and other per-
sonal matters, including counseling for domestic relations or substance
abuse.
Youth programs include basic skills training with a workplace con-
text and integrated with occupational skills testing, tutoring, and study
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skills training; alternative high school services; instruction leading to
high school completion or the equivalent; mentoring; limited intern-
ships in the private sector; training and education combined with com-
munity and youth service opportunities in public agencies, nonprofit
agencies and other appropriate agencies; entry-level employment expe-
rience; school-to-work transition services; school-to-postsecondary
transition services; school-to-apprenticeship transition services; preem-
ployment and work maturity skills training, and support services
(including limited needs based cash payments).
States also provide customized training to employers for their new
hires and incumbent workers. In 1999, 45 states had customized train-
ing programs, and the total spending on these programs in 1998–1999
was $593 million. Most of this training was funded from state general
revenue or from state taxes that were offset from the state unemploy-
ment insurance taxes (Ducha and Graves 1999). 
FEDERALLY FUNDED JOB TRAINING 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Federal lawmakers clearly expose ideologies when debating job
training policy. Some have asserted a responsibility to assist individu-
als who cannot support themselves, calling government assistance an
entitlement. Others contend that public assistance obliges the recipient
to work in exchange for government support. In the end, laws concern-
ing employment and training policy usually have been shaped from
input across the political spectrum, even during the few times that one
political party has controlled both the legislative and executive
branches of federal government. 
As a result of bipartisan negotiation, most federal employment and
training laws include provisions for program evaluation. Furthermore,
employment laws often have “sunset” provisions which terminate pro-
grams failing to demonstrate sufficient cost effectiveness.
Government action to promote employment in the United States
has always been prompted by crisis. The federal–state Unemployment
Insurance (UI) program was conceived in the widespread hardship
experienced from job loss during the Great Depression of the 1930s.
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Federal training policy also had its origin in depression era “New
Deal” programs for public works. Renewed training efforts thirty years
later were greatly influenced by new economic goals and the resulting
political struggles fought during President Johnson’s “War on Pov-
erty.” A summary of the four main postwar federal job training pro-
grams is provided in Table 1.2. 
Manpower Development and Training Act
The Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962
was marketed to the American public as an antipoverty program. With
MDTA, the federal government pursued a centralized and categorical
approach to eradicating poverty. Job training was targeted to the low
income and welfare recipient populations. Funds were available on a
formula basis to communities based on population and estimates of the
proportion below the poverty income level. 
The federal government managed MDTA funding through 12
regional offices of the U.S. Department of Labor, each of which super-
vised activity in between four and six states. Sometimes competing
agencies within localities bid against each other for federal funding by
submitting separate proposals to regional offices for review. Federal
grants often did not jibe with one another and occasionally were a
duplication of effort. The need for high-level coordination became
painfully obvious.
Sunset provisions ended the MDTA in 1969. Though some evalua-
tions had been done by that time, evidence about job training effective-
ness did not prevent reauthorization (Mangum 1968). The prime
reasons for the demise of MDTA were the administrative structure
whereby the authority of state and local political entities was circum-
vented with federal contracts going directly to local service providers,
and the duplication of service delivery at the local level. 
Job Corps
The Job Corps, a one-year residential program for disadvantaged
youth, was established in 1964 by the Economic Opportunity Act. It
provides remedial academic instruction, job training, and other support
services. It has remained largely unchanged over the years. 
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Table 1.2  A Chronology of Federal Job Training Programs in the United States
Program Training types Eligibility Intergovernmental relations
Manpower Development 
and Training Act 
(MDTA), 1962
Institutional and on-the-job 
training (OJT). 
Low income and welfare 
recipients.
Federal funding granted directly from 12 
regional offices to agencies in local areas.  




Training Act (CETA), 
1973
On-the-job training, classroom 
skill training, classroom soft 
skills training, work experience
in public agencies, and Public 
Service Employment (PSE).
Training was targeted to low 
income persons, welfare 
recipients, and disadvantaged 
youth.
Federal funding granted to prime sponsors 
in substate regions which numbered about 
470. Performance monitoring with results 
reported to the U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL).
Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPA), 1982
On-the-job training, Classroom 
skill training, Classroom soft 
skills training, and Work 
experience in public agencies.
Low income, public assistance 
recipients, dislocated workers, 
and disadvantaged youth.
Federal funding through state governors 
to private industry councils (PICs) in each 
of 640 service delivery areas. PIC 




On-the-job training, Customized 
classroom skill training, 
Classroom soft skills training, 
and Work experience in public 
agencies.
Access to core services like
job search skills and job referral
is unrestricted. Training is 
targeted to the most difficult
to reemploy.
Like JTPA, but PICs became fewer (600) 
workforce investment boards (WIBs) 
with private sector majority membership.  
Monitoring is reduced relative to JTPA 
practice. 
SOURCE: O’Leary and Straits (2004). 
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The first major evaluation of Job Corps was quasi-experimental
(Mallar et al. 1980). It found modest positive effects on employment
and weekly earnings but no impact on hourly wage rates. A recent
study was done as a classically designed field experiment. That study
found that Job Corps participation results in significant earnings gains
for disadvantaged youth. “Furthermore, earnings gains, educational
progress, and other positive changes were found across most groups of
participants and are expected to persist as they get older” (Burghardt et
al. 2001). Among training programs for youth, evaluation research
finds that the interventions most likely to work are intensive, costly,
and of relatively long duration.
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
The 1970s brought a more comprehensive approach to addressing
the problems of the economically disadvantaged. Decentralization
became the employment policy theme for the decade. It involved the
transfer of decision-making authority from the federal to state and local
governments. Authority as defined in the legislation and regulations
often included responsibility for designing, implementing, and evaluat-
ing program activities.
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of
1973 introduced the concept of a local advisory board to assure that
local public interest would guide program planning. The private indus-
try council membership and role were established in the regulations,
and in some localities representation was “guaranteed” for constituen-
cies like education and labor. CETA job training was targeted to the
economically disadvantaged, welfare recipients, and disadvantaged
youth. 
Three main findings emerged from 11 major CETA evaluations
(Leigh 1990, p. 11). First, there were no measurable employment or
earnings impacts for men; however, impacts for women were positive
and significant. Second, OJT training is usually more effective than
classroom training. Finally, the range of impact estimates was quite
wide, despite the fact that all analysts used the same CLMS reporting
data. However, it was journalists rather than economists who brought
the end to CETA. The pubic service employment component of CETA
became a target for national media criticism when careless manage-
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ment of funds and enrollment of program ineligibles were widely
reported.
Job Training Partnership Act
The arrival of the Reagan administration in 1981 came with a
“conservative challenge on the principles, policies, and programs of
the liberal tradition of federal activism in economic and social affairs
as it evolved in the half of the century starting with the New Deal”
(Palmer 1987, p. 9). A major objective of Reagan-era legislation was to
increase earnings and employment as well as decrease welfare depen-
dency. Classroom skill training was identified as a major weakness of
existing programs because it was often not the kind of training desired
by local employers. 
The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 limited training
choices to skills that were in demand by local employers. JTPA also
increased the private sector share of members on the advisory commit-
tees to ensure that their interests were taken into consideration. Evalua-
tion was an integral part of the program, which was said to be
performance-driven through a system of performance standards for
participant reemployment rates and earnings. Absent from JTPA was
anything remotely resembling public service employment. In response
to the widespread layoffs associated with economic restructuring in
American business during the 1980s, JTPA job training was targeted to
dislocated workers in addition to the economically disadvantaged and
welfare recipients. 
The performance standards system allowed governors receiving
federal JTPA training grants to structure incentive systems, thereby
simplifying relationships with substate areas. The performance moni-
toring system changed training program management and intergovern-
mental relations. It also complicated the net impact evaluation of
programs by introducing the risk of cream skimming in program
assignment. That is, program managers might select mainly the most
able applicants for participation. The result is high observed reemploy-
ment rates, although many of the selected program participants may
already possess the skills and abilities to get reemployed themselves. 
To assure an objective net impact evaluation, Congress authorized
a major national evaluation of JTPA based on methods of field experi-
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mentation with random assignment of subjects both to training and to
comparison groups in 16 sites across the country. Orr et al. (1996, p.
109) report that training to economically disadvantaged adults resulted
in 11 percent greater earnings for women and 6.7 percent greater earn-
ings for men. For both genders the earnings gains were mainly due to
increases in hours worked. There were positive net benefits to both
men and women, and the net benefit to society for both genders was
just over $500 per participant (Orr et al. 1996, p. 189). 
An evaluation of dislocated worker programs was initiated during
the 1990s but was cancelled in anticipation of substantial program
changes resulting from implementation of a new dislocated worker
program under the Workforce Investment Act. An evaluation of the
new dislocated worker program is now needed.
Our focus on the main job training programs for economically dis-
advantaged and dislocated workers should not obscure the fact that the
number of federal job training programs had proliferated to the point
that by the early 1990s there were 163 distinct programs receiving
funding (U.S. General Accounting Office 1994). While the great
majority of these were small and targeted, including, for example, a
variety of distinct programs for separate native American groups, the
overlapping management burdens from the large number were seen as
a problem. Funding streams for job training of particular target groups
sometimes originated in two or more executive departments.
During 1999, which was the final year of JTPA authorization, there
were 40 major employment and training programs funded by seven
executive departments of the federal government (U.S. General
Accounting Office 2000). Two-thirds of the total funding went to just
six programs, three of which were JTPA dislocated workers, JTPA
summer youth, and Job Corps. 
Workforce Investment Act
By the late 1990s, economic conditions had improved to the point
where full employment existed in most of the United States. The more
than 30 years of searching for ways to reduce poverty through employ-
ment policy evolved into a new approach that shifts responsibility from
government to the individual, and divests authority from the federal
government to the states. It exchanges an emphasis on skill training as
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a path to economic security for an emphasis on job placement leading
to self-sufficiency and a reduced dependence on public assistance pay-
ment.
Two pieces of legislation signed into law by President Clinton, the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of
1996 and then the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, illustrate
the intended change in federal human resources policy towards self
sufficiency and local control. 
PRWORA reformed the nation’s welfare laws. A new system of
block grants from the federal government to the states named Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) was created, changing the
nature and provision of welfare benefits in America. A key feature of
the new law was a five-year lifetime time limit on cash assistance. 
WIA, signed into law on August 7, 1998, includes many of the
political characteristics that are in the PRWORA. It reforms federal job
training programs and creates a new comprehensive workforce invest-
ment system. The reformed system is intended to be customer focused,
to help individuals access the tools they need to manage their careers
through information and high-quality services, and to help employers
find skilled workers. 
Key innovations brought by WIA are 1) one-stop career centers
where all employment and training programs are assembled in one
physical location; 2) individual training accounts which act as vouch-
ers for job seekers requiring skills improvement for labor market suc-
cess; 3) universal access to core employment services with sequential,
more restricted access to intensive services and training; and 4)
accountability monitored through performance indicators. 
JOB TRAINING EXPENDITURES AND PARTICIPANTS
While WIA offers broadened eligibility for core employment ser-
vices, job training remains targeted to economically disadvantaged and
dislocated workers. The mix of funding types supported during fiscal
year 2001, which was the first full year of WIA operation, is summa-
rized in Table 1.3. Expenditure estimates indicate that a total of nearly
$68 billion was spent on job training during fiscal year 2001. Of this,
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Adult and dislocated 
worker activities
2,540,040 39.6
Youth activities 1,377,965 21.5
Job Corps (youth) 1,399,148 21.8




TAA training 94,400 1.5
NAFTA training 37,150 0.6
CSE for older 
Americans 
440,200 6.9
Total funding 6,421,553 100.0 276,621 593,191 60,700,000 67,991,365
Percentage of grand 
total of funding
9.4 0.4 0.9 89.3 100.0
NOTE: WIA: Workforce Investment Act; TAA: Trade Adjustment Assistance; NAFTA: North American Free Trade Act; CSE: Commu-
nity service employment.
SOURCE: Wandner, Balducchi, and Spickard (2001).
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89.3 percent was privately financed by American employers, 9.4 per-
cent by the federal government, and 1.3 percent by state governments. 
International comparative statistics from the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) set the total federal
expenditures on job training programs in the year 2000 at 0.04 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP). As shown in Table 1.4 this level
places the United States in the bottom 20 percent of OECD member
nations in terms of government spending on job training. Among the
top five spending national governments in 2000, only Germany is
among the world’s leading industrial nations. Public spending on job
training in Japan and the United Kingdom closely matches that of the
United States. 
Considering spending on all active labor market programs
(ALMPs) in 2000—which include the public employment service,
wage subsidies, and programs for the disabled and youth—federal job
training expenditures amount to 26.7 percent of spending on ALMPs in
the United States. Within the broader category of expenditures on all
U.S. labor market programs (LMPs)—which for the United States adds
UI benefit payments to ALMPs—job training amounted to 10.5 per-
cent of all labor market programs in 2000. So while the United States
ranks low among OECD countries in public job training expenditures
as a share of GDP, among government labor market programs job train-
ing is a relatively important activity in the United States compared to
other countries.1 
Among the fiscal year 2001 federal spending on job training, Table
1.3 shows that 39.6 percent went to adult disadvantaged and dislocated
workers, 43.3 percent to youth programs (Job Corps and others), 6.9
percent to community service employment for older workers, and 2.1
percent to workers impacted by changing patterns of international
trade. 
Background characteristics for participants in the three main feder-
ally funded employment and training programs are summarized in
Table 1.5. Among 113,774 adult participants (JTPA Title II-A) who
received more than just assessment in program year 1999, most were
female (65 percent), most had at least completed high school (78 per-
cent), the ethnic make-up included 35 percent black and 16 percent
Hispanic, disabled amounted to 7 percent, 26 percent were on public
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Table 1.4 Government Expenditures on Job Training as a Percentage of 
GDP in OECD Countries, 2000
As a percentage of 
GDP
Training as a percentage 
of spending on
Country Training ALMPs LMPs ALMPs LMPs
Denmark 0.84 1.55 4.51 54.2 18.6
Finland 0.35 1.07 3.29 32.7 10.6
Germany 0.34 1.23 3.12 27.6 10.9
Sweden 0.31 1.38 2.72 22.5 11.4
Netherlands 0.30 1.57 3.65 19.1 8.2
Portugal** 0.30 0.51 1.34 58.8 22.4
Spain 0.29 0.84 2.18 34.5 13.3
France 0.28 1.36 3.12 20.6 9.0
Belgium* 0.25 1.36 3.70 18.4 6.8
New Zealand 0.18 0.55 2.17 32.7 8.3
Austria 0.17 0.49 1.58 34.7 10.8
Canada 0.17 0.51 1.49 33.3 11.4
Greece** 0.17 0.35 0.83 48.6 20.5
Italy* 0.12 0.63 1.28 19.1 9.4
Korea 0.09 0.46 0.55 19.6 16.4
Switzerland 0.09 0.48 1.05 18.8 8.6
Norway 0.08 0.77 1.16 10.4 6.9
Hungary 0.07 0.40 0.88 17.5 8.0
United Kingdom 0.05 0.36 0.94 13.9 5.3
Mexico* 0.04 0.08 0.08 50.0 50.0
United States 0.04 0.15 0.38 26.7 10.5
Japan 0.03 0.28 0.82 10.7 3.7
Australia 0.02 0.45 1.50 4.4 1.3
Czech Republic 0.02 0.22 0.52 9.1 3.9
Poland 0.01 0.15 0.96 6.7 1.0
NOTE: *1999; **1998. Where GDP is gross domestic product, ALMP is active labor
market programs, and LMP is labor market programs. No data available for OECD
countries: Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, and Turkey.
SOURCE: OECD (2001).
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Number of program participants 113,774 58,548 189,794
Female (%) 65 58 54
Aged 14–15 (%) 7
Aged 16–21 (%) 93
Aged 22–54 (%) 97 89
Over 55 (%) 3 11
Less than high school (%) 22 71 11
High school (%) 56 26 50
Post high school (%) 22 3 39
Black (%) 35 34 19
Hispanic origin (%) 16 23 13
White (%) 43 38 62
Disabled individual (%) 7 12 2
Welfare recipient (%) 26 19 2
Ex-offender (%) 18 13 5
UI recipient (%) 10 1 69
UI exhaustee (%) 3 1 5
Veteran (%) 6 11
Outcomes
Entered employment rate (%) 68 47 69
Average hourly wage ($) 8.75 7.07 11.95
SOURCE: Social Policy Research Associates (2001). 
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welfare assistance, 10 percent were UI recipients, and 6 percent were
military veterans. 
Among 58,548 youth participants (JTPA Title II-C) who received
more than just assessment in PY 1999, a majority were female (58 per-
cent), some (7 percent) were very young workers (aged 14 to 15), most
had not yet completed high school (71 percent), the ethnic make-up
included 34 percent black and 23 percent Hispanic, disabled amounted
to 12 percent, 19 percent were on public welfare assistance, and only 1
percent qualified to be UI recipients. 
The JTPA program provided more than just assessment to 189,794
dislocated workers in PY 1999. Of these, a slight majority were female
(54 percent), the great majority (89 percent) were prime-aged workers,
a sizeable proportion (39 percent) had education beyond high school
completion, the ethnic make-up included 19 percent black and 13 per-
cent Hispanic, disabled amounted to 2 percent, only 2 percent were on
public welfare assistance, and 69 percent were UI recipients. 
The bottom of Table 1.5 provides some gross outcome information
for participants in the three major JTPA-funded programs. Entered
employment was 68 and 69 percent for the adult and dislocated worker
programs, respectively, while it was 47 percent for the youth program.
For youth, sizeable proportions also achieved an employment enhance-
ment or competency which JTPA also regards as success. Among those
entering employment at program exit, hourly earnings rates were esti-
mated to be $8.75, $7.07, and $11.95 for adult, youth, and dislocated
workers, respectively. 
PROLOGUE
This introductory chapter has provided background for the exami-
nation of public job training policy in the United States. A review of evi-
dence from evaluation studies of prior job training programs in the next
two chapters completes setting the context for a consideration of current
and future job training programs. The subsequent three chapters of this
book address issues critical to implementation of the new job training
strategy established by WIA. This is followed by an examination of the
private sector role in job training which involves mainly employed, or
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incumbent, workers. An international comparison of public efforts in
job training rounds out the exposition. We then offer speculation about
future directions for public job training in the United States.
Evaluation of job training in the United States has involved both
monitoring gross outcomes through performance management systems,
and estimation of net program impacts through comparison group
designs. In Chapter 2, “Performance Management of U.S. Job Training
Programs,” Burt Barnow and Jeff Smith review the development, use,
and incentive effects of performance monitoring under CETA and JTPA,
and they speculate on the practicality and value of the new approach
being tried under WIA. They offer suggestions on ways to improve the
implementation and use of performance management systems. 
Chris King in Chapter 3 reviews a vast literature on evaluation of
federally funded job training programs in the United States, and
identifies the population groups and economic contexts where
particular types of job training have been most effective. 
WIA operations began in most states on the officially designated
starting date of July 1, 2000. Ron D’Amico and Jeffrey Salzman pro-
vide an overview of the experience to date in Chapter 4, “Implementa-
tion Issues in Delivering Training Services to Adults under WIA.” 
A core theme of WIA is the market orientation of job training
selection which involves disclosure by training providers on service
effectiveness and informed choice among alternative training services
by participants. Janet Javar and Steve Wandner examine mechanisms
for screening and certifying job training institutions and other labor
market intermediaries in Chapter 5, “The Use of Service Providers and
Brokers/Consultants in Employment and Training Programs.” 
Expression of individual choice in job training selection is facili-
tated under WIA by the use of job training vouchers. However, the job
training market is not laissez faire. Vouchers are government funded
and customer choice is bounded by information on occupational job
demand and job training provider quality. Using information from a
classically designed field experiment, Paul Decker and Irma Perez-
Johnson in Chapter 6 examine “Individual Training Accounts and Eli-
gible Provider Lists” under WIA.
The focus of this book is on government-funded job training pro-
grams. However, American employers spend nine dollars on job train-
ing for every dollar spent by government agencies. Robert Lerman,
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Signe-Mary McKernan, and Stephanie Riegg balance our investigation
with Chapter 7, “The Scope of Employer-Provided Training in the
United States: Who, What, Where, and How Much?” Their summary
aims to identify areas where public expenditure may fruitfully supple-
ment employer-provided job training.
In Chapter 8, “International Experience with Job Training,” Lori
Kletzer and William Koch view American job training policies in a
broader context. They examine U.S. policy and experience compared
with that in selected developed and developing nations. In the conclud-
ing chapter, we, the editors of this book, speculate on “Public Job
Training: Experience and Prospects” based on the job training experi-
ence and trends in the United States and other countries.
Notes
Opinions expressed are those of neither the W.E. Upjohn Institute nor the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor, but are those of the authors. Errors and omissions are also ours.
1. These comparisons abstract from the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) paid to
low-income workers with dependent children in the United States. In recent years
the EITC, which is essentially a targeted wage subsidy, totaled about $30 billion
or roughly equal to the total expenditures for LMPs listed in the text.
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This chapter reviews the effects of performance management sys-
tems in federally sponsored employment and training programs. We
focus on programs for the disadvantaged because they have the longest
history, but the lessons generalize to other programs. We find in our
survey that most of the evidence on the effects of performance systems
relates to their failure to motivate behavior in the direction of increas-
ing the mean impact of program participation, and their success at
inducing cream skimming and strategic responses on the part of pro-
gram operators. At the same time, little or nothing is known about the
effects of performance systems on assignment to service types or on
the technical efficiency of program operation. We recommend further
research to fill in gaps in our knowledge as well as policy changes to
reflect the knowledge we already have.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section
lays out the theory behind performance management systems in gov-
ernment programs. The third section provides the historical background
on the use of performance management in U.S. employment and train-
ing programs, followed in the fourth section by a discussion of the
available evidence on incentive effects in employment and training pro-
grams. The final section provides conclusions and recommendations.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Here we explore why an incentive-based system might be useful in
employment and training programs, and why existing performance
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management systems take the form they do. We draw primarily upon
research on the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). The JTPA pro-
gram was the primary federal training program for the disadvantaged
from 1982 through 1998, at which time the Workforce Investment Act
(WIA) program replaced it.1 
The Purpose of Performance Management Systems
Consider the JTPA program (the same issues arise in WIA). This
program involved the federal, state, and local levels of government.
The federal government funded the program and set its broad outlines.
Administration was partly devolved to the state level, and operation
was primarily the responsibility of local entities. The key problem with
such an arrangement is that the state and local governments, and their
contractors, may have goals different from those of the federal govern-
ment. In the language of economics, such multilevel programs involve
a principal–agent problem in which the federal government (the princi-
pal) tries to get its agents (state and local governments and their con-
tractors in JTPA and WIA) to further its program goals.2 See
Prendergast (1999) and Dixit (2002) for theoretical discussions of prin-
cipal–agent problems.
A first step in solving principal–agent problems is for the principal
to define its goals. As Dixit (2002) points out, ascertaining the goals of
federal programs is not always a simple matter, and even when they are
clear, there are often multiple, partially conflicting goals representing
the aims of different stakeholders. In the case of JTPA, Section 141 of
the statute states that opportunities for training are to be provided to
“those who can benefit from, and are most in need of, such opportuni-
ties.” Furthermore, the statute states in Section 106, which describes
the program’s performance management system, that training should
be considered an investment and that “it is essential that criteria for
measuring the return on this investment be developed and . . . the basic
measures of performance for adult training programs under Title II are
the increases in employment and earnings and the reductions in welfare
dependency resulting from the participation in the program.” 
The statute clearly indicates both equity (serving the hard-to-serve)
and efficiency (maximizing the net gain) goals for the program. As we
discuss below, these goals may or may not conflict in practice. For the
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moment, take them as given and consider the question of how the fed-
eral government gets the state and local players in JTPA to further its
goals. Under JTPA, the federal money for the program was first distrib-
uted to the states by formula and then further distributed to local areas
known as “service delivery areas” (SDAs).3 The SDAs then selected
from one or more of the following options: 1) delivering services them-
selves, 2) contracting with for-profit organizations, 3) contracting with
nonprofit organizations, typically community colleges or community-
based organizations, and 4) making individual referrals to for-profit or
nonprofit organizations.
States, SDAs, and the for-profit and nonprofit service providers
under contract to the SDAs may each have goals that differ in whole or
in part from those of the federal government. States may wish to pro-
mote use of their community college systems, or economic develop-
ment in specific regions. Local governments may reduce the training
given to each participant below the optimal amount in order to provide
services to a larger number of participants (voters), or they may allo-
cate funds to activities based on popularity with voters rather than
based on the present value of the earnings gains.4 For-profit vendors
want to maximize profits, so they will follow the incentives implicit in
a performance standards system, whether or not those incentives pro-
mote program goals. Nonprofit vendors may emphasize service to par-
ticular ethnic, religious, or target groups. They may also emphasize
service to “hard to serve” clients.
The JTPA performance standards system sought, and the similar
system under WIA seeks, to provide incentives for the lower level
actors in the system to do the bidding of the federal government,
instead of pursuing their own objectives. The system did so by setting
out concrete performance measures related (it was hoped) to program
goals, and by providing budgetary rewards to SDAs based on their
measured performance.
Why Performance Systems Take the Forms They Do
A performance management system requires measures of perfor-
mance, standards that indicate acceptable performance, and rewards
and sanctions (which need not be monetary) for organizations that
exceed or fail to meet the standards. Performance-based contracting is
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a system where the vendor receives some or all of its compensation
based on achieving certain performance goals. Both approaches
attempt to align the interests of the agents with those of the principal,
and performance-based contracting may be thought of as a special case
of performance management.
Ideally, and in some cases in practice, the performance incentive
system directly measures and rewards the government’s goals. In our
context, that means measuring and rewarding earnings impacts and ser-
vice to the hard-to-serve. The latter is relatively straightforward, as it
requires only measuring the characteristics of program participants.
The former, however, is not straightforward. As is well known, mea-
suring earnings impacts is not a trivial task because of the difficulty of
estimating what labor market outcomes participants would have expe-
rienced, had they not participated.5 Social experiments, the preferred
way to estimate impacts, are expensive and time consuming, while
nonexperimental methods are controversial. Moreover, as shown in
Heckman and Smith (1999), because of “Ashenfelter’s (1978) dip,” the
observed phenomenon that the mean earnings of participants in
employment and training programs decline in the period prior to partic-
ipation, before-after estimates will not be a reliable guide to program
impacts. Instead, a comparison group of nonparticipants must be uti-
lized, an undertaking likely to greatly increase the cost of the system.
Furthermore, the real goal is long-run earnings impacts, but wait-
ing around for the long run makes little sense in administrative terms.
For administrative purposes, quick feedback is required, so that agents
perceive a clear link between their actions and the rewards and punish-
ments they receive under the incentive system (see Blalock and Bar-
now 2001). 
The difficulty in measuring program impacts, and the desire for
quick response, leaves the federal government with three alternatives
as it tries to get states and local agencies to advance its goals for the
program. First, it can use fixed-price contracts. This leaves local gov-
ernments, for-profit vendors, and nonprofit vendors to use the money
they receive to pursue their own agendas, subject to regulatory restric-
tions, such as program eligibility rules, and to professional norms. Sec-
ond, the government can use cost-based reimbursement schemes.
However, it is well documented in the health literature that such an
approach can lead to overuse of resources, which is another way of
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saying that impacts net of costs will not be maximized and, therefore,
the government’s goals will not be served. Finally, the federal govern-
ment can adopt a system of performance incentives based on short-
term outcome levels, rather than on long-term program impacts. As we
discuss in detail below, such a system provides training centers and ser-
vice providers, regardless of type, with many perverse incentives, so
that even a for-profit vendor with no agenda of its own may not end up
pursuing the government’s goals. 
Despite these potential problems, JTPA and WIA make the third
choice and reward short-term outcome levels. In the usual notation, the
JTPA and WIA systems reward based on short-term values of Y1, the
labor market outcome levels achieved by participants.6 In contrast, the
program’s goal is the maximization of long-term values of ∆ = Y1 –Y0,
where Y0 is the counterfactual labor market outcome participants would
experience if they did not participate, and as a result, ∆ is the impact of
participation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Performance management in employment and training programs
began during the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) period in the 1970s. It was formally incorporated into JTPA in
the early 1980s. Unlike many of the performance management systems
established in the wake of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA), the JTPA system was designed primarily by
economists who wanted to maximize the employment and earnings
gains of participants. Most of the other systems devised in response to
GPRA focus on management issues rather than on program impacts. 
The JTPA program included a performance management system
that provided rankings of the local SDAs. There were about 620 SDAs
in the program, each with a geographic monopoly. Six percent of the
JTPA budget was set aside for two purposes: 1) for performance
awards to SDAs that performed well relative to performance standards
based on the labor market outcome levels (not impacts) achieved by
their participants in a given program year, and 2) for technical assis-
tance for SDAs that failed to meet their performance standards.7 
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The JTPA performance standards system evolved considerably
over its life from 1982 to 2000, when WIA replaced JTPA.8 The short
but controversial history of the JTPA performance standards system
illustrates how successive attempts to develop an effective system led
to new reforms, which in turn led to new concerns.9 
Originally, JTPA had four performance measures for Title II-A: the
entered employment rate, average wage at placement, cost per entered
employment, and the entered employment rate for welfare recipients.10
Although the statute called for measures to use gains in employment
and earnings from before the program, the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) believed (incorrectly) that virtually all participants were
unemployed prior to entry, so that the postprogram outcomes would
represent before-after changes. Although the statute also called for
postprogram measures, it was widely believed that postprogram stan-
dards should only be implemented after data were collected for several
years to allow the setting of appropriate standards. 
A desire to hold local programs harmless for variations in local
economic conditions and the characteristics of their participants, com-
bined with the fact that the people responsible for developing the sys-
tem were mostly economists, led to the use of regression models to
adjust the level of satisfactory performance for differences in local con-
ditions and participant characteristics.11 To implement these models,
the system included the collection of data on participant characteristics
and local economic conditions.
Governors had a great deal of discretion in the JTPA system. They
could use the national standards without making any adjustments, they
could use the USDOL regression model for their SDAs, they could use
the regression model and make further adjustments to take account of
unique features in their states, and they could develop their own adjust-
ment procedures. Governors also could decide how to weight the vari-
ous measures and could (and did) add additional measures. They also
determined the “award function” that mapped SDA performance into
budgetary rewards. These functions varied widely among states at a
point in time and over time within states; see Courty and Marschke
(2003) for a detailed description.
When 13-week postprogram employment and earnings data
became available, four additional standards were added in program
year (PY) 1988.12 At this point, the employment and training commu-
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nity felt that there were too many performance measures, so as of PY
1990 all the measures at the time of termination were dropped and
effectively replaced by the four measures based on the 13-week follow-
up data. Another important development for PY 1990 was that the cost
standard was dropped. This was done because it was widely believed
(especially by providers of expensive long-term classroom training)
that the cost standard was leading SDAs to focus too much on “quick
fix” job search activities.13 Although most states used the USDOL
regression model to adjust the standards for local economic conditions
and the characteristics of participants, some states did not do so. To
encourage them to do so, USDOL required states not using its model to
use an alternative adjustment procedure that met criteria set out by
USDOL.
When WIA became operational in July 2000, the performance
management system was modified in several significant ways.14 Stan-
dards are now set for states as well as local areas, and the standards are
“negotiated” rather than set by a regression model.15 No automatic
adjustments are made to take account of economic conditions or partic-
ipant characteristics, but states may petition to the USDOL if circum-
stances have changed. The lack of a regression adjustment model is not
based on statutory language. Indeed, while not requiring the use of a
regression model, the statute states that the state-level standards are
supposed to be set “taking into account factors including differences in
economic conditions, the characteristics of participants when the par-
ticipants entered the program, and the services to be provided.” Like
JTPA, WIA called for the use of before–after earnings change perfor-
mance measures, although under JTPA this requirement was ignored
and the earnings performance measures were based on levels of post-
program earnings.16
There are a total of 17 core performance measures for WIA. For
adults, dislocated workers, and youth ages 19–21, the core measures
are defined as
• the entered employment rate,
• retention in employment six months after entry into employment, 
• the earnings change from the six months prior to entry to the six
months after exit, and
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• the obtained credential rate for participants who enter unsubsi-
dized employment or, in the case of older youth, enter postsec-
ondary education, advanced training, or unsubsidized
employment.
For youth between the ages of 14 and 18, the core performance mea-
sures are
• attainment of basic skills and, as appropriate, work readiness or
occupational skills,
• attainment of a high school diploma or its equivalent, and
• placement and retention in postsecondary education and training,
employment, or military service.
Finally, there are customer satisfaction measures for both participants
and employers.
The changes to the performance management system from JTPA to
WIA were significant, so we discussed the rationale for the changes
with individuals involved in the process.17 The WIA legislation did not
require dropping the model-based performance management system
used under JTPA, so the switch was based on preferences rather than
necessity.  Indeed, a workgroup of practitioners established to advise
the Employment and Training Administration (ETA) recommended
that a model-based system be retained.
There were several reasons for substituting a negotiated standards
system for a model-based system.  First, ETA wanted to signal that
WIA was going to be different from JTPA, so change was considered
good in its own right. Second, the group charged with developing the
performance management system felt that under JTPA, the system was
“looking back,” and they believed that a negotiated standards system
was prospective in nature rather than retrospective. Finally, a model-
based system, by definition, requires that data for the regression mod-
els be collected.  States indicated to ETA that they found the JTPA data
collection requirements to be onerous, and they urged that the data col-
lection be reduced under WIA.  Although this would not require aban-
donment of a model-based system, it would support such a decision. 
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EVIDENCE ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE EFFECTS
In this section, we examine the literature on the effects of perfor-
mance incentives on the behavior of local training centers—e.g., SDAs
in JTPA and workforce investment boards (WIBs) in WIA—that pro-
vide employment and training services to the disadvantaged. We divide
the possible effects into five categories, and then consider the evidence
from the literature on each category in turn. The five categories flow
out of (in part) the theoretical model presented in Heckman, Heinrich,
and Smith (2002).
The first type of response consists of changes in the set of persons
served. Performance incentives may induce programs to serve persons
who will increase their likelihood of doing well relative to the out-
comes measured by the incentives, rather than serving, say, the hard-to-
serve. The second type of response consists of changes in the types of
services provided conditional on who is served. Here the incentives
may lead to changes that will maximize the short-term outcomes, such
as employment at termination from the program (or shortly thereafter),
emphasized in incentive systems, rather than long-term earnings gains.
The third type of response consists of changes in the (technical) effi-
ciency of service provision conditional on who is served and what ser-
vices they receive. We have in mind here both the effect of incentives
on on-the-job leisure, as well as their effects on the effort devoted to
the design of office procedures and the like. The fourth type of
response pertains to subcontracting. Training programs may change the
set of providers they contract with, and may pass along (perhaps in
modified form) their performance incentives to their providers. The lat-
ter will, in turn, affect the actions of those providers. Finally, the fifth
type of response consists of gaming, whereby training centers take
actions to affect their measured performance that do not affect their
actual performance, other than indirect effects due to the diversion of
time and resources. 
In the remainder of this section, we summarize what is known
from the employment and training literature about each of these
responses. Much of the available evidence comes from a major experi-
mental evaluation of the JTPA program funded by USDOL and con-
ducted in the late 1980s. This evaluation, called the National JTPA
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Study, took place at a nonrandom sample of 16 JTPA SDAs around the
United States. The evaluation included both adult programs and out-of-
school youth programs. See Orr et al. (1996) for a full description of
the study as well as experimental impact estimates.
Effects of Incentives on Who Gets Served
The majority of the employment and training literature on perfor-
mance incentives addresses the question of their effects on who gets
served. Under JTPA, SDAs had strong incentives to serve persons
likely to have good labor market outcomes, regardless of whether those
outcomes were due to JTPA. Similar incentives, with a minor excep-
tion in the form of the before-after performance measure, guide the
WIA program. In fact, the absence of a regression model to adjust stan-
dards for serving individuals with labor market barriers should make
these incentives stronger under WIA than they were under JTPA. 
The literature divides this issue into two parts. First, do SDAs
(WIBs under WIA) respond to these incentives by differentially serv-
ing persons likely to have good outcomes, whether or not those good
outcomes result from the effects of the program? This is the literature
on “cream skimming.” Second, if there is cream skimming, what are its
efficiency effects? Taking the best among the eligible could be efficient
if the types of services offered by these programs have their largest net
impacts for this group. In what follows, we review the literature on
each of these two questions.
Do employment and training programs “cream skim”?
A handful of papers about the JTPA program examine whether or
not program staff cream skim in response to the incentives provided to
do so by the JTPA performance system. The key issue in this literature
is the counterfactual: to what group of nonparticipants should the par-
ticipants be compared in order to determine whether or not cream
skimming has occurred? In all cases, because the performance out-
come—some variant of Y1 in our notation—cannot be observed for the
nonparticipants, the studies proceed by comparing observable charac-
teristics correlated with Y1, such as education levels or participation in
transfer programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). A find-
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ing that participants have “better” characteristics in the form of higher
mean years of schooling or lower average preprogram transfer receipt
is interpreted as evidence of cream skimming.
Anderson et al. (1992) and Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond
(1993) compare the characteristics of JTPA enrollees in Tennessee in
1987 with the characteristics of a sample of JTPA eligibles in the same
state constructed from the Current Population Survey. The literature
suggests that less than 5 percent of the eligible population participated
in JTPA in each year (see the discussion in Heckman and Smith 1999),
which allows wide scope for cream skimming. Both papers find mod-
est evidence of cream skimming. In particular, Anderson, Burkhauser,
and Raymond’s (1993) bivariate probit analysis of program participa-
tion and postprogram job placement suggests that if eligible persons
participated at random, the placement rate would have been 61.6 per-
cent rather than 70.7 percent, a fall of 9.1 percentage points.
The problem with the Anderson et al. (1992) and Anderson,
Burkhauser, and Raymond (1993) papers is that they potentially conflate
participant self-selection with cream skimming by program officials. As
documented in Devine and Heckman (1996), the JTPA program eligi-
bility rules cast a wide net. The eligible population included both many
stably employed working poor persons and persons who were out of the
labor force. Both groups had little reason to participate in JTPA.
Heckman and Smith (2004) address the issue of self-selection ver-
sus selection by program staff using data from the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) on JTPA eligibles combined with
data from the National JTPA Study. They break the participation pro-
cess for JTPA into a series of stages—eligibility, awareness, applica-
tion and acceptance, and participation—and look at the observed
determinants of going from each stage to the next. They find that some
differences between program eligibles and participants result primarily
from self-selection at stages of the participation process, such as
awareness, over which program staff have little or no control. For
example, for persons with fewer than 10 years of schooling, lack of
awareness plays a critical role in deterring participation, although this
group is differentially less likely to make all four transitions in the par-
ticipation process than are persons with more years of schooling. The
evidence in Heckman and Smith (forthcoming) suggests that while
cream skimming may be empirically relevant, comparing the eligible
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population as a whole to participants likely overstates its extent, and
misses a lot of substantive and policy-relevant detail.
The paper by Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) presents a con-
trasting view. They use data from the Corpus Christi, Texas SDA, the
only SDA in the National JTPA Study for which reliable data on all
program applicants are available for the period during the experiment.
In their empirical work, they examine whether those applicants who
reach random assignment (i.e., those who were selected to participate
in the program) differ from those who do not in terms of both predicted
outcome levels (earnings in the 18 months after random assignment)
and predicted program impacts (projected into the future and dis-
counted). Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) argue that it is this stage
over which program staff have the greatest control, although even here
applicants may wander off if they find employment elsewhere, get in
trouble with the law, and so on. The authors find strong evidence of
negative selection on levels combined with weak evidence for positive
selection on impacts. They attribute the former to a strong “social
worker mentality” toward helping the hard-to-serve among the eligible
that was evident in interactions with program staff at the Corpus
Christi site.
The WIA program offers an interesting contrast to JTPA because
the WIA performance standards are not adjusted by a regression model
and therefore do not hold programs harmless for the characteristics of
their participants. Because programs now have stronger incentives to
enroll individuals with few barriers to employment, we would expect
to observe enrollment shift toward this group. A recent internal
USDOL (2002) study finds that this is precisely what appears to be
occurring, at least in the area scrutinized:
A brief survey of States by our Chicago Regional Office indicated
that WIA registrations were occurring at only half the level of
enrollment achieved by JTPA. While some of this may be due to
start up issues, there are indications that the reduced registration
levels are due to a reluctance in local areas to officially register
people in WIA because of concerns about their ability to meet per-
formance goals, especially the “earnings gain” measure. It appears
that local areas in these States are selective in whom they will be
accountable for. Some local areas are basing their decisions to
Oleary training.book  Page 32  Friday, September 17, 2004  8:56 AM
Performance Management of U.S. Job Training Programs 33
register a person on the likelihood of success, rather than on an
individual’s need for services. (p. 9)
Overall, the literature provides modest evidence that program staff
responded to the incentives provided by the JTPA performance stan-
dards system to choose participants likely to improve their measured
performance whether or not they benefited from program services. At
the same time, the evidence from the Corpus Christi SDA indicates that
staff concerns about serving the hard-to-serve could trump the perfor-
mance incentives in some contexts.18
What are the efficiency implications of cream skimming?
A number of studies have examined the efficiency implications of
cream skimming by estimating the correlation between performance
measures and program impacts. In terms of the usual notation, they
estimate the relationship between Y1, the outcome conditional on par-
ticipation, and ∆ = Y1 – Y0, the impact of participation. If this relation-
ship is positive, so that higher outcome levels predict higher impacts,
then cream skimming is efficient because it implies serving those with
the higher impacts. In contrast, if this relationship is negative, then
cream skimming is inefficient because services are provided to those
who benefit less from them than those who would be served in the
absence of the incentive system.
Table 2.1 summarizes the evidence from the seven studies that
comprise this literature.19 The seven papers examine a variety of differ-
ent programs, ranging from the Manpower Development and Training
Act of the 1960s to the Job Corps program of today. Most rely on
experimental data for their impact estimates. With one exception, Zor-
nitsky et al. (1988), the findings are negative or mixed regarding the
relationship between outcome-based performance measures of the type
typically used in employment and training programs and program
impacts. The Zornitsky findings refer to a program, the AFDC Home-
maker Home Health Aide Demonstration, which differs from programs
such as JTPA and WIA in that it provided a homogeneous treatment to
a relatively homogeneous population. Taken together, the literature
summarized in Table 2.1 clearly indicates that, in the context of
employment and training programs, commonly used performance mea-
sures do not improve program efficiency by inducing service to those
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Study Program  Data 
 Measure of 
impact  Impact estimator 
Performance 
measures  Findings




















1968 to June 1970 
and matched (on 




sample of eligible 
nonparticipants.
Impact on social 
security earnings 
in 1973 (from 18 










to one quarter 
after) changes in 
weeks worked, 
weeks not in
the labor force, 





and amount of 
public assistance 
received. 
No measure has a 
consistent, positive and 
statistically significant 
relationship to 
estimated impact across 
subgroups and 
programs.  The before-
after measures, 
particularly weeks 
worked and wages, do 
much better than 
employment in the 
quarter after the 
program.
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histories and local 
labor markets. 
All measures have the 
correct sign on their 
correlation with 
earnings impacts, 
whether adjusted or not.  
The employment and 
earnings measures are 
all statistically 
significant (or close to 
it).  The welfare 
measures are correctly 
correlated with welfare 
impacts but the 
employment measures 
are not unless adjusted.  
The measures at three 
and six months do 
better than those at 
termination, but there is 
little gain from going 
from three to six.
(continued)
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Study Program  Data 
 Measure of 
impact  Impact estimator 
Performance 
measures  Findings
Friedlander (1988) Mandatory 
welfare-to-work 
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quarters 2 and 3 
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quarters 4 to 6 




in quarter 3 
(short-term) or 
quarter 6 (long-
term) after random  
assignment.
Employment measure is 
positively correlated 
with earnings gains but 
not welfare savings for 
most programs.  
Welfare indicator is 
always positively 
correlated with earnings 
impacts, but rarely 
significantly so.  It is 
not related to welfare 
savings.  Long-term 
performance measures 
do little better (and 
sometimes worse) than 
short-term measures.
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Study Program  Data 
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who will benefit most. Moreover, the findings indicate that cream
skimming likely has neither much of an efficiency benefit nor much of
an efficiency cost.
Effects of Incentives on Services Provided
Marschke (2002) is the only paper we know of that has examined
the effects of performance incentives on the types of services offered in
an employment and training program, holding constant the characteris-
tics of persons served. Marschke’s novel analysis uses the variation in
performance incentives facing the SDAs in the National JTPA Study to
identify the effects of performance incentives on the types of services
received by JTPA participants. This variation includes both time-series
variation within states and cross-sectional variation across states dur-
ing the period of the study. For each member of the experimental treat-
ment group, Marschke estimates a predicted outcome on each
performance measure. These are then entered into a service type choice
model along with other factors, such as predicted impacts from each
service type and measures of whether or not the participant is “hard to
serve.” Both the predicted impacts and the hard-to-serve measures are
intended to capture any caseworker efforts to act in the interest of the
participants (and the long-suffering taxpayer) or to follow their hearts
by providing the most expensive services to the worst off.
Marschke (2002) finds evidence that changes in the performance
measures employed in JTPA led SDAs to alter the mix of services pro-
vided in ways that would improve their performance relative to the
altered incentives they faced. In some cases, these changes led to
increases in efficiency, but in others they did not. Marschke (2002)
interprets his evidence as indicating that SDAs’ service choices are
responsive at the margin, but that existing performance measures do a
poor job of capturing program goals such as maximizing the (net)
impacts of the services provided.
Effects of Incentives on the Technical Efficiency 
of Service Provision
Performance incentives may affect how hard training center
employees work and how smart they work, conditional on their choices
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about whom to serve and how to serve them. Indeed, traditional incen-
tive systems in industry such as piece rates, which are intended to
increase the price of on-the-job leisure, aim to produce just such
effects.
We have not been able to locate any evidence on this type of
behavioral response in the literature on employment and training pro-
grams. This type of response is unlikely to get picked up by the sort of
regression models employed in the studies summarized in Table 2.1. To
see why, consider the following example. Suppose that establishing
performance incentives leads training program workers to work harder,
which in turn raises the expected impact of the program for every par-
ticipant by $10. In this case, the regressions described above would see
their intercepts increase by $10, but the coefficient on the performance
measures would not increase at all. 
In principle, cross-state variation in performance incentive inten-
sity, such as that employed by Cragg (1997), in combination with data
on outputs (number of persons served, etc.) and number of workers
could be used to answer this question. In the absence of such evidence,
it remains to refer to the broader economic literature on this question,
which is summarized in Prendergast (1999). He reports that this “litera-
ture points to considerable effects of compensation on performance.”
How well his conclusion generalizes to government programs where
the rewards consist of additional budgetary allocations, rather than
higher earnings for individual workers, remains an open question.
Effects of Incentives on Subcontracts and Subcontractor Behavior
In many, if not most, employment and training programs that have
operated in the United States, secondary providers operating under
subcontracts have played an important role in service delivery. In this
subsection, we consider the evidence on how performance incentives
alter the subcontracts that agencies make with their subcontractors, and
how performance-based contracts affect the performance of providers.
As elsewhere, the literature we survey draws primarily on the
experience of the JTPA program. Performance-based contracting had
an interesting history under JTPA.20 Initially, SDAs that entered into
performance-based contracts for training were able to exceed the 15
percent limit on administrative expenses in JTPA if the contract met
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certain provisions. By the late 1980s, a number of concerns surfaced
about the use of performance-based contracting. As enumerated in
Spaulding (2001), USDOL was concerned that states were not effec-
tively monitoring their performance-based contracts (PBCs), that total
costs billed under PBCs were not “reasonable,” that SDAs were using
PBCs for activities that contained little if any training, that contracts
did not include the performance measures required by law, that pay-
ment schedules either eliminated contractor risk or built in high profit
levels, and that profits were sometimes used to establish economic
development loan funds, which was prohibited. The Department of
Labor issued a series of guidance letters in the late 1980s intended to
reduce the use of PBCs. 
In a series of papers, Heinrich (1995, 1999, 2003) examines the
contracting behavior of a JTPA SDA in Cook County, Illinois.21 She
finds that this site passed along its performance incentives to its service
providers through performance-based contracts. These contracts often
included performance levels in excess of those facing the SDA itself,
apparently as a form of insurance. Even if some contractors failed to
meet the (inflated) standards in their contracts, most would, and so the
SDA would meet its own overall standards despite a few subcontractor
failures. Heinrich (1995, 2003) found that at this SDA, which had tech-
nical resources that most other SDAs did not, caseworkers and manag-
ers were keenly aware of how they and their subcontractors were doing
relative to their performance standards throughout the program year.
This was particularly true of the cost-per-placement standard.  Heinrich
(1999) shows that subcontractor performance in one program year rela-
tive to the cost-per-placement standards in their contract affected
whether or not they were awarded a contract in the next year.
Now consider the studies that examine the effects of performance
based contracting on subcontractor behavior. Dickinson et al. (1988)
performed some analyses looking at how the use of performance-based
contracting affected the mix of participants in JTPA. They found that,
contrary to their expectations, the use of performance-based contract-
ing was associated with a statistically significant increase in services to
minority groups, and had no effects on services to welfare recipients,
females, older workers, or individuals with other barriers to employ-
ment. Dickinson et al. (1988) also analyzed the impact of higher wage
at placement provisions on participants served, and found that they led
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to a reduction in services to welfare recipients; estimated effects on
other hard-to-serve groups were also negative but not statistically sig-
nificant.
Heinrich (2000) focuses primarily on the relationship between
organizational form (for-profit or nonprofit) and performance, but she
also explores the effects of having performance incentives in provider
contracts. She finds, for her study of an Illinois SDA, that inclusion of
performance incentives has a very strong positive effect on realized
wages and employment at termination and up to four quarters follow-
ing termination. Similarly, Spaulding (2001) analyzed the effect of per-
formance-based contracting in JTPA programs on the performance of
SDAs in program year 1998. Her results indicate that the use of perfor-
mance-based contracting is generally associated with higher outcomes. 
Overall, the literature makes two things clear. First, local training
programs sometimes pass along the performance incentives they face
to their subcontractors, perhaps with something added on as insurance.
Second, performance-based contracts yield higher performance on the
rewarded dimension. 
Strategic Responses to Performance Incentives
In addition to the substantive responses to performance incentives
considered above, in which training centers changed what they actually
did, training centers can also attempt to change their measured perfor-
mance without changing their actual performance. We refer to this as a
strategic response, or as “gaming” the performance system. Regardless
of their differing goals, all types of organizations have an incentive to
respond strategically to performance incentives, provided the cost is
low, as doing so yields additional resources to further their own goals.
The literature provides clear evidence of such gaming behavior under
JTPA.
One important form of strategic behavior under JTPA was the
manipulation of whether or not participants were formally enrolled.
Under the JTPA incentive system, only persons formally enrolled
counted towards site performance. In addition, for the first decade of
JTPA’s existence, SDAs had substantial flexibility in regard to when
someone became formally enrolled. Clever SDAs improved their per-
formance by basing enrollments on job placements rather than the initi-
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ation of services. For example, some SDAs boosted performance by
providing job search assistance without formally enrolling those
receiving it in the program. Then, if an individual found a job, the per-
son would be enrolled, counted as a placement, and terminated, all in
quick succession. Similarly, SDAs would send potential trainees to
employers to see if the employer would approve them for an on-the-job
training slot; enrollment would not take place until a willing employer
was found.
There are two pieces of evidence regarding the empirical impor-
tance of this phenomenon. The first is indirect, and consists of the fact
that USDOL found it enough of a problem to change the regulations.
Specifically, in 1992 USDOL required that individuals become
enrolled once they received objective assessment and that they count as
a participant for performance standards purposes once they received
any substantive service, including job search assistance.22 
The other evidence comes from the National JTPA Study. As part
of their process analysis of the treatments provided at the 16 SDAs in
the study, Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993) conducted interviews
of nonenrolled members of the experimental treatment group at 12 of
the 16 sites. These results, reported in their Table 3.2, show that 53 per-
cent of nonenrolled treatment group members received services, most
often referrals to employers for possible on-the-job training (36 percent
of all nonenrollees) and job search assistance (20 percent of all nonen-
rollees). They report that “. . . most of the study sites enrolled individu-
als in classroom training when they attended their first class or in OJT
when they worked their first day . . .”
The flexibility of JTPA also allowed strategic manipulation of the
termination decision. Because performance standards in JTPA were
based on terminees, SDAs had no incentive to terminate individuals
from the program that were not successfully placed in a job. By keep-
ing them on the rolls, the person’s lack of success would never be rec-
ognized and used against the SDA in measuring its performance. As
USDOL explains in one of its guidance letters, “Without some policy
on termination, performance standards create strong incentives for
local programs to avoid terminating failures even when individuals no
longer have any contact with the program.”23
 Problems with local programs retaining participants on the rolls
long after they stopped receiving services go back to the days of JTPA’s
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predecessor, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA). In one of their guidance letters, USDOL observed that “moni-
tors and auditors found that some participants continued to be carried
in an ‘active’ or ‘inactive’ status for two or three years after last contact
with these programs.”24 For Title II-A of JTPA, USDOL limited the
period of inactivity to 90 days, although some commentators suggested
periods of 180 days or more.
Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997, 2004) provide additional evi-
dence on the strategic manipulation of termination dates using data
from the National JTPA Study. The first type of evidence consists of
the timing of termination relative to the end of services as a function of
the employment status of the trainee as of the end of services. Assum-
ing that the timing of termination responds mainly to the employment
at termination standard in place during the time their data were col-
lected (rather than the wage rate or cost standards, which would be
more difficult to game), they argue that sites should immediately termi-
nate participants who are employed when their services end. In con-
trast, they should not terminate participants who are not employed at
the end of their services; instead, they should wait and see if they later
become employed, at which point they should then terminate them
from the program. Not surprisingly, Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997,
2004) find that the sites in the National JTPA Study did exactly this
with, for example, Courty and Marschke (1997, Figure 1), revealing a
spike in terminations at the end of services for employed participants,
and a spike in terminations at the end of the mandatory 90 days after
the end of services for participants not employed at the end of services.
Their analysis likely understates the full extent of sites’ strategic
behavior, as it takes the date of the end of services as given, when in
fact sites had some control over this as well. For example, a participant
without a job at the end of classroom training could be assigned to a
job club in the hopes that employment would soon follow.
Courty and Marschke (1997) interviewed 11 of the 16 sites in the
National JTPA Study regarding their responses to the switch from mea-
suring employment at termination to measuring it 90 days after termi-
nation. They report that 
[m]ost administrators indicated that . . . case managers began
tracking terminees until the follow-up period expired. To
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increase the chances that an employment match lasted until the
third month, some SDAs reported that they offered special ser-
vices between termination and follow-up, such as child-care,
transportation and clothing allowances. Case managers also
attempted to influence employers to keep their clients until the
third month. (p. 387)
Moreover, “training administrators reported that after the third month,
they did not contact the client again.” While these follow-up services
may add value, their sudden termination at 90 days, and their sudden
use after the change in performance standards, suggests motives other
than impact maximization.
The second type of evidence from the National JTPA Study
reported in Courty and Marschke (1996, 1997, 2004) concerns the tim-
ing of terminations relative to the end of the program year. In JTPA,
performance was measured over the program year from July 1 to June
30. For SDAs in states where there were no marginal rewards for per-
formance above the standard, this leads to an incentive to wait on ter-
mination until the end of the program year when possible, and then to
strategically terminate each participant in the program year in which
his or her marginal value is highest. Consider a site that comes into
June well above its performance standard. It should then terminate
nonemployed participants who have finished their services until its
measured performance is just above the standard. It thereby gets its
reward in the current year, while starting the next year with as small a
stock of poorly performing enrollees as possible.
Courty and Marschke (2004) builds on the analyses of Courty and
Marschke (1996, 1997) by embedding them in an econometric frame-
work, and by examining whether the manipulation of the termination
dates is merely an accounting phenomenon or whether it has efficiency
costs. To do this, they look at nonexperimental differences in mean
impacts between persons terminated at training centers that appear to
engage in more gaming (based on measures of the average waiting
time to termination after the conclusion of training), at differences in
mean impacts for trainees terminated in June (at the end of the program
year) relative to other trainees, and at whether or not trainees are more
likely to have their training truncated at the end of the program year.
The impacts at the end of the training year are also interacted with how
close the center is to its performance standards for the year. All of their
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analyses indicate an apparent (and surprisingly large) efficiency cost to
the gaming behavior. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The literature on the behavioral effects of performance manage-
ment systems in employment and training programs is a small one.
From it, we draw the following conclusions. First, there is modest evi-
dence of cream skimming in JTPA, which had such a system. Because
the performance management system in WIA does not adjust the stan-
dards for sites that serve more disadvantaged groups, WIA provides
even stronger incentives to cream skim than did JTPA. There is no evi-
dence, however, that cream skimming behavior would not have
occurred even in the absence of the federal performance standards sys-
tem, perhaps in response to local political incentives. Second, there is
fairly strong evidence in the literature that the performance measures
typically used in these systems, which focus on short-term outcome
levels of participants, have little or no relationship to long-run impacts
on employment or earnings. As such, to the extent that program admin-
istrators devote time and effort to including persons in the program
who will do well on the performance measures, they are not promoting
efficiency. Third, there is not much empirical evidence about the effect
of performance standards systems on the types of services provided.
The single paper that exists suggests that SDAs under JTPA allocated
services to increase their measured performance; effects on efficiency
are mixed. 
Fourth, there is essentially no evidence on the important question
of the effects of performance management on the technical efficiency
of service delivery. Fifth, performance management at the level of the
SDA or WIB leads to changes in the relationship between the two and
their subcontractors in some instances. The nature of the contracts
changes as local programs seek to insure their aggregate (across con-
tractors) performance, and contractors respond by changing their own
behavior to please the local program. Sixth, and finally, there is strong
evidence that local programs devote time and resources to gaming per-
formance management systems by increasing their measured perfor-
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mance in ways that do not affect their actual performance. These
strategic responses represent a cost of having a performance manage-
ment system.
In light of these findings, we make two main recommendations.
The first is that USDOL commission additional research on the effec-
tiveness of and incentive structure created by performance manage-
ment systems and that it devote resources to providing the data
necessary to support such research. USDOL has spent large sums eval-
uating its employment and training programs, but much less on evalu-
ating its performance management systems. It is clear to us that
marginal returns have not been equated on these two lines of research.
Several types of research would serve to improve our understand-
ing and use of performance management systems. These include, but
are not limited to, the following:
• The search should continue for short-term outcome measures that
are reliably correlated with long-run program impacts and cannot
be gamed by local programs. 
• Additional research on the effects of performance management
on the types of services offered, on the match between participant
characteristics and service type, and on the technical efficiency of
service provision would provide a fuller understanding of what
the current types of standards actually do. 
• Research on the effects of other types of performance measures
sometimes adopted at the state level, such as measures designed
to encourage service to particular subgroups among the eligible,
would inform decisions about whether or not to introduce such
measures at the national level. 
• Finally, research on the response of WIBs to alternative reward
functions at the state level would provide useful information
about how to design such functions in the future. Key aspects
here include the extent of competition among WIBs, as in tourna-
ment systems, variation in the number of standards a WIB must
pass to receive any budgetary reward, and the effects of marginal
incentives for performance above the standard.
The data required to support the proposed research effort include a
panel data set, with the WIB as the unit of observation, containing for
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each program year the negotiated standards for each WIB, the actual
performance of the WIB, characteristics of the economic environment
and eligible and participant populations for the WIB, and the details of
the relevant state policies, including any additional standards and
related outcomes, and the reward function linking WIB outcomes to
budgetary rewards. Had such data been collected under JTPA, the
knowledge base for redesigning the WIA system would be much more
solid. Even the limited information for the National JTPA Study exper-
imental sites described in Courty and Marschke (2003) yielded useful
insights. These data should be collected, maintained, and distributed to
the research community, presumably by a private research firm under
contract to USDOL.
Our second recommendation is that USDOL take advantage of the
WIA reauthorization process to redesign the WIA performance man-
agement system to reflect the current base of evidence on the perfor-
mance of these systems. As we show in this paper, the systemic
changes from the JTPA performance management system to the WIA
system ignored the literature and, overall, took the system farther away
from the evidence than it was before. In the absence of a redesign along
the lines suggested here, we view the present system as a step back-
ward that should either be scrapped or have its effects reduced by limit-
ing the amount of incentive payments based upon it, pending further
research.
We envision four possible scenarios for such a redesign effort,
which we list in order of what we see as their desirability. The first
redesign scenario represents adoption of an “ideal” performance sys-
tem. In an ideal system, randomization would be directly incorporated
in the normal operations of the WIA program. Such randomization
need not exclude persons from any services, but only assign a modest
fraction to low-intensity services, e.g., the core services under WIA. It
could be incorporated directly into a system similar in spirit to the
Frontline Decision Support System (if that system is used to assign
individuals to services) and so made invisible to line workers Eberts
and O’Leary 2002). The randomization would then be used, in con-
junction with outcome data already collected, to produce experimental
impact estimates that would serve as the performance measures. For
sample size reasons, randomization might be viable in practice only for
state-level performance incentives or only when applied to perfor-
Oleary training.book  Page 49  Friday, September 17, 2004  8:56 AM
50 Barnow and Smith
mance measures consisting of moving averages over several program
years.
The second reform scenario takes a different direction. It acknowl-
edges that short-term outcome levels have little or no correlation with
program impacts and so changes the system to focus on the program’s
goals other than efficiency. Such a system could focus, for example, on
measures related to who gets served and measures of customer (partic-
ipants and employers) satisfaction. The customer satisfaction measures
would focus on aspects of the program such as waiting times and cour-
tesy of staff, about which the customer is the best judge, and not on
value-added, of which the customer is likely to be a poor evaluator (as
shown empirically for JTPA in Heckman and Smith, 1998). Somewhat
surprisingly, the present system does not do a very good job of guiding
behavior along these dimensions, though it easily could. The timeliness
standards employed in the Unemployment Insurance system provide
an example of a successful system along these lines (see the discussion
in West and Hildebrand 1997).
The third reform scenario downplays or scraps the current system
until additional research identifies measures based on short-term out-
comes that correlate with long-term program impacts, or provides con-
vincing evidence that the current system has beneficial effects on
dimensions, such as the efficiency of time use by program staff, for
which little or no evidence presently exists. In this scenario, the negoti-
ated performance standards could be taken over at the national level
and used in a systematic manner to generate knowledge about WIB
responses to particular performance measures and to the general tough-
ness of the standards.
The fourth and final reform scenario simply modifies the WIA sys-
tem to look more like the JTPA system. In practice, this scenario might
represent a baseline to which elements of the other scenarios could be
added. The heart of this scenario consists of replacing the negotiated
standards with a model-based system similar to that in JTPA. Within
the context of such a model-based system, a number of suggestions for
marginal changes become relevant. First, the model should not be rees-
timated every year using a single year’s data. Doing so caused a lot of
volatility in the standards, and in the effects of particular variables, but
did not produce any corresponding benefit. Barnow (1996) discusses
how this variability applied to persons with disabilities.  Second, given
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the current focus on return on investment within WIA, a cost standard
might be reintroduced, designed in a way to get around problems with
WIBs that mix funds from a variety of sources, but that encourages
local programs to focus more on the return on investment. Third, the
literature surveyed here has some lessons for the optimal length of the
follow-up period for the outcome-based performance measures. In par-
ticular, the literature suggests that longer is not always better in terms
of correlation with program impacts, above and beyond the problem
that longer follow-up periods interfere with the system’s ability to pro-
vide reasonably quick feedback. 
Notes
We thank Richard West and participants at the “Job Training and Labor Exchange”
conference in September 2002 for helpful comments.
1. See D’Amico et al. (2002) and D’Amico (2002) for more information on the
implementation of WIA and its relationship to JTPA.
2. A principal–agent problem is not a necessary condition for a performance man-
agement system. An individual or firm might adopt such a system as a way of
quantifying and rewarding progress toward distant or difficult to measure goals.
3. In some instances, the state government assumed responsibility for some or all of
the service delivery in the state.
4. See Barnow (1979) for illustrative models of this type of behavior.
5. See, for example, the discussion in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
6. WIA also includes measures of the change in earnings from the pretraining period
to the posttraining period.
7. See Blalock and Barnow (2001) and Barnow (2000) for discussions about the ori-
gins of the performance management system in JTPA.
8. WIA became law in 1998 but was not implemented until 2000.
9. We have more to say about this back-and-forth pattern in a later section.
10. For a description of the performance management system in the early days of
JTPA, see Barnow and Constantine (1988).
11. It might make more sense to hold constant the characteristics of the eligible popu-
lation, which the sites do not choose, rather than of program participants, which
they do.
12. JTPA operated on a program year rather than a fiscal year basis. PY1990 began
July 1, 1990, and ran through June 30, 1991.
13. See the discussion in Dickinson et al. (1988).
14. See Section 136 of the WIA statute for a description of the law’s performance
management requirements.
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15. States we have spoken with indicated that the negotiations are largely one sided,
with USDOL establishing the standards.
16. See USDOL (2000a,b) for more details on the WIA performance standards sys-
tem.
17. Our discussion of the motivation for the WIA changes draws on discussions with
several staff who participated in the development of the WIA performance man-
agement system. As some of our informants requested anonymity, we simply
thank all of them for sharing their views without mentioning their names.
18. This is consistent with the findings from the earlier study by Dickinson et al.
(1988).
19. This table is a modified version of Table 3 in Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith
(2002). See that paper for a more detailed survey of these results.
20. This section is based on Spaulding (2001).
21. This section draws on Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).
22. See Training and Employment Notice (TEIN) 31-92 for the formal description of
requirements on when a person must be enrolled in the program. http://
wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.asp?DOCN=299.
23. See TEIN 5-93. http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.asp?DOCN=770.
24. See TEIN 3-92. http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/corr_doc.asp?DOCN=282.
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The Effectiveness of Publicly 
Financed Training in 
the United States
Implications for WIA and Related Programs
Christopher T. King
The principal focus of this chapter is publicly financed, subbacca-
laureate education and training in the United States. I first discuss the
context within which training is provided in the United States. I then
examine the nature of publicly financed training and review the evi-
dence on the effectiveness of various types of training for key target
populations of interest, emphasizing the results from experimental
evaluations. I conclude with a series of observations, implications, and
lessons for U.S. training policies and programs, with emphasis on the
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 that is expected to be reau-
thorized by Congress. 
TRAINING IN CONTEXT
Training comes in many different shapes and forms and is provided
in many different ways. Gary Becker (1975) made the important dis-
tinction between general and firm-specific training. General training
provides the trainee with skills that apply to many employers in the
labor market, while specific training mainly offers skills that have
value within a given firm or for a given employer. The presumption is
that individuals (or government) should finance more of the former,
while employers should support more of the latter, since they are its
principal beneficiaries. 
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Many of the offerings at educational institutions, especially com-
munity and technical colleges, can be considered training, although
much of it may be intended for other purposes. The late George
Kozmetsky, founder and chair emeritus of the University of Texas at
Austin’s IC2 Institute, made the further distinction between education
as knowledge for understanding and training as knowledge for value in
the market.
We can categorize training by its primary objective, as follows:
• Qualifying training that is intended to prepare and qualify indi-
viduals for jobs.
• Skills maintenance and upgrading training that is intended to
maintain or improve workers’ performance on the job, assist
them in building new skills for retention and career advancement,
and generally enhance their earnings potential in existing or new
jobs. 
Human capital investment in the United States tends to be focused dis-
proportionately on qualifying training—initial preparation for work
(Ganzglass et al. 2000). On a macro level, investing in training can also
be viewed as part of a larger strategy to bolster national economic com-
petitiveness (see, for example, Commission on the Skills of the Ameri-
can Workforce 1990; Marshall and Tucker 1992; Secretary of Labor’s
Commission on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency
1989). 
Training can take many different forms. It can be formal and
highly structured. Alternatively, it can be informal and very unstruc-
tured, occurring as part of the regular ongoing workplace processes.
Institutional or classroom training is one of the more typical mecha-
nisms for providing formal training and is often contrasted with on-the-
job training (OJT), under which employers may receive a public sub-
sidy to offset the costs of providing structured training to workers. OJT
is a relatively structured form of learning by doing. In the early days of
manpower training, public offerings under the Manpower Demonstra-
tion and Training Act of 1962 supported institutional training and OJT,
as well as training that combined them in varying mixes. Apprentice-
ship training is one of the older and more intense forms of training
under which workers receive both formal and informal training in con-
junction with unions. In the past few decades, there has been growing
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emphasis on what is referred to as customized training, publicly
financed training designed and offered in close collaboration with and
for employers (Isbell, Trutko, and Barnow 2000). 
We can also classify training by skill level. In the 1990s, training
began to focus more on basic skills—e.g., reading, math, teamwork,
learning-to-learn—as well as occupational skills. This trend toward
basic skills training was in response to growing recognition that
employers were seeking workers who were ready to be trained more so
than workers with particular skill sets (Secretary of Labor’s Commis-
sion on Achieving Necessary Skills 1990). 
And, workers secure training from many sources. Surveys of
employers and employees indicate that employers expend considerable
time and resources on training, both formal and informal, for their
workers (Frazis et al. 1998). In fact, the amount of training provided by
employers dwarfs that provided with public support: expenditures on
training by employers, public and private, may approach $80 billion or
more annually by some estimates (American Society for Training and
Development 2002). According to the recent review by Lerman, McK-
ernan, and Riegg (2004), employer-provided training has been increas-
ing in all of the surveys that measure such activity. For example, data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) indicate
that the share of workers 18–64 years of age reporting receipt of
employer-provided training rose from only 6 percent in 1984 to 20 per-
cent in 1996. Note that the range of estimates tends to be wide and is
sensitive to the definition of employer training and the sample: Ler-
man, McKernan, and Riegg (2003, p. 11) offer a lower-bound estimate
of 26 percent from SIPP that asks most workers about most recent
training of an hour or more, and an upper-bound estimate of 70 percent
from the Survey of Employer-Provided Training (SEPT) that asks
workers in large establishments about the receipt of short (five minutes
or more) formal training. 
Finally, the incidence of formal training tends to be higher in larger
establishments that have lower rates of employee turnover and offer
more extensive employee benefit packages. The 1995 SEPT was
restricted to private establishments with 50 or more employees. Citing
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, Lynch (1994a) states that only
11 percent of workers in small establishments reported receiving train-
ing, compared to 26 percent in large establishments. In addition, data
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from the National Household Survey of Education indicate that young
workers (aged 17–35 years) not currently enrolled in school have been
participating in part-time training at an increasing rate and are more
likely to do so the higher their level of formal education (Hight 1998).
This is an important general phenomenon: compared with lower-
skilled workers, higher-skilled workers tend to have greater access to
training and have higher rates of training participation than lower-
skilled workers (see, for example., Carnevale and Desrochers 2000;
Mangum 2000), as do workers with higher levels of general skills and
education, white workers, and male workers (Lerman, McKernan, and
Riegg 2003). The incidence of training in the United States is low com-
pared to other developed countries (Lynch 1994b). 
RECENT TRENDS IN TRAINING EXPENDITURES, 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
Depending on which source we rely on, it appears that expendi-
tures on training have been either rising or falling of late. On the one
hand, Lerman, McKernan, and Riegg (2003) report that employers
have been training an increasing share of employees in the past two
decades and are spending more than the one percent of payroll on train-
ing that was recommended over a decade ago by the Commission on
the Skills of the American Workforce (1990). According to Lynch and
Black (1998), the majority (57 percent) of firms report increasing the
amount of training offered in the early 1990s. In addition, the Ameri-
can Society for Training and Development (ASTD) reports that
employers have been expending increasing amounts on training
(ASTD 2002) through the 1990s and into the early 2000s. Its 2002
State of the Industry Report states that total training expenditures
increased both on a per-employee basis (to $704 in 2000) and as a per-
centage of annual payroll (to 2.0 percent in 2000). Training expendi-
tures were projected to increase in both 2001 and 2002. However,
ASTD relies on member surveys for such data, and its membership is
comprised of larger employers that are more favorably disposed to
training than the universe of U.S. employers. 
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On the other hand, other researchers report that aggregate real
expenditures on training by employers and government programs have
been declining. King, McPherson, and Long (2000, pp. 276–277) state
that “[s]ince 1960, federal expenditures on all forms of workforce
development have never exceeded 0.85 percent of gross domestic
product or 2.4 percent of federal budget outlays.”1 Real federal training
and employment expenditures peaked at more than $22 billion in 1980
(including large sums for public service employment), but fell to just
under $8.2 billion by 1985 and have remained in the $7–$8.5 billion
range since, or about the same as 1970’s $7.3 billion figure (all
expressed in 2001 dollars). However, workforce spending per labor
force member peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s at less than
$250 and has hovered near $50 in the last few years, a level roughly
one-quarter of that two decades earlier in the face of an increasingly
dynamic and uncertain labor market (King et al. 2000). 
Some forms of public support for education and training have
increased noticeably in recent years. Pell Grants and other student aid,
especially in the form of loans to students and their families, have risen
sharply. “Pell Grants and other student assistance from the federal and
state governments account for a growing share of the total resources
devoted to work-related education and training, as well as higher edu-
cation” (King 1999, p. 64). Real federal expenditures on training and
employment programs and all forms of student aid (grants and loans)
were approximately the same in 1970 at around $7.3 billion, and each
had risen to more than $22 billion by 1980. But, by 1985, real student
aid expenditures had increased to three times those on training pro-
grams ($24 billion versus $8 billion) and by 2000, real student aid
expenditures were more than five times federal workforce program
spending (nearly $37 billion v. almost $7 billion). This is part of a large
and significant shift from place-based to people-based funding for
training.
TRAINING: A “HOT-BUTTON” POLICY ISSUE
In the past 10 years, training has become a “hot-button” policy
issue at all levels. Early impact findings from welfare employment pro-
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grams in California (e.g., Riverside Greater Avenues for Independence,
or GAIN) suggested that less costly strategies emphasizing work over
training—so-called “work-first” approaches stressing labor force
attachment (LFA)—were more effective than those stressing more tra-
ditional human capital development (HCD). The debate over whether
to stress LFA versus HCD spilled over from the welfare reform arena
into workforce development generally with the passage of WIA in
1998. Some of the larger states, including Florida, Michigan, and
Texas, had already begun reorienting their workforce development
strategies toward a work-first model well before the passage of WIA,
some as early as 1995 (Grubb et al. 1999). 
WIA mandates a sequence-of-services model in which training can
be viewed as the “service-of-last-resort” by states and localities. Adults
and dislocated workers participating in WIA generally are expected to
proceed through core and intensive services before becoming eligible
to receive training. Only job seekers who are still unable to secure jobs
that allow them to become economically self-sufficient with the assis-
tance of less costly core and intensive services are supposed to gain
access to training. Early emphasis by the U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) and many states and localities on less sophisticated variants
of work-first appears to have given way more recently to mixed LFA/
HCD strategies and discussion of worker access to support services on
the job, including training, as well as child care and other services (e.g.,
Martinson and Strawn 2002). 
PUBLICLY FINANCED TRAINING IN THE UNITED STATES
Major changes have taken place in publicly funded training pro-
grams. The main program administered by USDOL has evolved from
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (1973–1982) and
the Job Training Partnership Act (1983–1998) programs to the Work-
force Investment Act (1999–present). Each has had a different orienta-
tion and stressed different service strategies for different target groups.
Each also has placed primary responsibility for workforce policy-mak-
ing and service delivery with a different level of government. WIA
emphasizes a stronger state role in policymaking and encourages priva-
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tization of services that have traditionally been the domain of local
governments (see, for example, O’Shea and King 2001).
Other important training programs include: TANF work-related
programs serving welfare recipients; the Food Stamp Employment and
Training (FSE&T) program; Adult Education and Literacy programs;
secondary and postsecondary Vocational Education; Vocational Reha-
bilitation; the Employment Service providing labor exchange services
for all jobseekers under the Wagner-Peyser Act; and, until 2003, the
H1-B training program offered training for U.S. residents that are in
selected occupations that are the object of employers’ H1-B visa appli-
cations that fund the program. Table 3.1 provides funding and related
information for the major federal employment and training programs. 
In addition, 42 states have state-financed training programs (Dus-
cha and Graves 1999), supported by either diverted Unemployment
Insurance (UI) taxes—California’s Employment and Training Panel
(ETP) is the oldest and largest of these—or state general revenue, e.g.,
the Texas Skill Development Fund. State training funds tend to support
training provided directly by employers or through community and
technical colleges. These funds extended to more states and grew in
size in the 1980s and 1990s but encountered hard times in the 2000–
2001 recession, when state UI trust funds fell to levels at which dollars
flowing into training funds dried up. Few rigorous evaluations have
been conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of training conducted
under them.2 
These programs—many of which now are either administered by
workforce boards and other entities but co-located in one-stop centers
or administered directly through the auspices of the local boards—can
offer jobseekers a broad array of activities and services; the tendency
since the late 1990s, however, has been to provide mainly low-inten-
sity, LFA services, e.g., job search assistance. One typical, medium-
sized workforce board in Texas, a state with relatively integrated state
and local workforce services ranging from WIA and TANF to Food
Stamp E&T and even child care, exhibited the following training
shares for participants under its major funding sources in fiscal year
(FY) 2001: WIA, 30 percent training; TANF, 7 percent training; and
Food Stamp E&T, 0 percent training.3 Ron D’Amico, in Chapter 4 of
this volume, reports similar national figures for WIA adults and dislo-
cated worker participants exiting in program year 2000: 32.3 percent
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Table 3.1 Major Federal Training and Employment Programs
Program
Appropriations 
(FY 2002) Target groups
Major activities and 
services
WIA $5.7 billion 
(including $1.46 




Core, intensive and 
training services with 
training often as a 










Job search and related 
services, some training
Food Stamp E&T 
Program
$110 million Food Stamp 







exchange, job search, 
very limited training








Skills training in high-
demand occupations
Adult Education & 
Literacy
$613 million Adults with basic 
skills deficiencies
Basic reading, math 
and literacy services
Vocational Education $1.3 billion Secondary and 
postsecondary
students





$2.9 billion Individuals with 
disabilities needing 




education and training 
services
ES/One-Stop Grants $987 million Employers and 
jobseekers, including 
UI recipients
Labor exchange, LMI, 
counseling and related 
services
NOTE: WIA = Workforce Investment Act of 1998; TANF = Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families, work-related program under the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996;
FSE&T = Food Stamp Employment and Training program, under the Food Security
Act; TAA, NAFTA-TAA = Trade Adjustment Assistance and North American Free
Trade Agreement TAA serving trade-affected workers; ES = Employment Services
under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933.
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WIA adults in training, and 39.6 percent WIA dislocated workers in
training, while comparable figures for JTPA carry-over participants in
WIA were 73.6 percent and 65.8 percent, respectively.4
It should be noted that there are many shortcomings in the new
WIA data collection and reporting systems, i.e., the WIA Standard
Reporting and Data (WIASRD) system, that will make it very difficult
to know with any degree of certainty just what is actually being pro-
vided under the program, for whom and with what success.5 WIASRD
allows states and localities wide discretion in terms of when to register
or enroll participants in activities and also creates perverse incentives
for doing so by only having participants count toward performance
accountability if they are registered. Many local boards are delaying
the point of enrollment to ensure that their participants will be recorded
as “successful.” In addition, workforce boards in states such as Michi-
gan, Texas, and Utah that have authority and responsibility for a broad
array of funding streams may not show up in WIASRD as having
received WIA “core” (e.g., job search assistance) services, since these
might be funded under Wagner-Peyser or TANF. Real differences
among areas may be difficult to determine.
HOW EFFECTIVE IS TRAINING?
A number of researchers have summarized the literature on train-
ing, producing syntheses of what we do (and do not) know about the
provision and effectiveness of publicly financed training. USDOL even
conducted its own review (USDOL, Office of the Chief Economist
1995). Barnow (1987) critically reviewed the evidence on CETA pro-
gram impacts on employment and earnings, pointing out that the quasi-
or nonexperimental evaluation methods that were employed in assess-
ing CETA had created serious ambiguities.6 He concluded that, while
the programs appeared to raise earnings by $200 to $600 (in 1987 dol-
lars)7 for all participants, there was wide variation across the studies,
including several that produced negative results for subgroups (e.g.,
youth and males). He found that estimated earnings impacts also varied
widely by training activity, with the highest impacts generally associ-
ated with participation in Public Service Employment (PSE)8 and
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OJT—with impacts exceeding $1,500 in 1987 dollars (or more than
$2,330 in 2001 dollars)—and the lowest with Work Experience, an
activity that was generally reserved for the most disadvantaged partici-
pants (Barnow 1987, Table 1, pp. 160–161).
This discussion focuses only upon experimental evaluations of
training for several key groups that have been the object of attention by
federal and state government efforts for decades: disadvantaged adults
and youth; dislocated workers; and welfare recipients. It both draws
upon earlier evaluation syntheses as well as distills findings from
recently completed experimental evaluations. It stresses per-partici-
pant earnings impacts as the primary outcome of interest, with all
impacts and associated costs (where available) converted into current
(2001) dollars. 
The rationale for relying exclusively on experimental evaluations
is straightforward. Despite enhancements in quasi-experimental meth-
ods for evaluating training programs in recent years (e.g., Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith 1999; Hollenbeck 2002), the most reliable and
credible evidence of the impacts of training comes from well-designed
and structured experiments relying on randomly assigned treatment
and control groups. This was recognized by the 1985 Job Training
Longitudinal Survey Research Advisory Committee, which was
chaired by Ernst Stromsdorfer (1985), who was instrumental in shap-
ing approaches to evaluating education and training programs in the
United States starting in the 1960s. The committee recommended that
USDOL redirect its resources to conducting experimental training
evaluations, resulting in the National JTPA Study that ran from 1985–
1993 (Bloom et al. 1997; Orr et al. 1996). A number of studies—Bar-
now (1987), Fraker and Maynard (1987), LaLonde (1995), and Fried-
lander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997, 2000)—all reached essentially
the same conclusion. Thus, findings reported here are based primarily
on evidence derived from evaluations based on experimental rather
than quasi- or nonexperimental designs. 
Presentation of per-participant rather than per-assignee impacts is a
matter of discussion among evaluation researchers. The issue arises
because, despite the use of random assignment to treatment and control
status, not all of those assigned to a given treatment—for example,
classroom training or OJT/Job Search Assistance (JSA) in the National
JTPA Study—actually received it. Not surprisingly, per-assignee
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impacts are generally lower than per-participant or per-enrollee ones.
The results presented here are per-participant impacts, where possible,
emphasizing earnings impacts for those actually receiving services
rather than those merely assigned to them.
The final issue to be addressed before turning to training impacts is
the appropriate basis for comparison, termed the counterfactual. In
many evaluations of training and related social interventions, the stan-
dard counterfactual is that control group members receive no services,
while treatment group members do. In fact, the more realistic counter-
factual, is that control group members may receive whatever educa-
tion, employment, and training services are generally available to the
community, just not those specifically funded by the program being
evaluated. This is the stance adopted for the National JTPA Study, the
Job Corps evaluation and a number of other major evaluations con-
ducted since the mid-1980s. That is, what is being estimated is the
incremental impact of training over and above the effects of services
that are readily available in the community.9 
Disadvantaged Adults and Youth
LaLonde (1995) reviewed experimental as well as quasi-experi-
mental evaluations, focusing on CETA, JTPA, and other federal train-
ing programs, including those for welfare recipients. He began by
establishing realistic expectations for the impact of training on earn-
ings:
Given that existing public sector sponsored employment and
training programs usually are less intensive and expensive than an
additional year of schooling, it would be surprising if they gener-
ated larger earnings increases. Instead, we should expect that most
JTPA programs, which usually cost several hundred to a few thou-
sand dollars per participant, would generate annual earnings gains
of perhaps several hundred dollars. (p. 156)
A year of education was associated with an 8 percent earnings
gain, or around $2,200 per year (in 2001 dollars). He summarizes the
consensus on earnings impacts of training for adults and youth as fol-
lows (LaLonde 1995, pp. 158–161):
• Various services raise the postprogram earnings of disadvantaged
adult women, but have mixed or no effects on those of adult men
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or youth. Moreover, earnings gains for women tend to be “modest
in size, persist for several years, arise from a variety of training
strategies, and are sometimes achieved at remarkably little
expense.” 
• There is less evidence on the value of classroom training (CT)
and OJT, and the evidence that does exist is mixed. 
• The results for adult males are less than encouraging. 
• The National JTPA Study offers no evidence that relatively less
disadvantaged youths participating benefited from the low-cost
training provided.
Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997) expand upon
LaLonde’s conclusions based on their extensive review of both quasi-
experimental and experimental evaluations of programs that they sort
into services that are voluntary and mandatory for participants. Table
3.2 provides updated impact estimates (all expressed in 2001 dollars)
for many of the evaluations they reviewed. Their major conclusions on
the effects of voluntary training programs include the following:
•  “Consistently strong evidence has accumulated that government
training programs have been effective for adult women. The
experimental estimates of JTPA’s effects on earnings are positive
and statistically significant, and the rate of return on cost in JTPA
is large even in the short run . . . Nevertheless, . . . such earnings
effects are not large enough to lift most families out of poverty”
(p. 1833).
• Average earnings effects for adult men in JTPA were as large as
those for women and also produced high rates of return even in
the short run. “The JTPA finding for men, therefore, represents a
significant break with the results of past evaluations” (p. 1834). 
• “Evidence has been accumulating for a number of years that
training programs have been ineffective in producing lasting
earnings effects for youth . . . The experimental estimates from
the JTPA evaluation … are small and bracket zero . . . Moreover,
no significant positive earnings effects were found for either male
or female youth in any of the three program activity clusters or 39
subgroups examined by the JTPA evaluators” (pp. 1833–1834).
Oleary training.book  Page 68  Friday, September 17, 2004  8:56 AM
The Effectiveness of Publicly Financed Training in the United States 69
Table 3.2 Experimental Training Impacts on Participant Earnings for 





Range of effects (if 
more than one) ($)






NSW demo 539 517–566 17,284
Adult Women
JTPA 1,236 993–1,420 1,931
OJT/JSA 1,490 892–2,876 1,363
CT 533 407–641 2,704
MFSP demo 1,021 139–2,217 7,573
Youth
JTPA –220 –932–237 2,583
NSW demo 346 26–666 16,849
JOBSTART demo 712 546–744 8,305

















782 JS only, low-cost 
site; 5,292 JS + 
training, high-cost 
site




–1,549 JSA, plus 
Training





NSW demo 1,685 713–2,657 19,626
H-HH Aide demo 2,380 269–4,827 12,541
Maine TOPS 1,864 2,933
(continued)







Range of effects (if 
more than one) ($)
Net training cost per 
participant ($)
WIN-JS/WE demo 245 Adult men
564 Adult women –72–1,047 Women 
1,442 Men
532 Women
WIN-Mixed demo 577 Adult men
937 Adult women 914–960 Women 
1,481 Men
1,730 Women
Food Stamp E&T –111 223
NJ GD demo 1,412 1,120






JTPA Adult Welfare 1,205 1,587
OJT/JSA 3,520 —
CT 825 —
NOTE: All results based on experimental designs and reported for the second postpro-
gram year, where available. Welfare program participation largely, but not entirely, man-
datory. All earnings impacts and costs expressed in 2001 dollars. For range of effects
(no. negative and statistically significant results/no. negative and not statistically sig-
nificant/no. positive and statistically significant/no. positive and not statistically sig-
nificant). — = data unavailable; OJT/JSA = OJT or job search assistance as JTPA
primary services; CT = classroom training as JTPA primary service; H-HH Aide =
Homemaker-Home Health Aide demonstration with paid work experience plus training;
TOPS = Targeted Opportunities in the Private Sector with OJT, unpaid work experience;
MFSP = Minority Female, Single Parent demo with CT, OJT; JOBSTART = demo with
CT; New Chance = CT, paid/unpaid work experience; Job Corps = intensive CT, resi-
dential and nonresidential; WIN-JS/WE = national and demonstration with job search,
unpaid work experience; WIN-Mixed = mix of job search, unpaid work experience, CT;
JOBS = Job Opportunities and Basic Skills program with job search, unpaid work expe-
rience, CT; Food Stamp E&T = job search; NJ GD = grant diversion demo with OJT;
and NSW = National Supported Work demonstration with paid work experience plus
training.
SOURCE: This table updates Tables 1–4 in Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins
(1997), incorporating results from Bloom (1990), Leigh (1995, 2000), Nudelman
(2000), and Schochet et al. (2001). 
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• “Skills development is often implicitly associated with the inten-
sity and cost of an activity, with greater skills development seen
as requiring greater effort by participants and greater costs to pro-
grams . . . In our view, the evidence is mixed. A link between
increased cost and intensity of training and greater earnings
effects has not been firmly established” (p. 1834).
• “The absence of long-term follow-up in most studies is a critical
problem in assessing the effectiveness of lengthy and costly skills
development activities. The limited evidence available (e.g.,
Couch [1992], U.S. General Accounting Office [1996]) suggests
that earnings effects may persist” (p. 1836).
•  “At present, the most important unresolved issue concerning vol-
untary training programs for adults is the efficacy of various pol-
icy tools intended to increase program scale by increasing the
number of participants and the intensity and expense of the activ-
ities provided to them” (p. 1837).
With respect to mandatory training programs, Friedlander et al. (1997)
conclude that the evaluation evidence is strong and consistent, includ-
ing the following findings:
• Most of the earnings effects for mandatory programs are positive
and are larger for women than for men (p. 1839).
• The evidence in favor of more intensive and expensive skills
development to increase skills and near- and longer-term earnings
is mixed (p. 1840).
We now have long-term results available for JTPA from USDOL/ETA
and the Job Corps evaluation findings, both of which significantly bol-
ster our understanding of training impacts for disadvantaged adults and
youth. 
Long-Term JTPA Impacts
Orr et al. (1996) and Bloom et al. (1997) published the findings
from the National JTPA Study that ran from 1986 to 1993. These were
augmented with additional follow-up data collected by USDOL in a
report published by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1996).
USDOL has now collected and tabulated additional follow-up data for
National JTPA Study participants as well, including up to seven years
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of postrandom assignment Social Security Administration earnings
records across all 16 of the original service delivery areas.10 
USDOL estimated annual per-assignee earnings impacts for seven
years following random assignment for adult men, adult women,
youth, and welfare recipients by recommended service strategy. The
three JTPA service strategies were: CT, the primary service recom-
mended; OJT/JSA, where either OJT or job search assistance were the
primary services recommended; and Other, which was a catch-all strat-
egy where neither CT or OJT/JSA were the primary recommended
strategies. Impacts were also disaggregated for those with and without
significant prior work experience. Selected per-enrollee impact results
for disadvantaged adults and youth include:11
• Adult women exhibited positive earnings impacts in all seven
years for which data are available, with a per-enrollee impact for
the entire seven-year period of $3,206 (5 percent); impacts were
statistically significant in the first four years. Impacts were con-
centrated among women enrolled in OJT/JSA and Other, with
impacts of $4,933 (7 percent) and $6,031 (9 percent), respec-
tively. 
• Adult men did not fare as well. Overall per-enrollee earnings
impacts for adult men were positive for the seven-year period
($1,268, or 1 percent) but not statistically significant. This was
true for all service streams as well.
• Female youth had positive but insignificant earnings impacts in
each year of the period, with an overall per-enrollee earnings
impact of $1,640, or 3 percent. 
• Male youth experienced negative but insignificant earnings
impacts in each year, with an overall per-enrollee earnings impact
of –$3,167, or 4 percent. This continues the pattern reported in
earlier JTPA analyses by Orr et al. (1996) and Bloom et al.
(1997). 
Figure 3.1 shows these longer-term per-enrollee earnings impacts
by service strategy for adult males and females. 
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National Job Corps Program
Job Corps, the most stable and intensive program serving
extremely disadvantaged youth, has been operating since 1964 and has
sites spread all across the country. In 2001, Mathematica Policy
Research completed an exhaustive experimental evaluation of the
national Job Corps program for USDOL based on an experimental
design (see Burghardt and Schochet 2001; Burghardt et al. 2001; Gritz
and Johnson 2001; McConnell and Glazerman 2001; and Schochet,
Burghardt, and Glazerman 2001).12 Of the 80,883 youth who applied
and were found eligible for Job Corps between November 1994 and
February 1996, 9,409 were randomly assigned to the treatment group
and 5,977 to the control group. The treatment group included some eli-
gible youth who did not enroll in or receive Job Corps services.13 Con-
trol group members were not permitted to enroll in Job Corps but could
access similar services available in their communities. 
Demographic data for all study participants were obtained from
program records as well as baseline interviews that were conducted
shortly after random assignment. Follow-up interviews were conducted
with participants by telephone after 12, 30 and 48 months to determine
participants’ employment-related experiences. Long-term analysis was
based on information from the 6,828 program and 4,485 control group
members who completed the 48-month interview. 
Among the key findings from the Job Corps evaluation are the fol-
lowing (see Table 3.3):
• Job Corps dramatically increased both participation in and near-
term outcomes from education and training programs across a
variety of measures, with the exception of attaining high school
diplomas. 
• Impacts on employment rates, hours worked, and earnings per
week were significantly negative after the first five quarters, then
leveled off and became positive after the second year. 
• Program group members earned an average of $16 per week more
than those in the control group during the fourth year. Gains
resulted from a combination of increased hours of work and
higher wages.









Program Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7









1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Classroom training On-the-job training Other training
Figure 3.1 Long-Term, Per-Enrollee JTPA Earnings Impacts for Adult 
Males and Females, by Recommended Service Strategy
Adult males
Adult females
SOURCE: Ray Marshall Center computations based on long-term follow-up data col-
lected and tabulated by USDOL/ETA and activity enrollment rates provided in Orr et
al. (1996).
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Table 3.3 Selected Per-Participant Job Corps Impacts
Outcome Per-participant impacts
Education/Training
Ever enrolled in educational program (%) 28.9***
Ever attended academic classes (%) 32.9***
Ever received vocational training (%) 63.4***
Received GED certificate (%) 20.9***
Received high school diploma (%) –3.1***
Employment/Earnings
% employed at 48 months 4.2***
% of weeks employed, Year 1 –14.2***
% of weeks employed, Year 2 –2.9
% of weeks employed, Year 3 2.4***
% of weeks employed, Year 4 4.1***
Hours/week employed, Year 1 –5.8***
Hours/week employed, Year 2 –1.2
Hours/week employed, Year 3 1.4***
Hours/week employed, Year 4 1.9***
Earnings/week, Year 1 –$35.7***
Earnings/week, Year 2 –$1.7
Earnings/week, Year 3 $21.6***
Earnings/week, Year 4 $25.7***
NOTE: ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. Earnings expressed in 2001 dollars.
SOURCE: Burghardt et al. (2001).
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• Impacts on employment rates and earnings were greater for pro-
gram group members aged 20–24 years than for younger partici-
pants, but were similar across gender, residential, and behavioral
subgroups. Impacts were significantly lower among Hispanics
than other ethnic groups. Low impacts for Hispanics did not
appear to be due to the heavy concentration of Hispanics in spe-
cific regions or the fact that English was the primary language for
less than half of Hispanic participants.
• Significantly more program than control group members received
employer-sponsored health insurance, paid sick leave, child care
assistance, retirement benefits, dental coverage, and reimburse-
ment for tuition or training.
Finally, note that Job Corps benefits were estimated to exceed
costs by nearly $17,000 per participant if the positive fourth-year earn-
ings impacts on earnings are assumed to continue over their working
lifetimes.14 Barnow and Gubits (2002) suggest that, while we might
question the assumption that Job Corps earnings impacts will persist
undiminished beyond the fourth year, the justification given by Mathe-
matica researchers is sensible for several reasons. First, measured earn-
ings impacts persisted over the entire period of study. Second, the
additional education and training that Job Corps participants received
was about the equivalent of an extra school year, the benefits of which
tend to persist over a person’s lifetime. Finally, the types of skills that
Job Corps teaches—e.g., literacy, numeracy, workplace, and social
skills—are unlikely to become obsolete. 
To summarize, by most accounts, it appears that training—at least
as it was structured and provided in the 1980s and 1990s—was associ-
ated with modest but lasting impacts on earnings for disadvantaged
adult men and women. Further, intensive training for very disadvan-
taged youth as in Job Corps also yields impacts that are solid and last-
ing. Youth training of the sort delivered under regular JTPA programs
in the 1990s does not appear to have been effective. In all cases, the
counterfactual is not receiving no training but rather gaining access to
other education, training, and employment services available in local
communities. Estimated impacts thus represent the incremental value
of training secured via JTPA (now WIA), Job Corps, and other publicly
funded training and employment programs.
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Dislocated Workers
Duane Leigh (1990, 1995, 2000) reviews what we know about dis-
located workers, the various programs and approaches that have been
developed since the early 1960s to assist them, and their effects.
According to Leigh, dislocated workers, probably the most advantaged
group served by publicly funded training programs, are distinguished
by three interrelated characteristics: 1) they have been laid off from
jobs they have held for some time, 2) they have significant work expe-
rience and firm-specific skills, and 3) they have low probabilities of
being recalled to their old jobs or other jobs in the same industries. Dis-
location has been and continues to be a large problem, with an average
of two million full-time workers permanently displaced from their jobs
annually from 1984–1992. The groups displaced have changed some-
what over time, however, with older, college-educated, white-collar
workers from nongoods producing industries disproportionately
affected in the latter half of the 1990s. 
Experimental evaluations of dislocated worker programs have
been the exception, such that our understanding of their impacts is
quite limited. Only two have been conducted to date: the Texas Worker
Adjustment Demonstration (1984–1987),15 and the New Jersey Reem-
ployment Demonstration (1986–1987). The dearth of experimental
evaluations for dislocated worker services probably stems in part from
the nature of the programs themselves: they are often viewed as “emer-
gency” or “rapid” responses to immediate crises in communities rather
than ongoing efforts to address industrial or labor market shifts.
The Texas Worker Adjustment Demonstration tested what was
termed a Tier I/Tier II service model for a range of dislocated workers
in two very different labor markets in the state (i.e., Houston and El
Paso) in the mid 1980s (Bloom 1990). Tier I services consisted basi-
cally of job search assistance, while Tier II—which could only be
reached subsequent to participation in Tier I—consisted of occupa-
tional skills training. In essence, the Texas demonstration sought to test
an early version of “work-first-plus” for dislocated workers. More than
2,200 workers were randomly assigned to Tier I, Tier I/II and control
group statuses for the demonstration across all sites. UI wage records
and survey-based data provided information on their outcomes. Abt
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Associates conducted the evaluation. Key impact results included the
following (Bloom 1990):
• Earnings impacts for displaced women were substantial and sus-
tained over the one-year follow-up period, although these dimin-
ished over time. In 2001 dollars, women participants earned
approximately $1,890 (34 percent) more due to participation (see
Table 3.2).
• Impacts for males were smaller and shorter-lived. Men posted
gains of only $1,108 (8 percent) in 2001 dollars. 
No additional gains were found for adding Tier II services to Tier I
job search (p. 137), however, problems with implementing the design
may well have precluded such impacts.16
The New Jersey UI Reemployment Demonstration also operated in
the mid 1980s and sought to test whether the UI system could be used
to both identify and serve UI-eligible dislocated workers early in their
unemployment spells to accelerate their return to work. Some 8,675 UI
claimants were randomly assigned to three service packages for the
demonstration: JSA only; JSA combined with training (some enroll-
ees) or relocation assistance (very few); and JSA combined with a cash
reemployment bonus. Incremental impacts were computed relative to
outcomes for UI claimants receiving regularly available services.
Claimants were served via a coordinated service approach that brought
together the UI, ES, and JTPA systems in the New Jersey sites. Mathe-
matica Policy Research conducted the evaluation. Corson and Haimson
(1995) found that:
• None of the treatments had any long-term impacts on employ-
ment, earnings, or weeks worked when measured up to six years
after random assignment.
• While all three treatments had positive impacts, the JSA com-
bined with the reemployment bonus was the only service strategy
that led to statistically significant, initial increases in earnings,
and these increases were modest and very short-lived, i.e., just the
first quarter. 
• Training—in which relatively few workers participated—had no
added impact on earnings in either the near- or longer-term,
although this may have been an artifact of the small numbers
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enrolled. Reanalysis of earnings impacts for those actually
enrolled in training indicated that participation in training—CT
and OJT—did appear to enhance participant earnings.17 
To date, we have not fully tested the impact of skills training or
retraining for dislocated workers with a solidly implemented demon-
stration evaluated with an experimental design. In fact, USDOL initi-
ated an experimental evaluation of dislocated worker services toward
the end of the JTPA regime, but it was never completed.18 Note that
recent analyses by Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan (2001, 2002)
using Washington State administrative data suggest that the returns to
community college education for dislocated workers are significant
and may endure for several years. However, their estimates of the
returns to education and training are derived from statistical compari-
sons of “observationally similar” groups of displaced workers (Jacob-
sen, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2002, p. 203) and do not approach the
precision of most quasi-experimental estimates. Absent well-designed
and conducted experimental evaluations of these strategies for dislo-
cated workers, we cannot be very confident of their impacts.
Welfare Recipients
Plimpton and Nightingale (2000) provide a comprehensive review
of both experimental and rigorous quasi-experimental evaluations of
14 welfare-to-work programs that have operated in the United States
since the mid 1970s, beginning with the intensive National Supported
Work demonstration of the late 1970s and welfare employment efforts
under the 1980s’ Work Incentive (WIN) program and ending with an
initial look at the labor force attachment (LFA) and human capital
development (HCD) sites of the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-
Work Strategies (or NEWWS). They summarize findings from these
evaluations, some of which they have contributed to, focusing on
impacts on employment, earnings, and welfare receipt. They report
overall impacts as well as those by subgroup and service strategy. They
summarize their findings as follows (p. 49):
• “Most welfare employment programs that offer low-cost, low
intensity services (like job search assistance and short-term
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unpaid work experience) have positive impacts on employment
and earnings and in some cases reduce welfare costs.
• More comprehensive training programs offering services like
supported, paid work experience and occupational training gener-
ally have larger and longer-lasting impacts.
• Even those interventions with the greatest impacts have been
unable to move individuals and families out of poverty or perma-
nently off the welfare rolls, nor have they produced economic
self-sufficiency.”
Nudelman (2000) analyzed a sample drawn from the National
JTPA Study, consisting of 1,862 adult women (22 years of age and
older) who were receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) when they applied to JTPA between November 1987 and Sep-
tember 1989. She presents both per-assignee and per-enrollee impacts
based on both UI wage records and 30-month follow-up survey data.
She examines JTPA’s overall net impacts on earnings and welfare
receipt, impacts attained by various subgroups of recipients, impacts of
various JTPA service streams, and the relationship between impact on
earnings and impact on receipt of welfare. Note that, as with the larger
National JTPA Study, welfare recipients were assigned to one of three
main service streams: 1) CT, 2) OJT/Job Search Assistance, and 3)
Other Services (i.e., a strategy that did not feature CT or OJT as the pri-
mary intended service). Impacts represent the “incremental effect of
JTPA services relative to services available elsewhere in the commu-
nity” (p. 104). 
Before presenting her findings, Nudelman cautions that there are
noteworthy differences between this group of welfare recipients in
JTPA and those that have been the focus of most welfare employment
evaluations in the past as well as those enrolled in current Welfare-to-
Work (WtW) and TANF programs (p. 105): welfare recipients who
enrolled in JTPA in the late 1980s comprised a very small share of all
recipients, were usually (but not always) volunteers who were screened
for program eligibility, and were not subject to welfare time limits. 
Nudelman reported that:
• More than 30 months after random assignment, JTPA participa-
tion led to a statistically significant 28 percent per-enrollee earn-
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ings increase for adult welfare recipients. During the second
postprogram year, per-enrollee earnings increased by a statisti-
cally significant $889 (21 percent), or about $1,205 in 2001 dol-
lars for adult welfare recipients.
• Earnings impacts persisted over the entire 30-month period and
were statistically significant for most quarters. During the final
two quarters, in fact, the magnitude of earnings impacts was
growing noticeably for adult welfare recipients.
• JTPA participation also resulted in significant reductions in wel-
fare receipt (about –$1,760 in 2001 dollars), although reliable
data on welfare recipiency were only available for 6 of the 16
JTPA study sites nationwide.
• Per-enrollee earnings impacts over the 30-month period were
largest (and statistically significant) for white and other women
($4,733), those with a high school diploma or GED ($2,145),
longer-term recipients ($6,202 for those on 2–5 years and $3,912
for those on more than five years), and those who were not
required to participate in JTPA ($3,149), all expressed in 2001
dollars.
• Per-enrollee impacts also tended to be greater (and significant)
for women assigned to the OJT/JSA and Other Service streams:
those assigned to the former earned nearly $3,520 more in the
second postprogram year and almost $7,400 for the 30-month
period; those in Other Services earned $5,661 more for the entire
period (all in 2001 dollars). Nudelman suggests that lower
impacts for CT might be explained by the short-term nature of the
training offered (only 3–6 months).
With additional years of labor market outcome data, it is possible
to round out this picture of longer-term impacts for adult welfare recip-
ients in JTPA. The USDOL/ETA data provide detailed per-assignee
impacts by service strategy (i.e., CT, OJT/JSA, Other) for seven years
following random assignment for welfare recipients, sorted into two
groups: those on welfare less than two years, and those on welfare two
years or more prior to entry. Unfortunately, the USDOL data lack the
strategy-specific enrollment rates for each of the designated welfare
subgroups required to convert per-assignee to per-enrollee impacts.
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Among other findings, unpublished USDOL data on per-assignee
impacts indicate that:
• With a few exceptions, statistically significant earnings impacts
were concentrated among long-term welfare recipients with prior
work experience. 
• Long-term welfare recipients experienced earnings gains from
JTPA participation in all seven years following random assign-
ment, with significant earnings gains in the first three years. Over
the entire seven-year period, long-term welfare recipients experi-
enced a 9 percent earnings gain from participation.
• Impacts varied widely by service strategy and welfare status.
Long-term welfare recipients assigned to CT experienced modest
to near-zero impacts. Long-term recipients assigned to OJT/JSA
enjoyed substantial impacts in most years and a 12 percent earn-
ings gain over the period as a whole; those on welfare less than
two years at entry also gained from OJT/JSA, including a statisti-
cally significant 21 percent impact in year seven and 12 percent
over the entire period. For those assigned to the Other Service
stream, only long-term recipients enjoyed gains: persistent annual
increases and 24 percent for the seven-year period as a whole,
and statistically significant gains of 33–36 percent in the first and
second years. 
• Only welfare recipients with at least some prior work experience
enjoyed earnings gains following assignment to JTPA services.
Michalopolous, Schwartz, and Adams-Ciardullo (2000) provide
per-assignee impact results for 20 programs serving welfare recipients
across the country as part of the large National Evaluation of WtW
Strategies (NEWWS) being conducted by MDRC for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.19 The 20 welfare employment
programs included the Saturation Work Initiative Model (SWIM) in
San Diego; California Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) pro-
grams, located in Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego,
and Tulare Counties; LFA and HCD programs in Atlanta (Georgia),
Grand Rapids (Michigan), and Riverside (California); education-
focused Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (JOBS) programs in
Detroit and Oklahoma City; traditional and integrated JOBS programs
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in Columbus (Ohio); an employment-focused JOBS program in Port-
land (Oregon); Minnesota’s Family Investment Program (MFIP); and
finally, the Family Transition Program (FTP) in Escambia County
(Florida).
Some 71,932 single-parent welfare recipients were randomly
assigned to a program or control group across the participating sites.
Control group members did not receive employment-related services
offered under the various programs and were not mandated to partici-
pate in the programs. Thus, the NEWWS evaluation focuses on a vol-
untary program, in sharp contrast to most earlier evaluations of welfare
employment programs.
Michalopoulos, Schwartz, and Adams-Ciardullo (2000) report
that:
• Programs increased earnings by roughly $500 per person on aver-
age and rose for all subgroups. Earnings increased most for new
welfare applicants and least for those with high risk of depres-
sion. 
• Psychological and social barriers were not strongly related to
earnings impacts.
• Programs reduced welfare payments by $400 per person and food
stamp payments by $100 per person on average.
• Programs did not increase or decrease overall income for most
subgroups.
• Increases in earnings were fairly constant for all levels of disad-
vantage, although more disadvantaged program groups had
higher reductions in welfare payments.
• Programs increased earnings substantially for low-risk partici-
pants (about $800) and moderate-risk participants (about $500)
but did not significantly increase earnings for the most
depressed.20 
• Among disadvantaged subgroups, program impacts were higher
for those without prior work experience than for those who had
not graduated from high school.
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• Employment-focused programs (Portland, Riverside GAIN,
MFIP, and FTP) were more effective for more disadvantaged
groups.
• Programs with a mix of activities (all GAIN sites, Portland,
MFIP, and FTP) helped a wider range of individuals overall.
Freedman (2000) reports on four-year employment and earnings
per-assignee impacts from 10 of the programs evaluated by MDRC as
part of NEWWS. Four of these programs—Atlanta, Grand Rapids, and
Riverside LFA and Portland—were largely employment-focused,
encouraging rapid entry into the labor market. Six of the programs—
Atlanta, Grand Rapids, and Riverside HCD, Columbus Integrated,
Columbus Traditional, and Detroit—were education-focused, striving
to increase participants’ skills or credentials before they looked for
employment. 
Some 44,569 single parents were randomly assigned to treatment
and control groups over a three-and-a-half-year period. As with all
NEWWS sites, members of the control group did not receive employ-
ment-related services and were not mandated to participate. Freed-
man’s report covers roughly half of the sample (n = 27,105) for whom
four-year postassignment follow-up data are available. Short- and
long-term employment stability and earnings growth figures were cal-
culated using state UI wage records. Regression was used to adjust
impact estimates to account for sample members’ differences in prior
earnings and employment, welfare benefits received, and baseline
characteristics. 
Freedman found that a greater percentage of program group mem-
bers in the employment-focused programs were employed during the
first two years and remained employed at the end of year two than con-
trol group members. However, the results were mixed. The proportions
of individuals who were no longer employed after year two or who
experienced unstable employment or joblessness during years three
and four were also higher. Earnings findings were also mixed.
Hamilton (2002) synthesizes the overall findings from the five-
year NEWWS evaluation, reporting that:
• All NEWWS programs significantly increased single parents’
employment and earnings and decreased their dependence on
welfare (p. 23), although earnings effects tended to diminish dur-
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ing the fourth and fifth follow-up years (p. 24). Only Portland—a
hybrid employment/education program—and the Riverside LFA
program produced significant earnings impacts in the fifth year.
• “Notably, only a minority of program group members experi-
enced stable employment over the five years.” Even after five
years, most were still earning relatively low hourly wages, e.g.,
$7–$8 per hour (p. 24).
• “Employment-focused programs generally had larger effects on
employment and earnings than did education-focused programs”
(p. 28). LFA program impacts on earnings for the full five-year
period ranged from $1,500 to $2,500, while those for HCD pro-
grams ranged from $800 to $2,000 (p. 29). In both instances,
these are per-assignee impacts.
• Compared with LFA, the more costly HCD approach did not pro-
duce additional long-run economic benefits (p. 29), nor did it lead
to greater earnings growth or increase the likelihood of employ-
ment in good jobs (p. 32). These results held for nongraduates as
well as graduates.
It is important to note that HCD programs included in the NEWWS
evaluation stressed basic and adult education much more than occupa-
tional skills training. During the five-year period, 40 percent of all par-
ticipants in the HCD programs participated in adult education for at
least one day, while only 28 percent participated in vocational training.
Participation in vocational training, not surprisingly, was far higher for
high school graduates than for non-graduates. HCD programs
increased adult education participation by fully 20 percentage points,
but only increased participation in vocational training by 5 percentage
points (p. 17).
The most effective program emerging from the NEWWS evalua-
tion was the Portland program, a hybrid employment- and education-
focused model. Over five years, participants in the Portland site
increased their earnings by 25 percent and their average number of
employed quarters by 21 percent, and also experienced more stable
employment and earnings growth than all of the other programs. Its
distinctive features included the following: “an employment focus, the
use of both job search and short-term education or training, and an
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emphasis on holding out for a good job” (p. 36).21 Portland also limited
the duration of participation in some types of adult education.
Finally, Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2000) make an important
contribution to our understanding of the duration of impacts from wel-
fare employment and training program participation. They reanalyze
long-term impacts from the four California GAIN sites that were fea-
tured in the MDRC evaluation (i.e., Alameda, Los Angeles, Riverside,
and San Diego), using nine years of postrandom assignment outcomes
data—the longest time period used in any random assignment evalua-
tion conducted to date—and accounting for county-level differences in
participant populations. They conclude that “work-first” programs
were more successful in producing net impacts on employment, earn-
ings and welfare reductions than “human capital accumulation” pro-
grams in the early years, i.e., one to three years after assignment.
However, the relative advantage of these less expensive “work-first”
interventions disappears in later years. Based on their long-term re-
analysis of GAIN program impacts, Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2000)
conclude that:
[S]hort-term evaluation of training programs can be misleading.
The relative ranking of programs is not stable over time. Simple
extrapolations of early results to later results do not appear to be
possible. The relation of short-term results to long-term results
appears to vary with program content in ways consistent with a
priori expectations. (p. 43)
Without a doubt, we know more about the impacts of various
employment and training interventions on the employment and earn-
ings of welfare recipients than any other single group. High-quality
experimental evaluations of both demonstration projects and ongoing
programs have been conducted over three decades in order to estimate
impacts for welfare women. Fortunately for policymakers, they have
yielded reasonably consistent results. First, most welfare employment
and training programs evaluated over the years have led to increased
employment and earnings and reduced welfare payments for welfare
recipients, especially those with more education and some work expe-
rience who were longer-term (though not necessarily longest-term)
recipients and who volunteered to participate. Second, while low-
intensity LFA approaches worked very well in the near term, more
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intensive ones tended to perform better over the long haul, especially
those that stressed a mix of work and skill development. And finally,
while employment and training programs have worked for all con-
cerned—for participants, taxpayers, and society—most of the partici-
pants have remained in low-paying, relatively unstable employment.
Only a small share have escaped poverty. 
Before concluding, we should acknowledge just how much the
context for welfare employment and training programs has changed
over the time period in which these studies have been carried out.
Women on welfare now encounter constrained service options (e.g.,
work-first) and mandates to participate under the threat of sanctions
that accompany welfare time limits and personal responsibility agree-
ments, among other important changes. They are expected to work and
attain economic self-sufficiency through earnings—or possibly mar-
riage—rather than relying on public assistance. 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND LESSONS FOR 
TRAINING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
What we know about the effectiveness of training can be summa-
rized in a few brief statements, which are based on decades of experi-
ence evaluating these programs with the most reliable method
available: an experimental design with random assignment to treatment
and control groups. These statements also incorporate results from
major evaluations that were completed in the last two years, namely the
National Job Corps Evaluation and NEWWS. In general, we know
with considerable confidence that:
• Training as delivered in traditional employment and training pro-
grams produces modest incremental impacts on employment and
earnings (measured relative to other services available in the
community) for adult men and women. While statistically signifi-
cant and often lasting for years, these impacts are insufficient to
lift these individuals and their families out of poverty.
• Training as delivered in traditional programs does not result in
positive employment or earnings impacts for disadvantaged
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youth. Training for youth that is delivered through intensive and
expensive programs like Job Corps does produce modest and last-
ing impacts on employment and earnings as well as strong returns
on investment, although not for all groups (e.g., Hispanics and
younger youth).
• Employment-focused approaches tend to produce modest, signif-
icant and near-term effects on employment and earnings for wel-
fare recipients. The models that are particularly effective for
welfare recipients are those that offer a mix of LFA and skills
acquisition services (and only limited adult education) and that
encourage participants to be selective in their search for jobs
offering good wages and benefits and career advancement oppor-
tunities. 
• HCD programs produce significant long-term (up to nine-year)
impacts on employment and earnings for welfare recipients that
exceed those of less costly “work-first” programs. 
What lessons can we draw from these evaluation findings for WIA
and other workforce-related policies and programs? Several features of
WIA merit our attention (see Chapter 4 of this volume). Unlike its pre-
decessors CETA and JTPA, WIA posits training as a “service of last
resort,” directing local one-stop centers to put adults and dislocated
workers through a sequence of core and intensive services before refer-
ring them to providers for more expensive training services. This fea-
ture was incorporated into WIA to stress a “work-first” orientation
much like that in the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996 for welfare
recipients. WIA also stresses individual choice through the use of indi-
vidual training accounts (ITAs), voucher-like mechanisms, to fund
most training for adults and dislocated workers.22 In addition, ITAs
may only be used to secure training from providers certified by the
state as eligible training providers (ETPs) based on their recent record
of performance. ITAs and eligible training provider lists reflect WIA’s
increased reliance on market-like mechanisms. WIA has also intro-
duced a far more competitive environment for delivering workforce
services, both by mandating that workforce boards contract out com-
petitively for one-stop center operators as well as by introducing ITAs
and eligible provider provisions. Finally, WIA accountability provi-
sions allow states and local boards discretion over the point at which an
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individual jobseeker is officially registered for services and, thus, a
person for whom the board is accountable. One-stop operators may
delay registration until they feel reasonably confident the individual
will be successful (e.g., entered employment, earnings gain). WIA has
also dropped the use of a regression model to adjust performance
expectations for local conditions and participant characteristics.
We can draw several important lessons for WIA and related poli-
cies. First, workforce policies and programs should stress combina-
tions of work and training for many if not most participants. Not only
are some of the largest and more durable earnings impacts associated
with such interventions (e.g., the OJT/JSA service stream for JTPA and
Portland’s hybrid approach under NEWWS), but we also know that
various forms of work-based learning, including apprenticeship and
customized training, are valued highly by employers. Moreover, for
participants, often the largest cost of education and training is their
foregone earnings. So, emphasizing combinations of work and training
appears to make sense from all perspectives. A corollary to this lesson
is that simplistic work-first, any-job-is-a-good-job approaches that
push participants into jobs without access to training should be
avoided. 
Second, WIA’s emphasis on training-as-last-resort is a good strat-
egy only if our main goal is producing near-term labor market impacts
at low cost. More recent USDOL interpretations of WIA’s sequence-of-
services provisions that tell states and localities to use discretion in
deciding when an individual can proceed to training represent a move
in the right direction. If the goal of WIA is real employment and earn-
ings impacts over the long-term—say, 6–9 years postenrollment—then
occupational skills training in the context of an employment-focused
approach is the way to go. Included in a more human capital-focused
strategy would be enhanced ties to community and technical col-
leges—what Grubb et al. (1999) refer to as “ladders of opportunity.”
WIA policies are currently discouraging such connections.
Third, greater reliance on market-oriented mechanisms—consumer
choice, ITAs, ETP certification lists—combined with measurement
focused on short-term performance and increased competition, is likely
to drive WIA even more towards immediate results, low-cost services,
and participant “creaming.” Research conducted on JTPA programs
indicated that these issues have been problematic for a while, but the
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combination of these WIA provisions can be expected to make matters
worse.23 The results from the Department of Labor’s ITA evaluation,
now being conducted by Mathematica (See Chapter 6 in this volume),
should be examined very thoroughly for insights regarding necessary
policy and program adjustments to avoid undesirable effects.
Fourth, the results for Portland and related evaluation research
point to a number of program features associated with longer-term
labor market success. Rather than leave program design completely to
market forces, WIA policy should actively disseminate these findings
and encourage states and local workforce boards to adopt program
designs accordingly. Key features include a strong focus on employ-
ment, combining job search and short-term education or training, and
being more selective about the choice of jobs, e.g., demand occupa-
tions paying self-sufficiency wages and offering greater potential for
retention and advancement. 
Fifth, WIA and related programs should put more resources into
postprogram services geared to promoting continued access to learn-
ing, retention and career advancement opportunities. Many of those
now being served in WIA, TANF, and related workforce programs are
unlikely to have the desired level of access to or participation in further
education and training opportunities in the workplace without an addi-
tional push from public policy. Employers are increasing their invest-
ments in training, but training is still offered disproportionately to
those at higher skill levels.
Sixth, impacts for youth are unlikely to improve under WIA unless
more intensive service strategies are pursued along the lines of those
found in Job Corps, which remains the only program that has yielded
significant, lasting labor market impacts for youth. Job Corps is expen-
sive, but under very reasonable assumptions, produces positive returns
on investment for very disadvantaged youths. USDOL, and other
responsible federal agencies (e.g., U.S. Department of Education),
would do well to study the lessons from Job Corps and develop mecha-
nisms for implementing them within the mainstream programs across
the nation. While doing so, special efforts must be made to determine
what works for Hispanic and younger (18–19-year-old) youth.24
We can also offer lessons that extend beyond WIA. One is that
measuring the impacts of training, a challenge in the best of circum-
stances, is likely to become even more difficult in the future. Even with
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training producing the desired impacts on earnings, if training is poorly
measured in WIA information systems, and if control group members
are accessing an ever-expanding array of Internet-based education and
training services, then detecting incremental impacts relative to ser-
vices received in the community at large will be very challenging.
Making the case for funding effective workforce services may become
more difficult.
Another lesson we should take from the Job Corps experience over
several decades is that serious attention to the what and how of training
pays off in the labor market for even the most disadvantaged partici-
pants. Job Corps is the only workforce development program that has
enjoyed relative stability over many years, while retaining a focus on
real skill acquisition with the necessary support services. It may be no
accident that many of the Job Corps contractors also bring to the table
experiences from the military sector, a sector that has made conscious,
long-term investments in curricula, learning technologies and related
tools (see, for example, Fletcher and Chatelier 2000). We should pur-
sue ways to promote greater technology transfer on training from the
military into other areas of the public as well as the private sectors.
Yet a third important lesson is that training and training-related
strategies are necessary but not sufficient without well designed
demand-side strategies. Even the most effective employment and train-
ing programs have tended to leave most of their participants in employ-
ment that was less than stable and earning wages that were inadequate
to attain economic self-sufficiency. Public policy must pay careful
attention to both sides of the labor market to be effective.
The importance of training is widely recognized (see, for example,
International Labour Office 1998). Mangum (2000) refers to this as the
“essentiality of occupational preparation.” We now compete in a global
economy with shortening production cycles, growing job insecurity
and instability, and rising emphasis on personal and family responsibil-
ity for all things, including career development and management
(“career navigators”). The labor market places a definite premium on
education and skills such that the income and earnings gap between
those who have them and those who do not continues to widen. We
must use the lessons learned from program evaluations to improve the
delivery of training services over time. In part, this may mean commu-
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nicating them in a form that individual consumers can comprehend and
act upon. 
Notes
This chapter was prepared with funding from the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employ-
ment Research and the U.S. Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Admin-
istration. Daniel Schroeder, Sarah Looney, Andy Redman, and Dan Starr assisted with
this research. David Grubb, Carolyn Heinrich, Dan Ryan, Steve Wandner, and Bill
Rogers provided helpful comments on earlier versions presented to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor/Upjohn Institute Conference on Job Training and Labor Exchange in
the U.S. in Augusta, Michigan, in September 2002 and the 24th Annual Research Con-
ference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management in Dallas,
Texas, in November 2002.
1. King et al. (2000) rely on figures from Function 504 in the federal budget. Fried-
lander et al. (1997, p. 1814) state that training expenditures “broadly defined,”
constituted less than 0.2 percent of GDP in 1995.
2. For example, the Texas Smart Jobs Fund, which had been second in size only to
California’s ETP, was eliminated in 2001, a victim both of the lack of evidence of
its effectiveness and of declining Texas UI trust fund balances.
3. Ray Marshall Center tabulations based on raw 2000–2001 participation data pro-
vided by the local board.
4. These figures are based on tabulations from WIA Standard Reporting and Data
System.
5. I am currently participating in two USDOL-funded projects—the Administrative
Data Research and Evaluation (ADARE) Project (see Stevens 2003) and the
eight-state WIA Service Delivery Study that is being directed by the Rockefeller
Institute (Barnow and King 2003)—that are exploring these issues and document-
ing WIA data collection and reporting problems.
6. Some researchers prefer the term “nonexperimental” to “quasi-experimental,” on
the grounds that the prefix “quasi” lends too much credence to the resulting esti-
mates. Yet, the point of the distinction is that evaluation methods relying on vari-
ous forms of comparison groups are attempting to approximate the results of
experiments, while simple gross-outcome analyses that are “nonexperimental” do
not. I’ve chosen to use the term “quasi-experimental” for this reason.
7. Note that these would translate into impacts ranging from around $312 to $935 in
current (2001) dollars.
8. PSE was dropped from the federal training toolkit in the early 1980s despite
showing positive (quasi-experimental) results, especially for women. Funding for
PSE was eliminated from the federal budget in FY 1981. Congress eliminated
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PSE as an allowable activity when JTPA was signed into law replacing CETA in
late 1982.
9. Kane and Rouse (1999, p. 74) suggest that researchers have been far too conserva-
tive in interpreting JTPA training impacts, a point also made in the recent paper by
Barnow and Gubits (2002).
10. I am grateful to Dan Ryan of USDOL/ETA’s Office of Evaluation for providing
these data.
11. USDOL’s per-assignee impacts were converted into per-enrollee impacts using
the activity enrollment rates provided in Orr et al. (1996) and Nudelman (2000).
12. Mathematica researchers Mallar et al. (1982) also conducted the quasi-experimen-
tal evaluation of Job Corps some twenty years earlier.
13. Roughly 27 percent of the applicants never enrolled in the Job Corps.
14. McConnell and Glazerman (2001), indicate that benefits exceed costs for most
participant subgroups with two troubling exceptions: Hispanics and younger (18–
19-year-old) participants.
15. The author served as Assistant Director of Research, Demonstration and Evalua-
tion for the Texas JTPA program during this period and expended considerable
effort to ensure that an experimental design was the basis for the Texas demon-
stration. An Abt Associates team led by Howard Bloom, then at New York Uni-
versity, conducted the evaluation.
16. Most of the Tier II referrals to training were in the Houston site, and, unfortu-
nately, many of these were referrals of former white-collar professionals to what
was seen as blue-collar training. A more appropriate test of their Tier I/II design
would have been desirable.
17. Estimated earnings effects for training participation are very high: for example,
second-year, per-enrollee impacts of $1,402 (insignificant) for CT and $10,987
for OJT (significant at the 99 percent level) in 1986–1987 dollars (see Corson and
Haimson 1995, p. 48). Note that these estimates are based on very small numbers
and are not true experimental impacts estimates. Only 15 percent of those referred
to training received it, while 19 percent of those offered the reemployment bonus
received it (Corson and Haimson 1995, pp. 18–19).
18. Again, thanks to Dan Ryan of USDOL/ETA for providing this information.
19. The NEWWS evaluation reports did not provide sufficient information to com-
pute per-participant impacts for all groups.
20. Risk of depression was measured for sample members in Portland, Riverside,
Atlanta, and Grand Rapids using four items from the Center for Epidemiological
Studies-Depression (CES-D) Scale.
21. We identified many of the same features as being important factors in producing
gross outcomes in a USDOL-funded research project on JTPA “success stories” in
Illinois and Texas in the mid 1990s (King et al. 2000). We utilized a combination
of multivariate statistical analysis of program records linked with long-term UI
wage records and in-depth field interviews with program administrators and staff.
22. OJT, customized training, and a few other exceptions are allowed.
23. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of these issues.
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24. WIA defines two youth subgroups: younger youth (18–19) and older youth (20–
24). Job Corps (part of WIA) takes the same approach.
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in Delivering Training Services 
to Adults under WIA 
Ronald D’Amico
Jeffrey Salzman
The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA) represents a poten-
tially important reshaping of the federal government’s approach to
worker training as part of publicly funded workforce development ser-
vices. First applied nationwide in program year (PY) 2000, a number
of the act’s key provisions were to some extent initially greeted with
confusion and uncertainty by workforce practitioners charged with
implementing them. Moreover, PY 2000 represented a period of rapid
economic growth and extremely tight labor markets that limited the
demand for training services among what would normally have been
the program’s traditional clientele. Both of these facts combined to
make WIA’s first full year of implementation rather tentative. Subse-
quently, WIA has matured substantially, as the workforce development
system has gained greater confidence and comfort with implementing
WIA, and changes to the economic climate have increased the demand
for training services.
In this chapter, we profile this trajectory with regards to the WIA
adult program.1 We begin by delineating the legislation’s key provi-
sions regarding training services and contrast them with previous
approaches. We next describe the early evolution of WIA service deliv-
ery by drawing on data collected through administrative records and
interviews we conducted with workforce practitioners in nearly 50
local workforce investment areas in 23 separate states around the coun-
try. We conclude by drawing attention to the inherent tension between
some of WIA’s key provisions and reflect on the likely implications of
WIA reauthorization for resolving them.
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KEY PROVISIONS REGARDING TRAINING IN WIA
WIA replaced and repealed the Job Training Partnership Act
(JTPA) and amended the Wagner-Peyser Act in response to a variety of
concerns about how the existing public workforce development system
was designed and operated. Among these concerns, it was noted that a
multitude of employment and training programs—by some counts over
150 separate programs, including, among others, those operating under
JTPA, Vocational Rehabilitation, Vocational Education, the Trade
Adjustment Assistance Act, and the Wagner-Peyser Act—often oper-
ated without effective coordination or collaboration. The resulting sys-
tem suffered from redundancies and inefficiencies and confronted
customers with a confusing maze of programs through which they
found it difficult to navigate (U.S. General Accounting Office
1994a,b,c 2000).
Second, JTPA services were limited to those who met narrowly
prescribed eligibility criteria, thereby curtailing access to potentially
valuable workforce services to the broader population in need of skills
upgrading or retraining. In JTPA’s adult program, participation was
limited to those who were economically disadvantaged and (after the
JTPA Amendments of 1992) at least 65 percent needed to be identified
as hard to serve, by virtue of having at least one barrier to employment
from a list of seven that were specified in the legislation. These stipula-
tions arguably served to target services on those who needed them the
most. However, as the U.S. workforce development system moved
toward a model of one-stop service delivery over the several years
before JTPA’s repeal, these eligibility restrictions created awkward
problems regarding funding and staffing support and hampered the
ability of JTPA-supported programs to operate effectively with its part-
ners (Kogan et al. 1997). Moreover, they hampered the ability of the
public workforce investment system to be agile in upgrading workers’
skills to meet evolving employers’ needs in a rapidly changing econ-
omy.
Third, JTPA was faulted for authorizing expensive training ser-
vices as a first, rather than as a last, resort. Indeed, JTPA was presump-
tively a training program. Although the requirements were somewhat
looser in the dislocated worker program, virtually all persons enrolled
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in the JTPA adult program were expected to receive comprehensive
services that could include basic skills training and occupational skills
training, among other things. Moreover, at least 50 percent of funds for
the adult program needed to be spent on direct training services, and
job search assistance or preemployment skill building as stand-alone
activities were discouraged.2 Given the hard-to-serve clientele that
JTPA was targeting, these restrictions might have been sensible. At the
same time, they arguably handcuffed practitioners and, if results from
recent welfare-to-work evaluations are an indication, might have pro-
moted training services when less costly interventions might have been
more effective in leading to employment quickly (Freedman et al.
2000; Hamilton 2002).3
Fourth, because of JTPA’s heavy use of contract training, partici-
pants’ choices among courses of study and available training providers
were often limited to a preselected vendor or set of vendors with which
the local workforce area had worked out prior agreements. In the worst
cases, participants were sometimes assigned to a course of study by a
case manager primarily because a training slot in a program for which
the local area had developed a contract needed to be filled. For these
reasons, JTPA was sometimes criticized for not being sufficiently cus-
tomer focused (Levitan and Gallo 1988; U.S. Department of Labor
1991).
Finally, JTPA was sometimes decried as being inattentive to the
needs of the business community. According to these arguments, the
role that publicly funded workforce development programs should play
in promoting the nation’s economic competitiveness and ensuring a
supply of skilled workers for emerging industry needs was too little
appreciated.
WIA was enacted to address these concerns, after much anticipa-
tion and delay caused by a protracted policy debate within Congress.
Building on reforms that some states and the federal government had
already begun (D’Amico et al. 2001; Grubb et al. 1999), it does so by
purportedly improving system integration and service coordination,
providing universal access while rationing services to promote effi-
ciency, promoting customer choice and system accountability, and
bringing business to the fore as a key customer of the workforce sys-
tem. 
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Among the ways WIA attempts to accomplish these purposes is by
mandating the establishment of a one-stop service delivery structure,
by which key partners involved in providing public workforce devel-
opment assistance are to come together to plan and coordinate their
services.4 To the extent that doing so is consistent with their authoriz-
ing legislation, partners are to contribute to the costs and maintenance
of the one-stop system in a way that should reflect benefits to their own
customers.
Apart from mandating a new service delivery infrastructure, WIA
also changes eligibility rules and program services in comparison to
JTPA. These differences are summarized in Table 4.1. As the table
shows, WIA promotes universal access by abandoning JTPA’s rigid
criteria regarding eligibility for services and thereby allows all adults
to access WIA services without regard to income status. To this degree,
the public workforce system must become equipped to meet a diverse
array of needs and, in so doing, can play a critical role in promoting the
efficient matching of workers with job openings and enhancing work-
ers’ careers and work skills. 
At the same time, recognizing the need to husband scarce
resources, WIA also promotes system efficiency by establishing a hier-
archy of three service tiers, with limited access to the more expensive,
higher tiers of service. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, core ser-
vices consist of basic informational services, self-services, or light-
touch staff-assisted services primarily designed to assist individuals in
conducting job search or researching training or other services on their
own. Intensive services, the next level of the hierarchy, consist of activ-
ities involving somewhat greater staff involvement, but the focus is
still on providing short-term assistance—such as pre-vocational ser-
vices or assessment and counseling—designed to help customers
access available job opportunities given their existing occupational
skills. Finally, training services, including on-the-job training and
classroom occupational skills training, consist of generally longer-term
skill-building activities designed to provide participants with occupa-
tionally specific skills or credentials. 
Abandoning JTPA’s rigid criteria regarding eligibility for services,
all adults are able to access these services. However, in keeping with
the notion that these three service tiers constitute a hierarchy, only
those who are deemed unable to achieve their employment objectives
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Table 4.1 Adult Program Side-by-Side WIA and JTPA Comparison Regarding Eligibility and Services
WIA JTPA (Title II-A)
Eligibility and 
targeting 
• All adults (ages 18 and over) are eligible for core 
services
• Intensive and training services are available to those 
who have had at least one service at a lower tier and 
are deemed unable to meet their employment goals 
without services at the higher tier
• Priority for intensive and training services must be 
given to recipients of public assistance and other 
low-income individuals, in local areas were funds 
are limited
• Eligibility generally restricted to economically disadvantaged 
adults (ages 22 or older)
• 65% must be in specified “hard-to-serve” categories (e.g., 
basic skills deficient, dropouts, welfare recipients, offenders, 
homeless, those with disabilities) 
• 10% need not be economically disadvantaged, but they must 
still be in a “hard-to-serve” category or be a displaced 
homemaker, veteran, or alcoholic or addict
Services • Customers must receive at least one core service 
before receiving intensive services, and at least one 
intensive service before receiving training services
• Core services consist of, among other things:
• Outreach, intake, and orientation to services
• Job search and placement assistance, including 
career counseling where appropriate
• Providing labor market info (e.g., job vacancy 
listings, occupations and skills in demand, etc.)
• Providing performance and cost info on training 
providers
• Services shall include an objective assessment of skill levels 
and service needs
• Basic skills training, occupational skills training, and 
supportive services should be provided, either directly or 
through referral, where the assessment indicates they are 
appropriate
• Authorized direct training services include, among others:
• Basic skills training and GED training
• On-the-job training and customized training





 • Intensive services consist of, among other things:
• Comprehensive and specialized assessments, to 
identify employment goals and barriers
• Developing the individual employment plan
• Group and individual counseling and career 
planning
• Short-term pre-vocational services
• Training services consist of, among other things:
• Occupational skills training
• On-the-job training
• Skill upgrading and retraining
• Entrepreneurial training
• Job readiness training
• Adult education and literacy services provided in 
combination with other training services
• Training services should be provided through 
Individual Training Accounts, except for on-the job 
training and customized training, training programs 
of demonstrated effectiveness for those with 
multiple barriers, or if there are too few eligible 
training providers




• Training to develop appropriate work habits
• Preapprenticeship programs
• On-site industry-specific training
• Authorized training-related and supportive services include, 
among others:
• Job search assistance and outreach
• Supportive services and needs-based payments
• Work experience, job search assistance, job search skills 
training, and job club activities are to be accompanied by basic 
and/or occupational skills training, unless the latter services 
are not appropriate and the former are not available through 
the Employment Service
• Services to older individuals (ages 55 and older) can be 
separately provided as part of Section 204(d)
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at a lower level of service can advance to the next higher level. More-
over, priority is to be given to public assistance and other low-income
individuals, whenever funds are deemed to be scarce. Thus, the intent
of these provisions taken together is to provide access to basic services
to all adults, while limiting the more costly services to those whose
need is demonstrable and most pressing.
Customer choice and empowerment are also key tenets of the leg-
islation. In the first instance, this objective is achieved by allowing the
universal customer free and open access to a vast array of informa-
tional tools and resources that he or she can use on a self-help basis. As
well, customers undertaking training are to be provided with opportu-
nities to choose the training program and provider that they feel best
meet their needs. In this regard, although WIA still allows contract
training under some circumstances, it aims to empower customers by
relying heavily on Individual Training Accounts (ITAs), which can be
likened to vouchers that customers are generally free to use to procure
training services of their choice, subject to certain limitations. Among
these limitations, local workforce agencies can place caps on the dura-
tion of training that customers can undertake and the costs that will be
approved. Second, the training generally must provide skills for jobs
that are deemed to be in demand in the local economy (or in another
location to which the customer intends to relocate). Finally, the training
program selected by the customer must have been certified by the state
and local area as meeting acceptable standards of quality. The latter
restriction will typically mean that the vendor has provided basic infor-
mation about the training program and that previous cohorts of the pro-
gram’s trainees have met state standards for successful training
outcomes.
By virtue of these provisions, WIA offers the basis for a substantial
systemwide transformation. The extent to which it in fact achieves its
objectives of greater system integration, customer empowerment, and
efficiency, however, will depend on the ways its key stipulations are
implemented in each of the nation’s 600-plus local workforce develop-
ment areas. Moreover, whether it does so without abandoning a
decades-long federal commitment to improving the employment pros-
pects of those who are economically disadvantaged by investing sub-
stantially in their occupational skills development remains very much
an open question.
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In the remainder of this chapter we provide a glimpse of the early
WIA implementation experience, focusing specifically on training ser-
vices funded to serve adults. We do so by drawing on recently available
data for PY 2001 from WIA’s client-level reporting system, the Work-
force Investment Act Standardized Record Data (WIASRD), which
records client characteristics, services, and outcomes for those who
exited WIA during that program year.5 Moreover, to provide a point of
contrast with JTPA, we also use the PY 1998 Standardized Program
Information Report (SPIR), the client-level reporting system analogous
to the WIASRD that was used under JTPA.6 Finally, we draw on quali-
tative information we collected from multi-day site visits to nearly 50
separate local workforce areas from PY 1999 through PY 2001 as part
of a number of separate evaluations.7 Because not all of these local
areas were selected randomly, they cannot be construed necessarily as
representative of the workforce system as a whole. Nonetheless, they
provide substantial coverage across all regions of the country and 23
separate states and, as such, provide important evidence about the
range of variation across the WIA workforce development system in its
early years.
Among the issues we examine with these data sources are the
extent to which local areas focus on training (as opposed to core and
intensive services), the ways they establish customers’ access to ITAs,
limits they impose on the training choices that customers can make,
and ways they support customers through the decision-making process. 
TRAINING AS A FOCUS OF PROGRAM ACTIVITY
As the above description suggests, WIA can be construed as a dra-
matic shift in thinking about the role of training in serving program
participants. The JTPA adult program, which WIA supersedes, was
intended to be predominantly a training program, while WIA estab-
lishes a sequence of service levels that will culminate in training only if
core and intensive services are deemed not to meet the customer’s
employment needs. To this extent, Congress recognized when enacting
WIA that, given constraints of available funding, service strategies
would need to rely on less costly interventions to accompany WIA’s
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broader scope for eligibility. Moreover, Congress was to some degree
demonstrating its philosophical bent toward a “work first” approach
that was even more clearly reflected a few years earlier in its revamp-
ing of the nation’s welfare system, through the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. In this context,
states and local areas need to decide the emphasis they will place on
WIA training and the role they see for less costly core and intensive
services. Their decisions reflect both practical considerations as well as
strategic thinking about how best to invest their WIA dollars for great-
est impact given the context of local labor market needs. 
Emphasis on Training
Implicit in the legislation is a tension between serving the universal
customer with a work-first approach on the one hand, and meeting the
needs of low-income and low-skilled customers who are likely to need
intensive interventions on the other (O’Shea and King 2001). Table 4.2
provides a preliminary answer to how this tension is being resolved.
Using WIASRD data for PY 2001, it tabulates the percentage of WIA
registrants in the adult program who exited after using only core ser-
vices, intensive services but no training, or training services.8 Data
from the PY 1998 SPIR are reported for comparison.
First, among WIA registrants, about 23 percent exited after receiv-
ing only staff-assisted core services, 36 percent after intensive services,
and 42 percent after training services.9 No comparable figures are
available in the PY 1998 SPIR. Nonetheless, JTPA’s heavier emphasis
on training can be deduced in that the incidence of basic skills instruc-
tion, on-the-job training (OJT), and other occupational training were
all substantially higher in JTPA than they are in WIA. Thus, the inci-
dence of basic skills instruction went from 18 percent to 2 percent,10
OJT from 9 percent to 5 percent, and other occupational training from
67 percent to 33 percent.11 Similarly, the average length of participation
was longer in JTPA than in WIA, with very short spells of participation
(participation of less than three months) substantially more common
now than previously (26 percent in JTPA versus 34 percent in WIA),
though differences are much more modest when one compares the
JTPA figures with those for WIA trainees.12 All of this is in keeping
with WIA’s allowance that limited-duration, nontraining services—and
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nothing more—might be suitable for many WIA registrants. Finally, as
one would expect, spells of participation in WIA are longer as one
moves across the three service tiers, from staff-assisted core, to inten-
sive services, and to training. 
The table suggests, then, that WIA program operators are making
full use of the three levels of service activity that WIA allows, exiting
registrants in substantial numbers at all three service levels. Table 4.3
shows, however, that local workforce investment areas (LWIAs) vary
greatly in the extent to which they do so. Thus, in just over one-half of
the nation’s local areas, about half of the WIA exiters have received
training service, while much smaller numbers of local areas give more
emphasis to core services or to intensive services. Clearly, then, local










Number of cases 163,223 160,529 36,344 57,648 66,537
Highest tier of service
Core only NA 22.6 100 — —
Intensive (no training) NA 35.9 — 100 —
Training NA 41.5 — — 100
Service Received
Basic skills instruction 18.1 2.1 — 0.1 5.1
On-the-job training 9.4 5.1 — — 12.8
Other occupational 
training
63.1 32.9 — — 82.1
Months of participation
Up to 3 26.4 34.1 52.9 38.5 20.1
3–6 26.6 24.1 21.2 24.0 25.7
6–9 16.6 16.3 11.7 15.4 19.7
9–12 10.0 10.6 6.3 10.2 13.5
More than 12 20.4 14.8 7.9 12.0 21.1
NOTE: All figures (except Number of cases) are given as percentages. SPIR data rep-
resent figures for adults (Title II-A) and older workers (Section 204d) who received
more than only an objective assessment. Data from the PY 2001 WIASRD are pre-
liminary figures and exclude JTPA carry-overs. A ‘—’ represents a percentage near
zero. NA = not available.
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areas are making very different decisions about the mix of services
they will provide with WIA funds, reflecting their local priorities and
the needs of their communities. To this extent, WIA’s provisions
designed to devolve decision making to the local level seem to be in
evidence. At the same time, a heavy emphasis on training that contin-
ues policies carried out under JTPA seems quite strong.
This variability is consistent with observations we gleaned from
the multi-day site visits we conducted to 48 separate local areas from
PY 1999 to PY 2001. Partly these differences reflected deep-seated
disagreements about how WIA should be interpreted and strategic
decisions about how best to use WIA funds for greatest impact, but
very practical considerations came into play as well.
Thus, some areas demonstrated a strong commitment to training at
the outset and sought to continue the high levels of funding for training
that they had provided under JTPA, because they believed that doing so
would best meet the needs of their communities or that training was
WIA’s most appropriate mission. Some areas were also able to concen-
trate on training services with their WIA funds as a consequence of the
nature of their one-stop partnerships and the funding decisions that
resulted from them. For example, in some local areas nearly all core
services and a substantial part of the costs of the one-stop infrastructure
were funded by Wagner-Peyser, which freed up substantial amounts of
WIA funds for training.
Other areas adopted a strategy of emphasizing core and intensive
services, and as a consequence cut back on investments in training con-
siderably. Some did so because they were explicitly adopting a “work-
first” interpretation of WIA, and, accordingly, considered training only
as a last resort. Administrators in these areas often cited policy direc-
Table 4.3 Service Emphasis among LWIAs (%)
High emphasis on core services 11.5
High emphasis on intensive services 18.0
High emphasis on training services 56.8
Mixed emphasis 13.7
NOTE: Figures represent the percentage of local areas. “High emphasis” is defined as
having more than 50% of WIA exiters, exclusive of JTPA carry overs, exit at the ser-
vice level indicated. Data are from the PY 2001 WIASRD, excluding JTPA carry
overs.
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tives they were receiving from their state officials, who in turn felt that
this approach was required by WIA. This interpretation seemed much
more common in WIA’s first year, however, than in its second, when
interest in work-first appeared to wane. Clarification that the U.S.
Department of Labor issued in mid PY 2000, which encouraged a flex-
ible approach oriented to each customer’s needs, seemed important in
accounting for this shift.
Local areas also seemed generally more cautious in authorizing
training at the outset than they did later on, because of a perceived
shortage of funds and other practical considerations. For example,
although they might have been very committed to training as a service
activity, some program administrators noted that they had much less
money to spend on training than they did under JTPA, because of
WIA’s requirement that they establish a one-stop infrastructure with
three separate levels of service. Others expressed a general caution in
using training funds in the face of substantial uncertainty regarding for
whom training could be authorized and because of other general start-
up difficulties, including the need to first certify eligible training pro-
viders. Notably, fewer sites made these observations as WIA matured,
suggesting that initial investments in establishing one-stop systems had
accomplished their objectives, and concerns and uncertainty about the
use of training dissipated to a substantial degree.
Finally, the very strong economic conditions during PY 2000 also
dampened the demand for training services to some degree. During this
program year, jobs were generally plentiful, job seekers wanted to find
employment quickly to take advantage of available opportunities, and
employers were eager for workers to fill their hiring needs. Accord-
ingly, program administrators found themselves emphasizing relatively
shorter-term interventions, because they believed that doing so best
met the needs of both employer and job-seeking customers. As the
economy cooled in the summer of 2001, however, program administra-
tors foresaw an increasing demand for training services among their
program participants.
These observations suggest some structural and systemic factors
that gave rise to variability in training incidence rates across local
areas, including philosophical predispositions on the part of local
WIBs, but also the nature of emerging partnerships and the funding
arrangements for one-stop services that result. They also suggest, how-
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ever, that training rates might have increased in PY 2001 in compari-
son to PY 2000, WIA’s first year of implementation, as local program
administrators gained greater comfort with WIA requirements and as
the demand for training services increased in a generally weaker eco-
nomic climate. Although deficiencies in the PY 2000 WIASRD make
comparisons with PY 2001 difficult, evidence suggests that that has
indeed occurred.13
What Counts as Training and Who Is Providing It?
The discussion in the previous section is hampered by important
limitations of measurement. To begin with, the WIA legislation and
implementing regulations define the three levels of service in fairly
general terms, thereby allowing states and local areas substantial dis-
cretion in what activities they classify as each. For example, the line
between what counts as WIA staff-assisted core services (which
requires WIA registration) and self-help or informational services
(which does not) is quite blurry and is operationalized inconsistently
from one local area to the next. Further, because the outcomes of WIA
registrants generally count as part of a local area’s official performance
statistics, some areas defer the point of WIA registration as long as
they can, either by classifying a range of light-touch services as self-
help or by funding them through non-WIA sources (D’Amico and
Salzman 2002). Thus, counts of participants, and, by implication, rates
of training could vary from one area to the next solely as a function of
who becomes classified as a WIA registrant, regardless of what ser-
vices are actually provided.
Related to this, the distinguishing line between the service tiers is
similarly vague. For example, the difference between assessment and
counseling that counts as staff-assisted core services rather than inten-
sive services is a fine one, and different local areas make different
practical decisions as to where that line should be drawn. More rele-
vant for understanding WIA training services, the distinction between
intensive and training services is not a clear one. For example, work
experience, thought of as a training service under JTPA, is typically
classified as an intensive service under WIA.14 Similarly, what one
local area classifies as training another might call pre-vocational ser-
vices, classified by the WIA legislation as an intensive service.15 In
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operationalizing this latter distinction, local areas commonly take into
account whether the service activity provides training for a specific
occupation or not, as well as its duration. Thus, short courses of
instruction that arguably provide skills useful in a broad range of occu-
pations—such as courses in computer literacy and basic computer
applications—might be classified in some local areas as a pre-voca-
tional service (and, hence, as intensive services), on the grounds that
learning the basics of a desktop computer and acquiring some mini-
mum level of proficiency with common office software are basic
requirements associated with many occupations. Given that 13 percent
of PY 1998 JTPA adult exiters undertook training of between 1 and 40
hours (Social Policy Research Associates 2000), much of the types of
services that were provided as training in JTPA might thus now be pro-
vided and classified as pre-vocational intensive services in WIA. In
other words, whatever the incidence of training services as formally
measured by the WIASRD, substantial additional skill building is
doubtless being carried out as part of intensive services (and perhaps
even, through self-service tutorials, as part of core services).
ESTABLISHING CUSTOMER ACCESS TO TRAINING
As we noted earlier, JTPA established a means test for the adult
program and required that 65 percent of enrollees have at least one
from a list of characteristics that are deemed to constitute barriers to
employment. WIA abandons these provisions, allowing program ser-
vices to be universally accessible. At the same time, the legislation
asserts that whenever funds are limited, priority for intensive and train-
ing services in the adult program should be given to those who are low
income or on public assistance. An important strategic concern for
local areas is balancing the obligation to provide universal access while
ensuring adequate service levels to JTPA’s traditional hard-to-serve cli-
entele.
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The Characteristics of WIA Registrants and Trainees
Table 4.4 provides evidence to suggest how these objectives are
being balanced. It does so by comparing the characteristics of PY 2001
WIA adult exiters—including those who received core services only,
intensive services but no training, and training services—with JTPA
adult exiters from PY 1998.16 
Table 4.4 A Comparison of Recent JTPA and WIA Adult Exiters







Number of cases 163,223 160,529 36,344 57,648 66,537
Low income
Yes 96.0 NA NA 73.2 70.0
No 4.0 NA NA 26.8 30.0
Cash welfare recipient 30.7 NA NA 19.9 14.3
TANF/AFDC 25.7 NA NA 9.7 10.2
GA, SSI, RCA 5.8 NA NA 9.9 4.2
Highest grade completed
Not a high school graduate 22.4 NA NA 22.2 18.4
High school graduate 56.1 NA NA 51.3 60.0
Post–high school 21.6 NA NA 26.6 21.6
Labor force
Employed 18.2 18.3 13.8 12.4 25.9
Not employed 81.8 81.7 86.2 87.6 74.1
Additional barriers
Disability 10.4 7.6 6.4 9.9 6.3
Limited English 6.5 NA NA 7.3 6.0
Single parent 43.7 NA NA 29.0 26.0
NOTE: All figures (except Number of cases) are given as percentages. PY 1998 SPIR
data represent figures for adults (Title II-A) and older workers (Section 204d) who
received more than only an objective assessment. Percentages are based on those with
non-missing data on the item in question. WIA data exclude JTPA carry-overs. 
GA = General Assistance; SSI = Supplemental Security Assistance; 
RCA = Refugee Cash Assistance; NA = not available
a The WIASRD does not require the reporting of many of the characteristics of partici-
pants who receive only staff-assisted core services. Thus, the total column for WIA
registrants cannot be computed. 
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The table shows some substantial differences in the characteristics
of program exiters that are consistent with what one might expect.
Thus, given JTPA’s eligibility rules, virtually all PY 1998 JTPA adult
exiters were classified as low income. This percentage dropped sub-
stantially among PY 2001 WIA exiters to about three-quarters of those
who received intensive or training services. Similarly, there has been a
pronounced drop in service to cash welfare recipients, with nearly one-
third of exiters classified as such in PY 1998, a proportion that is quite
a bit higher than the available figures for WIA.17 
With respect to other barriers, WIA exiters are much less likely to
be single parents (44 percent are single parents in JTPA versus fewer
than 30 percent in WIA), but they are about as likely as those who
exited under JTPA to be individuals with a disability or to be limited
English speakers.18 Curiously, among WIA registrants, those who
receive training are somewhat less likely to be low income or welfare
recipients, or to be high school dropouts or single parents, than are
those who receive intensive services but no training, even though those
with these barriers presumably are more in need of training than oth-
ers.19 
In Chapter 2 of this volume, Barnow and Smith reflect on a long-
standing concern (e.g., Anderson, Burkhauser, and Raymond 1993;
National Commission for Employment Policy 1988; U.S. General
Accounting Office 1989) that local areas engage in “cream skimming,”
by serving those more able to find employment from among those eli-
gible. One might expect this concern to be exacerbated in WIA, which
purports to promote universal access and lacks the explicit adjustments
for participant characteristics in setting performance standards that
JTPA had. Evidence to date indeed suggests local areas’ ability and
willingness to serve a wider customer base than they once did. At the
same time, their priority for serving those who are low income still
seems clearly in evidence.
Establishing Customer Eligibility for Training
Among the tensions embedded in WIA, local areas need to balance
the legislation’s requirements to husband resources by sequencing ser-
vices across the three tiers, while also being customer-focused and
responsive to customer needs. Based on our data collection, we con-
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clude that local areas generally seem quite flexible and are not adopt-
ing a rigid “work first” interpretation of WIA that severely limits
access to training. For example, only a few areas of the dozens we
studied required customers to demonstrate evidence of repeated unsuc-
cessful job search as a condition for being approved for training. 
However, although few sites imposed duration requirements of this
sort, some basic steps were always required before training would be
authorized. Thus, consistent with WIA, customers needed to undertake
at least one core and one intensive service before being approved for
training, which might entail registering with the state Employment Ser-
vice, attending a one-stop center orientation, undertaking an assess-
ment of occupational skills and interests, conducting labor market
research, and attending one or more preemployability workshops,
among other things. Thereafter, as part of their training decision, they
might be expected to research eligible training providers and interview
prospective employers or former trainees. To accommodate these vari-
ous steps, it generally took customers several weeks to complete a core
and an intensive service, make a decision to train, and then conduct
research associated with selecting a training program and a vendor. The
shortest typical period that any site reported was about two and a half
weeks, while the longest period was about nine weeks. This variability
reflected how case management appointments were sequenced, the
specific job search and information gathering that different local areas
required, and the extensiveness of the assessment process they used. 
These requirements notwithstanding, local areas emphasized their
flexible approach to dealing with customers, and pointed out that those
who were demonstrably in need of intervention—adults with little
work history, for example—could move from core to intensive ser-
vices, and then on to training, more quickly than others. The custom-
ers’ own motivation and initial preferences also seemed to be very
important. Thus, customers who missed appointments or took longer to
schedule them could undergo protracted periods in core and intensive
services before being approved for training. By contrast, those who
knew they wanted and needed training, expressed this preference early
in the intake process, and were prompt in scheduling appointments and
completing research or other requirements could move along quite
quickly.
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Helping Customers Make Training Choices
WIA requires that local areas should provide access to training in a
way that “maximizes customer choice” (WIA Title I.B.134). At the
same time, WIA is very performance driven and demands high levels
of system accountability in achieving employment and related out-
comes. In keeping with this, local areas have an interest in ensuring
that customers make wise training choices, because choices that result
in poor outcomes will negatively affect the local area’s attainments on
its core measures of performance.20 Similarly, results from the Career
Management Account demonstration suggest that case managers
sometimes have difficulty relinquishing control to customers over their
training decisions when they feel that customers are making poor
choices (U.S. Department of Labor 1999).21 
Through the visits we conducted to nearly 50 local areas over
WIA’s first several years, we concluded that local areas endeavor to
ensure both customer choice and system accountability by promoting a
model of “informed customer choice,” wherein case managers ensure
that those authorized to undertake training receive ample information
and assistance, so that they are led to make prudent choices (or at least
defensible choices) on their own. (This approach closely approximates
the middle approach, Approach 2 in the experimental ITA evaluation
described by Decker and Perez-Johnson in Chapter 6 of this volume.)
This general approach of promoting informed choice seemed to be
embraced virtually everywhere we visited. However, the specific
mechanisms that local areas adopted differed, as did the rigor with
which they were applied. Thus, nearly all areas required customers to
undertake a formal assessment of their basic skills or occupational
interests, although some assessment processes were much more exten-
sive than others. Similarly, customers everywhere were required to
conduct basic research on their training choices (e.g., through labor
market research and the Consumer Report System, a compendium of
information about eligible training providers), but some areas went fur-
ther by requiring customers to undertake field research, such as visiting
prospective training programs and interviewing former trainees or
employers. Similarly, all sites require customers to be able to justify
their training choices, but some have instituted a formal approval pro-
cess, whereby customers must make a formal presentation before an
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ITA review committee, or, as in one site, participate in a two-week
peer-managed workshop during which fellow ITA holders scrutinize
each other’s training choices. Case managers, meanwhile, play the role
of facilitators, guiding customers through the assessment process and
other requirements without being overly prescriptive. At the same
time, the case manager’s opinion clearly can carry considerable weight,
especially among participants without clear training plans of their own.
In keeping with WIA’s intent, then, it appears that almost every-
where customer choice is being taken very seriously, but that this
choice is guided and informed by assessment, research, and other
requirements that vary in their specifics. The ITA Experiment,
described by Decker and Perez-Johnson in Chapter 6, will shed impor-
tant light on optimal approaches to providing this guidance, at least
from the standpoint of maximizing the return on job training invest-
ments.
LIMITS ON ITA TRAINING CHOICES
Notwithstanding their obvious efforts to promote customer choice,
nearly all local areas implicitly limit choice by exercising their author-
ity to set limits on the ITA dollar amount or duration, establishing pro-
cedures for certifying training programs as eligible to be considered by
an ITA holder, and, potentially, by using non-ITA training alternatives
in some cases. In a theme that has been recurring throughout this chap-
ter, the decisions that local areas make reflect a balance between the
sometimes competing objectives that WIA promotes.
Dollar and Time Limits 
In keeping with provisions in the WIA regulations (Section
663.420), states and local boards are entitled to set dollar or time limits
on the training they will support through an ITA. Of the 19 states for
which we have data, each devolved this authority completely to their
local areas. In turn, nearly all the 57 local areas we researched do set
either dollar or time limits, or both. 
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These limits vary greatly, often even within the same state. Thus,
as Table 4.5 shows, dollar limits range from under $2,000 per ITA
holder in a small number of local areas, to a high of $7,500 or more in
others, with a modal value of $5,000. 
In setting their dollar caps, representatives from local workforce
boards made note of conflicting considerations. On the one hand, they
recognized that lower caps would serve to ensure that a greater number
of customers could be served overall, given the area’s overall funding
allocation. Similarly, they wanted to maintain some financial disci-
pline, both for customers who otherwise have no incentive to econo-
mize in their choices and for vendors that might price their programs at
whatever cap the local board set.22 At the same time, board members
recognized that setting dollar caps too low would serve to exclude from
consideration many longer-term and higher-quality training opportuni-
ties, especially those offered by private vendors, and would thereby
sharply curtail customer choice. Clearly, local areas balance these con-
siderations in very different ways, presumably after taking into account
the needs of their customers, the mix of training providers in their area,
and the local cost structure.
Establishing Program Eligibility
Consistent with the WIA legislation, ITAs can be redeemed only
from vendors whose programs are “eligible”—certified by states and
local workforce areas as meeting acceptable levels of performance. In
keeping with this requirement, vendors need to seek eligibility for each
Table 4.5 Dollar Caps Imposed on ITAs
No. of LWIAs %




Greater than $7,500 (or no limit) 16 28.1
NOTE: Figures represent the number (percentage) of LWIAs that established their dol-
lar ITA caps at various levels, of 57 local areas (in 19 separate states) for which this
information was collected.
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training program they wish to offer to ITA recipients; those that are
approved are placed on a statewide list of eligible training providers
(ETPs). To the extent that vendors decide not to apply for eligibility for
their programs, or those that apply are not approved, customer choice
is curtailed. On the other hand, higher certification requirements are
designed to promote greater system accountability and improved pro-
gram performance.
States were interested in developing a very inclusive list of eligible
programs during WIA’s first year or two (during the so-called “initial
eligibility” period).23 Accordingly, they actively marketed the ETP list
to vendors and established requirements for initial eligibility that were
quite easy for vendors to meet (D’Amico and Salzman 2002). Thereaf-
ter, “subsequent eligibility” takes hold. Following the WIA legislation
[WIA Section 122(c)], subsequent eligibility should involve the appli-
cation of performance requirements calculated for seven measures that
are based on how well the training program’s previous cohorts of stu-
dents performed, either while in training (e.g., program completion
rates) or in the labor market thereafter (e.g., employment, retention,
and wage measures). Of these seven measures, three apply to all stu-
dents in a program’s prior cohort of trainees and four apply to prior
cohorts who received WIA funding. These performance criteria must
be met not for the training provider as a whole, but separately for each
program for which the provider is seeking eligibility. The objective is
not only to ensure a high level of performance among programs certi-
fied as eligible, but also to assemble vendor performance in a Con-
sumer Report System (CRS), which customers are expected to use in
making training choices.
In practice, the application of these performance measures
involves thorny definitional issues (e.g., what counts as a “program”
for which the provider might wish to seek eligibility, or how to define
key terms such as “completion” and “enrollee”), difficulties in data
management and measurement (e.g., who should gather the necessary
data to measure vendors’ performance and by what means), and com-
plaints from many vendors who are wary about potentially burdensome
reporting requirements. Doubtless because of these reasons, among the
13 states whose requirements we examined in detail, 2 requested a
waiver from the U.S. Department of Labor to defer the more stringent
rules for subsequent eligibility for at least a few more years (i.e., until
122 D’Amico and Salzman
2004 or 2005), and 2 others were intending to establish requirements
for subsequent eligibility but had not yet done so when we visited them
in early 2002. The remaining 7 states had reached decisions about what
their performance requirements for vendors’ programs would be dur-
ing subsequent eligibility, but only after protracted and often conten-
tious discussion and debate.
The resulting definitions, procedures, and performance levels
established for subsequent eligibility show substantial disparity
(D’Amico and Salzman 2002). Thus, in most states employment out-
comes are measured for vendors through unemployment insurance
wage matching, but in others, vendors are required to self-report their
own data. Some require separate applications for each course of study
offered at every unique location, but others define a course of study
offered at multiple locations (say, the various campuses of a commu-
nity college) as a single program for which only one application is
required. The performance thresholds that vendors’ programs are
required to meet also vary across states. For example, some states
require vendors’ programs to meet performance requirement on all
seven measures, but others require that performance on just a few of
the measures be met. Similarly, some states set relatively high perfor-
mance thresholds on each of the measures (for example, one state
established a requirement for a program completion rate of 70 percent),
while others set much lower thresholds (a completion rate of 25 per-
cent in another state).
Rationales for the decisions that states made with respect to their
approaches reflected some similar themes, even if they often led to
very different decisions. Among the most common considerations was
the states’ effort to strike a balance by establishing performance criteria
that are high enough to ensure quality, but not so high that customer
choice will be impaired by having many vendors excluded from eligi-
bility. 
Subsequent eligibility has only recently begun in most states, so it
is too soon to be certain how these requirements will play out. How-
ever, in general, proprietary institutions seemed agreeable to the ETP
requirements and felt that they would have little difficulty in meeting
them. By contrast, many public institutions, which have traditionally
filled an important role in providing high-quality but low-cost training
under JTPA, are balking at the eligibility requirements that WIA
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imposes. In their view, the low volume of ITA-funded trainees that they
can anticipate, compared with the large numbers of conventional stu-
dents, does not warrant the time and expense they expend in complying
with subsequent eligibility requirements, and, as a consequence, many
are threatening to refuse to apply. Finally, many community-based
institutions, an important source of contract training for hard-to-serve
clients under JTPA, appear to be vulnerable under the ITA system,
because their small size and low capitalization are causing many of
them to have difficulty in coping with an irregular flow of ITA stu-
dents.
To the extent that many public institutions refuse to apply for eligi-
bility, as they have threatened, and community-based institutions strug-
gle, customer choice could be severely compromised. Indeed,
respondents in some states were expecting that their eligible training
provider (ETP) list would shrink by 50 percent or more once subse-
quent eligibility began. Again, the tension that WIA establishes
between customer choice and system accountability is an uneasy one
whose resolution can apparently sometimes lead to unexpected and
perhaps unwelcome consequences.
Moreover, given the variability in the service areas and target pop-
ulations that training providers serve, it is highly questionable whether
performance requirements as they have been applied are equitable or if
they provide customers with a sound basis for making training
choices.24 These considerations give rise to serious concerns about
whether ETP requirements are worth their price. In an effort to reduce
overlapping requirements and streamline the eligibility process, ways
of aligning the ETP process with other certification requirements to
which training vendors are already subject should be explored.
ITA and Non-ITA Training
In an effort to promote customer choice and market-based
approaches to providing workforce services, WIA suggests that ITAs
should be used to provide training under most circumstances. How-
ever, local areas have the option of using other forms of training
besides the ITA under certain circumstances. These options include
contracts that the local area can write to fund on-the-job training or
customized training provided by an employer, training programs by
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community-based organizations or other private organizations that are
of demonstrated effectiveness in serving “special participant popula-
tions that face multiple barriers to employment,” and other providers if
it is deemed that there are too few providers in the local area to fulfill
the intent of the ITA system.
Data from the PY 2001 WIASRD suggest that local areas are mak-
ing substantial use of these non-ITA alternatives. As Table 4.6 shows,
there seems to be a bifurcation between areas that use ITAs extensively
and those that use them very little. Thus, about 20 percent of local
areas issued an ITA for fewer than 20 percent of their trainees. At the
other extreme, 40 percent of them relied on ITAs heavily and, for many
of them, exclusively.
Based on the site visits we conducted, it appears that non-ITA
training is used for a variety of reasons. To begin with, some local
areas noted that non-ITA training typically had lower unit costs. They
also cited its advantages for serving targeted customer groups. For
example, one site used contracts to provide vocational training, com-
bined with English-as-a-second-language instruction, to a group of dis-
located garment workers, because it believed that the mutual support
afforded through the single class would be more effective in achieving
positive outcomes than would individual choices. Local areas also
noted that customized training was virtually assured of leading to job
placements for training participants and often provided them with an
income stream while they underwent training. It could also be very
effective in meeting the needs of the business customer in that it yields
Table 4.6 Percent of Local Areas with Various Incidence Rates of Using 
ITAs to Provide Training Services
Adult program
Fewer than 20% of trainees 20.0
20%–39% of trainees 11.8
40%–59% of trainees 11.6
60%–79% of trainees 16.5
80% or more of trainees 40.1
NOTE: Figures represent the percentage of local workforce areas with various inci-
dence rates of the use of the ITA among exiters who received training services
(excluding JTPA carry-overs). These tabulations are based on PY 2001 WIASRD
data, excluding the handful of LWIAs that provided no training.
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a trained workforce geared directly to the employers’ hiring needs and,
more generally, can be structured to advance an area’s economic devel-
opment objectives.
One concern is that, in their efforts to promote customer choice,
many local areas may be losing sight of the substantial advantages that
contract training can have, both for customers and employers. A chal-
lenge for local areas operating within the WIA context, therefore, will
be developing an appropriate balance between ITA and contract train-
ing, deciding for whom each training regimen is appropriate, and doing
so in a way that still promotes customer choice.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Since WIA was enacted in 1998, the public workforce develop-
ment system has been in the midst of a difficult yet potentially pro-
found transformation. From an emphasis on providing adult training
services geared toward a narrowly targeted customer pool, as in JTPA,
WIA promotes universal access within a hierarchy of service levels
that aims to ration more costly interventions to those whose service
needs are clearest. System accountability, efficiency, customer choice,
and market-based approaches are key tenets underlying the emerging
system.
As we have discussed throughout this chapter, though, these princi-
ples are sometimes in an uneasy tension. Thus, promoting accountabil-
ity and high system performance can limit customer choice and result
in cream skimming; providing universal access to a range of workforce
services limits funds that would otherwise be available to serve prior-
ity, low-income customers; promoting the efficient use of resources by
adopting a service hierarchy can undermine efforts to remain customer
focused; and promoting market-based approaches through the heavy
use of the ITA may sacrifice economies of scale or jeopardize the adop-
tion of alternatives that can often be better suited to directly meeting
employers’ workforce needs or serving customers with special needs. 
What is clear is that local areas are making unique decisions about
how best to balance these competing objectives, resulting in a matrix
of service design and delivery systems that looks vastly different
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throughout the nation. To this extent, WIA’s effort to devolve control
for policy decisions to the local level has clearly been realized. How-
ever, how and why these local decisions are made, and with what con-
sequences for program impacts or broader community economic and
workforce development, remain uncertain. As the syntheses by Fried-
lander, Greenberg, and Robins (1997) and by King (Chapter 3 in this
volume) suggest, evidence is not conclusive as to what kinds of ser-
vice strategies work best. Indeed, after summarizing their findings
from the JTPA experimental evaluation, Bloom et al. (1997) soberly
conclude that “ . . . we still do not know what works best for whom”
(p. 574). In some sense, then, local workforce boards are making stra-
tegic decisions about how to best invest their WIA dollars with little
hard evidence to guide them.
The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed H.R. 1261,
which reauthorizes and amends WIA. This legislation recognizes,
without necessarily resolving, some of the tensions we have drawn
attention to in this chapter. The legislation, which has recently been
taken into consideration by the Senate, proposes some sweeping
reforms of adult program services:
1) Funding for the WIA adult and dislocated worker programs
would be consolidated with Wagner-Peyser funds to streamline
program administration and, potentially, reduce inefficiency. At
the same time, this provision could further dilute attention on job
training, continuing a trend from JTPA that WIA has already
begun.
2) The one-stop infrastructure will be supported through funds
drawn from each mandatory partner program’s own allocation.
This provision should lessen the difficult cost negotiations that
partners currently undertake and ensure the one-stop system a
steady and equitable funding base.
3) The proposed legislation clarifies that case managers should be
customer focused, and, to this degree, should not require custom-
ers to undertake core or intensive services if it is apparent that
they need training to attain self-sufficiency.
4) In recognition that WIA and the Employment Service might be
consolidated under single funding, the proposed legislation stipu-
lates that the unemployed should receive the first priority for pro-
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gram services, and only secondarily should priority be given to
low-income individuals.
5) Prescribed performance measures for the ETP list have been
eliminated. This provision recognizes that WIA imposes overly
onerous reporting and performance requirements on vendors and,
as a consequence, may have inadvertently undermined customer
choice. Under the proposed bill, Governors are to establish their
own criteria and procedures to certify providers as eligible.
Assuming these or similar provisions are enacted, the research
community will have further work to do in examining their implications
for program services and customer characteristics. Further, this legisla-
tion makes explicit the need to go beyond thinking about WIA as a silo
program rather than part of an integrated, or at least coordinated, work-
force system. Thus, increasingly—and whether or not H.R. 1261 is
enacted—we need to understand how WIA works in concert with its
major partners to promote economic and community impacts. Already,
we see evidence of joint decision making and planning regarding the
financial and staffing support for the one-stop system that makes clear
that looking at WIA alone presents only part of the story of how the
workforce system is operating and who it is serving. As further evi-
dence of this, the concurrent participation of WIA participants appears
to be much more common than it once was. As Table 4.7 shows, about













14.4 22.8 14.7 22.7 27.2
Other JTPA/WIA 10.3 2.8 1.7 2.6 3.5
Non-JTPA/WIA 5.7 20.8 13.3 20.9 24.8
NOTE: All figures are given as percentages. SPIR data represent figures for adults
(Title II-A) and older workers (Section 204d) who received more than only an objec-
tive assessment. Data from the PY 2001 WIASRD are preliminary figures and
exclude JTPA carry-overs. When they are added together, the rates of Other JTPA/
WIA and Non-JTPA/WIA concurrent participation can exceed the total rate of con-
current participation because some individuals may be a participant under both Other
JTPA/WIA and Non-JTPA/WIA programs.
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14 percent of JTPA adult participants were coenrolled, primarily in
other JTPA programs, while, in WIA, about 23 percent are coenrolled,
mostly in non-WIA programs (and, primarily, in Wagner-Peyser).25 In
other words, program partners are increasingly working to form a sys-
tem, and the research agenda needs to follow suit.
As a result of reauthorization, no doubt important changes and sys-
tem transformations lie ahead. WIA’s first few years have been fraught
with some confusions and start-up problems that are understandable in
light of the legislation’s intended quick pace of implementation. These
years have also been a learning experience whose important lessons are
only now coming to light. The next few years will be important for
judging whether WIA’s success in establishing a first-class workforce
development system—access to an array of career tools for the univer-
sal customer, coupled with concerted efforts to meet the needs of those
who need extensive training services to attain self-sufficiency—can be
realized.
Notes
The authors wish to thank Kristin Wolff, Richard West of Social Policy Research Asso-
ciates, reviewers at the Upjohn Institute, and participants at the Job Training and Labor
Exchange Forum for their helpful comments.
1.  WIA Title I authorizes training services in the adult, dislocated worker, and youth
programs, as well as in targeted national programs. This chapter focuses on adult
program services only.
2.  Rapid response assistance and job search services as a stand-alone activity are
encouraged in the dislocated worker program, but not in the adult program.
3. However, the longer-term efficacy of these less costly strategies is less clear
(Friedlander and Burtless 1995; Grubb 1996).
4. Mandatory partners include WIA-funded programs, the Employment Service, and
Adult Education, Post-secondary Vocational Education, Vocational Rehabilita-
tion, Welfare-to-Work, Trade Adjustment Assistance, and NAFTA Transitional
Adjustment Assistance programs, among others.
5. In WIA, program years run from July 1 of one year to the following June 30. Pro-
gram years are named on the basis of the calendar year during which the program
year starts. Thus, data for PY 2000 cover those who exited WIA from July 1, 2000
through June 30, 2001. 
6. WIA was mandated to be implemented nationwide by July 2000. However, some
states, the so-called early implementers, began operating under WIA guidelines
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during PY 1999. Thus, PY 1998 represents the last full year in which JTPA was
operating nationwide. 
7. These site visits were conducted by Social Policy Research Associates primarily
as part of two separate evaluation studies funded by the U.S. Department of
Labor. The first is the Evaluation of the Implementation of the Workforce Invest-
ment Act. As part of this evaluation, team members visited 23 local areas in 14
states, including 6 early implementing states and 8 others that were randomly
selected. The second study is an Evaluation of the ITA/ETP Demonstration, being
conducted by Social Policy Research Associates, under subcontract to Mathemat-
ica Policy Research. This study involved site visits to 13 states and 28 local areas
within them, each of which was selected to participate in the demonstration
project. Because there is some overlap in coverage between these two studies, a
total of 23 states and 48 local areas were visited in total. The earliest site visits
were conducted in PY 1999 to the WIA early implementing states (that is, those
that agreed to implement WIA’s key provisions before the mandatory deadline of
July 1, 2000). Other sites were visited in PY 2000 through the middle of PY 2001.
Thus, they cover WIA in its earliest stages of implementation, through its second
year of full implementation.
8. One complication in using these data is that about 7 percent of PY 2001 exiters
are those who are JTPA carry-overs—that is, generally those who enrolled prior to
PY 2000, and hence under JTPA’s requirements. JTPA carry-overs are excluded
from this tabulation.
9. These figures would be slightly more tilted toward training services if JTPA
carry-overs were included in the tabulations.
10. No doubt partly accounting for the decline is WIA’s stipulations that adult educa-
tion and literacy activities should not be carried out with WIA funds unless in
combination with another training activity, because stand-alone literacy training is
viewed as the purview of the partner program, Adult Education. 
11. For the SPIR, other occupational training represents the category “occupational
skills training (non-OJT)” and can include job-specific competency training, cus-
tomized training, apprenticeship or pre-apprenticeship program, internships,
entrepreneurial training, and training that when structured like a job is designed to
impart work maturity competencies. In the WIASRD, this category represents
occupational skills training, skill upgrading and retraining, entrepreneurial train-
ing, job readiness training, and customized training.
12. In both programs, length of participation is calculated as time elapsed from date
of registration to date of exit. Differences in the average length of participation
between JTPA and WIA can partly be due to differences in events that trigger reg-
istration or exit in the two programs. The computation of average length of partic-
ipation in WIA is biased downward somewhat, because of the exclusion of JTPA
carry-overs, who by definition have had very long spells of participation. If the
percentage of WIA exiters who had a spell of participation of less than three
months were recalculated after including JTPA carry-overs, the figure would be
approximately 31 percent rather than the 34 percent shown.
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13. Because the WIASRD was new with PY 2000, data problems were legion, and
not all states submitted data. Nonetheless, the best evidence from these data sug-
gests that the percent of WIA exiters who received training services in PY 2000
was approximately 33 percent, in comparison to the 42 percent rate for PY 2001
that we have reported here.
14. JTPA classified as training services any of the following: basic skills training, on-
the-job training (OJT), occupational skills training other than OJT, work experi-
ence and private internships, and “other employment skills training” including
pre-employment and work-maturity training. Of these, WIA stipulates that basic
skills instruction can only be classified as training if it is provided in conjunction
with another training activity, preemployment and work-maturity are practically
speaking (based on our site visits) almost always being classified as pre-voca-
tional services (and, hence, as an intensive service), and work experience is gener-
ally classified as an intensive service (pursuant to the Code of Federal
Regulations, 20 CFR 663.200).
15. According to WIA, pre-vocational services is an intensive service that consists of
the “ . . . development of learning skills, communication skills, interview skills,
punctuality, personal maintenance skills, and professional conduct, to prepare
individuals for unsubsidized employment or training” [WIA Section
134(d)(3)(C)(vi)].
16. As before, the tabulations for WIA exiters exclude JTPA carry-overs. Those for
PY 1998 JTPA exiters include data for Title II-A (the adult program) and Section
204d (the older worker program); these two groups are jointly referred to as adults
for purposes of this discussion. Given the constraints of available data, most of the
WIA data elements shown in the table reflect the characteristics of WIA exiters
who received intensive or training services, because they are not required report-
able data items for WIA registrants who receive only staff-assisted core services.
17. This decline may be due to a combination of the general fall-off in welfare recipi-
ency in the nation as a whole over these years, the use of TANF or Welfare-to-
Work funds to serve welfare recipients, and changes in WIA’s targeting provisions
as compared with JTPA. Potentially, some part of the drop-off in both these mea-
sures represents an effect of declining poverty and welfare roles nationwide dur-
ing this period (the poverty rate was 12.7 percent in 1998 and 11.3 percent in
2000, according to the U.S. Bureau of the Census [2002]; similarly, there was a
substantial decline in the rates of TANF recipiency during this same period).
Nonetheless, with about 175 million adults living in poverty in 2000, a shortage of
customers who would meet WIA’s priority guidelines is clearly not a factor. A
reluctance of case managers to document low-income status when it is not abso-
lutely necessary to do so to establish program eligibility may also account for the
decline to some degree.
18.  SPIR and WIASRD definitions of these items are slightly different, which could
account for some of the variation in incidence rates. The SPIR defines single par-
ents as a category of family status for those who have “sole custodial support” for
one or more dependent children; the WIASRD, by contrast, speaks of those hav-
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ing “primary responsibility” for children under age 18. With respect to limited-
English speakers, in JTPA this term would refer to those who native language is
not English with an inability to communicate in English, resulting in a barrier to
employment; the WIA definition seems somewhat broader, including those with a
limited ability to speak, read, write or understand English and whose native lan-
guage is not English or who live in a family or community where English is not
dominant.
19. Potentially those who are low income are less able to support themselves through
training than others, or those with barriers might be deemed by the local area to
lack the foundation skills to benefit from training. Additionally, welfare recipients
might be accessing training through other funding sources, such as TANF.
20. In keeping with WIA, states and, in turn, local areas are held accountable for
attaining negotiated levels of performance on the so-called WIA core measures,
which relate to customers’ outcomes after they receive services. These core mea-
sures include postprogram employment rates, six-month retention rates, and earn-
ings gains, and the rate at which customers are awarded degrees or credentials,
among other things. States that fail to meet their negotiated levels are not eligible
for incentive awards and may be subject to sanctions.
21. The Career Management Account Demonstration operated in 1995 through 1997
(hence, before WIA was enacted) in 13 grantee sites, and was designed to test
ITA-like approaches for delivering training services to dislocated workers.
22. In fact, there is some evidence that training vendors were aware of a local area’s
ITA caps and set their prices with this in mind.
23. According to WIA, initial eligibility lasts for 12–18 months, though a 6-month
extension can be granted. During this period, degree-granting post-secondary
institutions and apprenticeship programs are granted automatic eligibility, so long
as they apply; other providers may need to meet performance levels established
by the state, at the state’s discretion. During subsequent eligibility, by contrast, no
provider is considered automatically eligible.
24. The WIA legislation suggests that service area and customer characteristics
should be taken into account in setting performance requirements for vendors, but
in actuality this rarely occurs (D’Amico and Salzman, 2002).
25. We caution, though, that these differences could be partly an artifact of measure-
ment. On the one hand, states’ data management systems have recently been striv-
ing for greater integration across partner programs, so that information about
instances of concurrent participation will be readily at hand; thus, the WIASRD
might be more likely to capture the incidence of concurrent participation when it
occurs than the SPIR did. On the other hand, the incidence of concurrent partici-
pation was a required data field in the SPIR, while it is an optional field in the
WIASRD; for this reason, the extent of concurrent participation might have been
more likely to be captured by the SPIR than the WIASRD. Note, too, that, in cal-
culating rates of concurrent participation from the WIASRD, we excluded
instances where the individual was coded as having participated in the Food
Stamps Employment and Training Program; the rather high incidence of partici-
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pation in this program that is recorded in the WIASRD (about 4 percent of all
adult WIA registrants) leads us to suspect that participation in Food Stamps was
being mistakenly captured here.
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Both public and private intermediaries have played important roles
as service providers throughout the history of publicly funded employ-
ment and training programs. The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of
1998 expanded the role of intermediaries participating in the workforce
investment system by establishing new one-stop operator roles and
excluding local workforce investment boards (local boards) from being
direct service providers, unless waivers have been approved.1 At the
same time, WIA introduced a voucher system and state eligible train-
ing provider list (ETPL) to the training program, which had varying
effects on the availability of training providers to customers. New rules
governing how services can be provided and who provides them have
changed the mix of intermediaries participating in the system. 
Intermediaries that provide services under WIA receive funds from
local boards to provide direct employment and training services to cus-
tomers, or facilitate workforce development in the one-stop environ-
ment. Intermediaries serve in a range of capacities: as one-stop
operators; core, intensive, or youth service providers; training provid-
ers; and brokering or consulting organizations. This chapter identifies
intermediaries as falling into four general types of organizations: 1)
nonprofit organizations, such as community-based and faith-based
organizations; 2) community colleges and other educational institu-
tions; 3) public governmental agencies, such as the state Employment
Service (ES); and 4) for-profit companies and proprietary schools.
Recent research indicates a great deal of variation and experimentation
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with how local boards work with different types of intermediaries in
fulfilling WIA responsibilities. 
The following section provides a brief background on the history
and growth of intermediaries in employment and training programs,
from the 1930s through the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. We
then describe the general nature of intermediaries in the one-stop sys-
tem under WIA implementation, synthesizing findings from other
research about local board experiences. We also describe the early
impacts of state ETPLs on the availability of different types of training
providers during initial and subsequent eligibility. The next section
summarizes four intermediary organizations and explores the advan-
tages of utilizing economies of scale to compete in the one-stop sys-
tem. Finally, we present a summary and conclusions in the last section. 
HISTORY AND GROWTH OF INTERMEDIARIES 
PRIOR TO WIA
The use of intermediaries in public employment and training pro-
grams has increased over time since the inception of the workforce
investment system. The workforce investment system was introduced
in the United States as a public responsibility to stabilize the U.S. econ-
omy in the wake of persistently high unemployment rates experienced
in the 1930s and the implementation of similar systems in other indus-
trialized nations. The system was created with the implementation of
ES and Unemployment Insurance (UI) as federal–state programs.2 ES
and UI had experimented with using the private sector in service deliv-
ery; however, that alternative was ultimately rejected, and service
delivery for these programs has since remained in the public sector.3 It
was not until the 1960s, when Congress passed the first major legisla-
tion to provide extensive job training through the Manpower Develop-
ment and Training Act (MDTA), that the system would rely heavily
also on the private sector to deliver publicly funded services. 
The training program under MDTA was federally administered,
with training providers subcontracted or contracted directly with the
federal government to deliver classroom training to customers. At the
onset of this new program, a range of intermediaries, such as commu-
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nity colleges, public schools, skill centers, and private schools, were
used to deliver training (Levitan and Mangum 1969; Operations
Research, Inc. 1972).4 State ES offices continued to provide labor
exchange services to customers, both job-seekers and employers, as a
separate program under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933. Over time,
while other employment and training programs became affected by
decentralization efforts, ES and UI continued to function as federal–
state programs.
In 1973, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) superseded MDTA and established state and local control in
the coordination of services for most of the employment and training
programs. Among the changes that were made, CETA required the cre-
ation of local “prime sponsors” to coordinate CETA programs. Unlike
MDTA, this structure required service providers to compete for fund-
ing directly from prime sponsors, a requirement intended to open the
market for competition of services (Franklin 1984). This movement of
program control from the federal government to localities had a num-
ber of results during early implementation: 1) the number of employ-
ment and training service providers increased from about 1,440 in
fiscal year (FY) 1974 to over 2,400 in FY 1975; 2) prime sponsors
became new entities that delivered services, with about 60 percent of
the prime sponsors delivering services; 3) prime sponsors shifted away
from the state ES as a service provider and transferred contracts to
themselves or other organizations; 4) prime sponsors had more flexibil-
ity in designing service delivery of the training program; and 5) com-
munity-based organizations (CBOs) had significant increases in work
and funding in the system (Franklin and Ripley 1984; Snedeker and
Snedeker 1978).5 
The flexibility given to prime sponsors resulted in less utilization
of ES to provide labor exchange services for the CETA programs.
Unlike its role under MDTA, where ES was the accepted and presumed
provider of these services, ES now needed to compete with other orga-
nizations to provide the services. Even though some localities contin-
ued to contract with ES because they believed it was important,
especially in the long run, to maintain a linkage with an established
agency that delivered employment services, others took advantage of
their flexibility to seek other alternatives. As a result, during FY 1974–
1976, ES staff positions decreased by one-quarter when contracts were
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awarded to other organizations.6 On the other hand, training was deliv-
ered by many of the same types of training providers as previous years,
although prime sponsors became more actively involved in determin-
ing the types of training to be offered, and funding levels differed from
previous years. Training was more often delivered by public educa-
tional institutions than private institutions, with over 90 percent of
CETA training funds contracted to public educational institutions.7
Some localities also began to utilize an individual referral system in
place of contracting for group training (Snedeker and Snedeker 1978).
CETA changed the nature of service provision as a by-product of shift-
ing to locally administered program operations from federal adminis-
tration under MDTA.
CETA continued for nearly a decade before the Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPA) replaced it in 1982, significantly reducing the fed-
eral and state role (Reville and Kerman 1996). Local decision making
on employment and training programs went from CETA prime spon-
sors to JTPA private industry councils (PICs), which required private
sector majority representation. Also, greater emphasis was placed on
the job training program given the cutback in the Public Service
Employment program, which was a major CETA program that focused
on job creation. 
PICs had the flexibility to administer their own programs, but they
generally found that contracting out for the services was a more cost-
effective alternative (National Commission for Employment Policy
1994). PICs also chose to contract out if they believed that their role
should be strictly in a policy and administrative capacity, and that their
ability to manage, monitor, and evaluate programs would be compro-
mised if they also became the service delivery organization. 
In the selection of service providers, coordination between the
JTPA and ES programs was supported among a number of states and
PICs. Because the ES federal budget tended to be stagnant and declin-
ing in real terms, ES had an incentive to coordinate and make use of
JTPA as a source of additional funding. At the same time, some PICs
found that the 15 percent administrative cap for the JTPA programs
was insufficient for program management, and ES became a likely
choice because they believed ES was cost-effective and well-estab-
lished within the community.8 However, a number of PICs also chose
not to contract with ES, believing that they could obtain better counsel-
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ing and employment assistance services elsewhere for their customers
(Westat 1985). 
During the 1990s, states and localities experienced shifts in the
welfare programs that would later have an influence on employment
and training programs. Prior to the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, state innovation
in the welfare program was supported through state waivers of federal
requirements. The use of block grants under PRWORA provided states
with a greater deal of flexibility than any other previous legislation. As
welfare rolls fell sharply in the late 1990s, the amount of funds avail-
able for employment and support services soared, and some of this
funding was provided to localities to serve welfare recipients and low-
wage workers. In 1997, similar use of grants for the Department of
Labor/Employment and Training Administration (ETA) Welfare-to-
Work program to assist the “harder-to-serve” welfare recipients pro-
vided more flexibility to localities in determining program operation
and design than any previous ETA program (Leonard 1999).9
The devolved system of Welfare-to-Work—and welfare employ-
ment program under state waivers and PRWORA—provided some
insight on how more mature systems under WIA might react to
increased flexibility and local oversight. In 1999, an intermediary
study for the TANF and Welfare-to-Work programs found that most of
the intermediaries in 20 localities were nonprofits with established his-
tories in the field. Many were either affiliates of national organizations
or specialized in assisting specific populations. Although considerably
fewer numbers of for-profit intermediaries served welfare recipients,
for-profit intermediaries tended to serve larger numbers of welfare
recipients. In fact, the study suggested that for-profit intermediaries
served about 45 percent of the welfare population in the study’s locali-
ties (Pavetti et al. 2000). The significant role of nonprofit and for-profit
intermediaries in the Welfare-to-Work programs is similarly reflected
in early program experiences under WIA.
The 1990s also gave rise to federal efforts towards developing a
one-stop delivery system, with federal one-stop initiative grants
awarded to 50 states for capacity building and planning of one-stops.
Initiatives were also being implemented at the state level (e.g., Florida,
Massachusetts, and Texas) to undertake further changes to the system.
When WIA legislation passed, and local control of programs changed
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hands from PICs to local boards, the experiences of planning and
implementing a one-stop system among states and localities were quite
mixed.10 
THE NATURE OF INTERMEDIARIES IN THE ONE-STOP 
SYSTEM UNDER WIA
This section relies on a small number of studies that have exam-
ined the use of intermediaries for different types of WIA services: one-
stop operations, and core, intensive, youth, training, and brokering/
consulting services. To better understand how the system and providers
participating in the system have changed from JTPA to WIA, ETA
funded a study on service provision among 16 local boards in the one-
stop environment (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).11 Analysis
in this section uses the results of the study, as well as other key studies:
the Private/Public Venture study of 5 local boards (Buck 2002); a study
on early WIA implementing states, with site visits to 6 states and 9
local boards within those states (D’Amico et al. 2001); and a study of
the Individual Training Account/Eligible Training Provider (ITA/ETP)
Demonstration, with site visits to 28 local boards (D’Amico et al.
2002; D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming). 
Table 5.1 summarizes information from site visits and research
conducted by Macro et al. (2003) of 16 localities within 8 states for
program year (PY) 2001 (July 1, 2001–June 30, 2002). The 16 locali-
ties included a total of 84 comprehensive one-stop centers and 71 affil-
iate (e.g., satellite and/or specialty) centers. The local boards for each
of these localities were not selected to be representative of the national
one-stop system, which (as of September 2003) consisted of nearly 600
local boards, over 1,900 comprehensive one-stop centers, and over
1,600 affiliate centers. However, Table 5.1 provides useful information
on the type and mix of intermediaries that were used within the one-
stop system.12 
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One-Stop Operator Services
Local boards have wide discretion in defining one-stop operator
responsibilities, such as the division of labor between one-stop opera-
tors and organizations providing other services. One-stop operators can
be responsible for coordinating with core and intensive service provid-
ers, or can serve as the exclusive intermediary for these services. One-
stop operators may also subcontract directly with other providers, serve
as lead providers, or serve in other capacities designated by their local
boards. Local boards make their selection either through a competitive
process or various non-competitive processes. The noncompetitive
processes include: 1) an agreement with the local board to operate as a
consortium or entity of at least three required partners; 2) a waiver by
the chief local elected official and governor for the local board to act as
the one-stop operator; and 3) certifying, or “grandfathering,” existing
service providers as one-stop operators.
Many local boards have opted for continuity of providers without
further competition by extending contracts, grandfathering existing
providers, or designating consortiums. Of the local boards visited in
the early WIA implementation study, half used a noncompetitive pro-
cess to select consortiums of partners to serve as one-stop operators
(D’Amico et al. 2001). Macro et al. (2003) found that half of the local
boards in the intermediary study also used a noncompetitive process,
but local boards selected consortiums of partners as well as grandfa-
thered existing service providers. Only one local board in the interme-
diary study requested and received a waiver to serve as a one-stop
operator. This differed from the early WIA implementation study,
which found that 18.4 percent of the local boards nationwide received
waivers (D’Amico et al. 2001).13
Risk aversion may be one reason why local boards have chosen not
to compete or re-compete services. Competing for a service or chang-
ing to a new provider can give local boards new opportunities for
improvement, but it can also expose local programs to risk. The period
of turnover and transition can be lengthy, and consequences can
include disruption of services and the perception among customers and
one-stop staff of an unstable system. Services may improve or worsen,
costs may increase or decline, all with effects on the number of cus-
tomers served and the quality of services delivered. Extensive training
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One-stop operators (number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (4) 2 (2)b 2 (2)c 1 (2) 2 (2)
For profit
Governmental 1 (1)d 1 (1) 3 (5)
Educational 1 (3)
Consortium 1 (1)e 1 (1)f
Local board 1 (1)
Competitive 
process used
Core service providers (estimated number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (5) 6 (6) 2 (2)j 1 (1) 2 (3)
For profit
Government: ESk 1 (5) 1 (6) 1 (6) 1 (2) 1 (8)l 1 (4) 1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (7)
Other 
government 1 (2) 1 (2) 1 (1)
Educational 1 (6) 1 (1) 1 (1) 3 (6)
Local board 1 (1)
Intensive service providers (estimated number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in 
parentheses)
Nonprofit 2 (2) 2 (2) 5 (8)m 5 (4) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 3 (3)
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For profit 1 (8) 1 (1)
Government: ES 1 (1)
Other 
government 1 (5) 1 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1)
Educational 1 (6) 1 (8) 1 (1) 1 (2) 3 (6)
Youth service providers (total number of providers serving entire local workforce investment area)
Nonprofit 1 2 9 5 1 1 3 5
For profit 2
Governmental 1 1
Educational 2 1 9 3 7
Consortium 3 1 1
Training providers that received an ITA (number of ITAs issued to providers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (5) 1 (4) 16 (282) 7 (115) 2 (72) 1 (108) 3 (20) 4 (16) 1 (3)
For profit 29 (543) 7 (20) 17 (90) 14 (149) 17 (306) 27 (526) 60 (221) 51 (329) 11 (52) 3 (3)
Governmental
Educational 10 (1,042) 4 (399) 5 (23) 4 (37) 5 (236) 4 (225) 6 (12) 14 (67) 6 (216) 5 (34)
Total training 
providers used 40 12 38 25 24 32 69 69 17 9
Total ITAs 
issued 1,590 423 395 301 614 859 253 412 268 40
(continued)
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One-stop operators (number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 4 (22) 3 (6) 15 (40) 38 (48)
For profit 1 (7) 1 (1) 2 (8) 5 (10)
Governmental 1 (6) 3 (8) 8 (10)
Educational 4 (8) 10 (10)
Consortium 1 (5)g 1 (2)h 10 (10)i 14 (19) 36 (23)
Local board 1 (1) 3 (1)
Competitive 
process used
Core service providers (estimated number of comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in parentheses)
Nonprofit 2 (4) 8 (9) 4 (25) 1 (6) 5 (5) 1 (1) 33 (67) 48 (32)
For profit 1 (4) 1 (7) 2 (11) 3 (5)
Government: ESk 1 (4) 1 (2) 1 (29) 1 (6) 1 (10) 1 (8) 16 (102) 23 (49)
Other 
government
1 (4) 4 (2) 1 (2) 1 (1) 10 (14) 14 (7)
Educational 1 (1) 7 (15) 11 (7)
Local board 1 (1) 1 (<1)
Intensive service providers (estimated number of participating comprehensive one-stop centers and satellite/specialty centers in 
parentheses)
Nonprofit 1 (4) 10 (2) 4 (25) 27 (7) 6 (5) 7 (8) 75 (74) 75 (51)
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a Does not add up to 100% due to rounding.
b Boston selected organizations that were formed of a collaborative of two or more organizations with a designated lead organization. The
organizations consisted of 1) Jewish Vocational Services (nonprofit lead organization), which partnered with the Economic Develop-
ment and Industrial Corporation of Boston/Jobs & Community Services Department (government); and 2) Goodwill Industries (non-
profit lead organization), which partnered with Dimock Community Health Center and Women’s Educational and Industrial Union
(nonprofits).
For profit 1(4) 1 (2) 1 (7) 5 (22) 5 (15)
Government: ES 1 (3) 2 (4) 2 (1)
Other 
government
1 (2) 1 (6) 1 (1) 7 (18) 7 (5)
Educational 1 (2) 2 (7) 1 (1) 11 (27) 11 (8)
Youth service providers (total number of providers serving entire local workforce investment area)
Nonprofit 1n 19 4 9 5 26 91 65%
For profit 1 1 4 3%
Governmental 2 1%
Educational 6 2 1 2 33 24%
Consortium 2 2 9 6%
Training providers that received an ITA (number of ITAs issued to provider in parentheses)
Nonprofit 2 (8) 2 (2) 1 (10) 1 (22) 13 (328) 55 (995) 9 (9)
For profit 32 (312) 27 (150) 38 (1,158) 19 (251) 5 (20) 45 (838) 402 (4,968) 68 (44)
Governmental 1 (5) 1 (5) <1 (<1)
Educational 11 (43) 9 (65) 13 (1,372) 9 (207) 18 (1,080) 9 (359) 132 (5,417) 22 (48)
Total providers 
used
45 38 52 29 24 68 591
Total ITAs 
issued
363 217 2,540 463 1,122 1,530 11,390
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c Hampden County selected a nonprofit organization, CareerPoint, began as a collaborative of local public agencies in 1995.
d Boston’s other collaborative organization included the state’s Department of Employment and Training as the lead organization that
partnered with Action for Boston Community Development (nonprofit).
e The consortium included Truckee Meadows Community College (educational), Department of Training and Rehabilitation (state gov-
ernment), and Nevada Works (Local Board).
f The consortium included Nevada Business Services (nonprofit), S.T. Gregg & Associates (for-profit), Nevada Partners (nonprofit),
Vocational Rehabilitation (government) and Employment Service (government).
g The consortium consisted of the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation (government), Bureau of Employment and Career Services (state
Wagner-Peyser agency), Greater Erie Community Action Committee (nonprofit), and Northwestern Regional Technology Institute (for-
profit). Each of the five one-stop centers also had an additional partner who was the leaseholder. Pennsylvania’s State Department of
Transportation (government), Community Action Inc. (nonprofit), Warren/Forest Counties Economic Opportunity Council (nonprofit),
Meadville Area Industrial Commission (nonprofit), and the Greater Erie Community Action Committee (nonprofit).
h The consortium consisted of the Pittsburgh Partnership (government), Allegheny County Department of Human Services (government),
Bureau of Employment and Career Services (state Wagner-Peyser agency, Office of Vocational Rehabilitation (government), and Good-
will Industries (nonprofit). Other nonprofit organizations also served as a partner.
i One of the consortiums for the one-stop centers consisted of ES, Job Corps, Vocational Rehabilitation, county Human Services Depart-
ment, Goodwill, two nonprofits, state technical college, and two Cooperative Education Services Agencies. The other consortium con-
sisted of ES, Vocational Rehabilitation, county Departments of Human Services and Economic Support, a nonprofit, state technical
college, and school-to-work program.
j The government agency of the nonprofit organization delivered core services.
k The Employment Service (ES) is a system of public employment offices that was established under the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933.
This system has also been known by other names, such as the Job Service, the Labor Board, and the Unemployment Office.
l All WIA partners also helped contribute in the delivery of core services.
mAll WIA partners also helped contribute in the delivery of intensive services.
n The nonprofit organization subcontracted with three regional organizations.
SOURCE: Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague. (2003).
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to staff of the new organization, and the transitional costs related to
changing from one organization to another, can also lead to greater
expenses for local boards (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).14
The WIA system has had little experience with turnover, both because
of the noncompetitive processes in place and because many new com-
petitive awards have not expired. Macro et al. (2003) reported that
when turnover did occur, it generally related to the organizations’
inability to handle the fiscal management of operations, which was
described as a greater issue for smaller organizations since a line of
credit was necessary in order to operate on a cost-reimbursement con-
tract. 
Many types of intermediaries, including local boards and consor-
tiums of intermediaries, actively participate as one-stop operators.
Table 5.1 shows that a wide range of intermediaries served as one-stop
operators, but with different levels of participation. For example,
Macro et al. (2003) found that nonprofits were contracted to operate
more one-stops than any other type of intermediary.15 The significant
role of nonprofits as one-stop operators was similar to Buck’s (2002)
findings that nonprofits were used more than any other type of interme-
diary in the study’s five localities. Macro et al. (2003) also found that
consortiums of public and/or private organizations were selected to
operate nearly one-quarter of the one-stops, with five local boards uti-
lizing this approach.16 Community colleges, government agencies, and
for-profits were selected in a handful of localities. The governmental
agencies were generally the local employment and training agencies,
and the for-profits were Maximus and Affiliated Computer Services
(ACS), formerly Lockheed Martin IMS.17 
A number of reasons can help explain the types of intermediaries
that have emerged as one-stop operators under WIA. For instance,
states’ policies can affect the types of intermediaries that are selected,
such as Nevada requiring the use of consortiums with mandatory part-
ners; Pennsylvania requiring consortiums with public and private enti-
ties; and Wisconsin explicitly prohibiting waiver requests from local
boards to deliver direct services. Local constraints or policies can also
be a factor, such as the perception among the community that nonprof-
its are more appropriate than others to serve as one-stop operators, for
example, a for-profit affiliate in Hampden County (New Jersey)
became a nonprofit organization after community pressure to do so.
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Unexpected situations can also occur, such as when the Lane County
(Oregon) local board requested a waiver to temporarily serve as a one-
stop operator after it began to have financial concerns with the non-
profit organization it originally selected (Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague 2003). In Montgomery County (Maryland), the one-stop opera-
tor (a for-profit organization) declined to re-bid on the contract because
it believed there was insufficient funding for operations. As a result,
staff of the for-profit left the company to incorporate themselves into a
new nonprofit that bid for, and was awarded, the contract (Jacobson
2002).18 In other instances, new organizations formed when two PIC
areas merged into a single WIA local area. One of the former PICs gen-
erally became the new local board, while the other often played a role
in one-stop operations, for example, in Gulf Coast (Texas), the former
PIC of Houston designated itself into a nonprofit organization and
became the new one-stop operator; and in the Bay Area and Northwest
Pennsylvania, the former PICs either became a part of or worked for
the one-stop consortiums. 
Another response to the one-stop operator role by some consor-
tiums has been to incorporate themselves from two or more public and/
or private entities into single nonprofit organizations. The motivation
for incorporating two or more organizations into a single organization
included the benefits of hiring personnel so that a definitive line of
authority among staff existed, and simplified administration and
accounting. This was perceived in some areas, such as Bay Area (Wis-
consin) and Hampden County (Massachusetts), as a more practical
approach than having the one-stop operator use various administration
and accounting systems (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
The one-stop operator role can be a desirable one for many organi-
zations. Local boards have commonly assigned the responsibilities of
core and/or intensive service delivery with one-stop operations for
competitive solicitations (D’Amico et al. 2001, Macro, Almandsmith,
and Hague 2003). 
As a result, service providers used under JTPA may find it benefi-
cial to bid as one-stop operators in order to continue delivering services
under WIA. Some organizations have also noted that the one-stop
operator role is beneficial in that it allows their organization to main-
tain a presence in the workforce investment system (Macro, Almand-
smith, and Hague 2003). 
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Core Services
A major difference between services delivered under JTPA and
WIA is the “universal access” requirement that is applied to core ser-
vices. Since core services are not restricted to any special or targeted
population, customers are able to access a variety of core services,
which can include self-services in resource rooms (e.g., computer
access to labor information, automated labor exchange and job search,
resume preparation software, self-assessment tools, and fax and tele-
phone services) or staff-assisted services (e.g., labor exchange, job
search, assessment, and counseling).
ES continues to serve as a major labor exchange provider under
WIA. The selection of ES as the primary provider of core services was
evident in 45 percent of the one-stops in the intermediary study, with
nearly three-fourths of the local boards selecting ES as the primary
provider. Even when ES was not a primary provider, ES played a role
in the core service delivery structure among all of the comprehensive
one-stops (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). The significance of
ES, particularly as primary core service providers, was also evident
among a majority of the nine local boards in the early WIA implemen-
tation study (D’Amico et al. 2001).19 This is likely the result of the state
ES having the legislative and appropriation mandate to provide Wag-
ner-Peyser services in comprehensive one-stop centers, and local
boards determining that ES would be useful intermediaries to pro-
vide—in whole or in part—these types of services as core services.
Local boards can define the role of ES in the one-stop system in vari-
ous ways, such as by placing core service delivery entirely with ES, as
a shared responsibility between ES and other organizations, or as the
sole responsibility of another organization, such as the one-stop opera-
tor. When ES was not the primary provider of core services, Macro et
al. (2003) found that the one-stop operator held primary responsibility
for core service delivery, and those tended to be nonprofit organiza-
tions.20 
The important role of ES in providing core services today reflects
its expanding role in providing similar “core services” to ES applicants
in the years just prior to the enactment and implementation of WIA.
For example, in PY 1998, of the 17.3 million total applicants, 63 per-
cent received some reportable services, including 11 percent receiving
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assessment services, 36 percent receiving job search services, 2 percent
referred to training, and 40 percent referred to employment. During the
mid 1990s, ES experienced a large increase in providing “core ser-
vices,” especially job search assistance, as ES became the primary pro-
vider of reemployment services for workers served by the Worker
Profiling and Reemployment Service initiative that was enacted in
1993 (USDOL 2000; Wandner 1997).
Intensive Services
Intensive services include more individualized assistance from
one-stop staff to help move customers into employment, self-suffi-
ciency, or training. Customers can receive intensive services such as
assessment, career counseling, financial management, training assis-
tance, and additional placement services. While local boards can apply
for a waiver to deliver direct services, only a small proportion of local-
ities have done so.21 Instead, nonprofits tend to play a significant role
as intensive service providers; for example, Macro et al. (2003) found
that nonprofits delivered services to the majority of one-stops across
the 16 local boards of the intermediary study. 22 
The extensive use of nonprofits could be explained in part by the
fact that local boards often assigned intensive delivery responsibilities
to the one-stop operator, who tended to be nonprofits. Many of the
organizations had established histories with delivering employment
and training services and assisting specific populations, e.g., the local
affiliate of the AFL-CIO in Milwaukee and the community college in
Lane County assisted the dislocated worker population, and the Wis-
consin Correctional Service assisted the ex-offender population
(Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). The lack of such established
relationships or prior experience could pose some difficulty for new
organizations trying to enter the local market of service delivery.
The quality of intensive services can vary across and within differ-
ent types of intermediaries, with some intermediaries delivering ser-
vices that may result in better outcomes. However, there has not been a
great deal of research in this area. An experimental study operated by
the Kalamazoo–St. Joseph County Workforce Development Board
(Michigan) from 1998 to 2000 made use of three nonprofit organiza-
tions, Goodwill Industries, Behavioral Foundation, and YOU, to deliver
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welfare-to-work services. Each provider had a different philosophy and
approach to delivering services, with some providing more intensive
services than others to welfare recipients, based on local staff observa-
tions. When each organization was funded at the same level per partic-
ipant, Goodwill Industries was more successful than the other two
providers in having welfare recipients become employed for 90 days.
Goodwill provided the most intensive services, followed by Behavioral
Foundation, and then by YOU. Thus, with respect to achieving employ-
ment, Goodwill Industries in this case had an absolute advantage over
the other two service providers. Goodwill could better serve welfare
recipients whether they were easy, moderate, or difficult in their ability
to find employment. Goodwill has a long history working with econom-
ically disadvantaged individuals and a philosophy that was highly sup-
portive of individuals. The study found that, because of differing
intensity of services provided, the three providers could be assigned
participants by their difficulties in finding a job to determine the best
mix of participant employment outcomes (Eberts 2002). Thus, better
matching clients with the appropriate service providers and services can
improve outcome results and cost-effectiveness.
Youth Services
WIA affected youth programs by combining the year-round and
summer youth programs into a single program. Additionally, the new
combined youth program under WIA is subject to performance stan-
dards, unlike the summer youth program under JTPA. While many
localities experienced and welcomed the increase in bids for contracts
by intermediaries between the first and second year of WIA implemen-
tation, some localities predicted a possible decrease of competition
from providers due to additional data requirements and services
expected from providers without sufficient funding (Macro, Almand-
smith, and Hague 2003). 
Localities use different approaches to delivering youth services.
Many have used multiple types of service providers for their youth
population (see Table 5.1). Services may be delivered within the one-
stop center by the one-stop operator staff, within the one-stop center by
co-located organizations, or in specialized youth or other affiliate cen-
ters located outside of the comprehensive one-stop by contracted orga-
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nizations. Intermediaries are typically selected through a competitive
process with contracts for a one-year duration.
Localities utilized consortiums and various types of single organi-
zations to deliver youth services, but nonprofits delivered a majority of
the services (D’Amico et al. 2001). Similarly, in the ETA intermediary
study, the majority of youth service providers were nonprofits. Almost
one-quarter of the organizations were educational institutions, such as
school districts and post-secondary institutions, while governmental
entities and for-profits were among the least reported types of interme-
diaries used (see Table 5.1).23 
Training Services
WIA legislation affected local training programs in a significant
way, by requiring the use of individual training accounts (ITAs) and
state ETPLs to provide increased customer choice while holding train-
ing providers accountable to performance measures. WIA experience
has shown that the mix, availability, and utilization of training provid-
ers has changed as a result of these new features. The following section
identifies key issues that affect training providers under initial and sub-
sequent eligibility periods of WIA. It also focuses on three types of
training providerseducational institutions, nonprofits, and for-prof-
its that play important roles in the public training program. 
Early WIA experiences and intermediary responses
Localities experienced and anticipated changes in the availability
and usage of different types of training providers with the transition to
the ITA and ETPL systems. The potential loss, rather than increase, of
providers has been one of the criticisms of the changes made to the
training program. Indeed, in a study of five localities during early WIA
implementation, Buck (2002) observed a voluntary loss of CBOs and
other nonprofits; for example, Orlando lost all of its CBOs and non-
profits, and Houston lost many of its CBOs likely due to required per-
formance benchmarks.24 At the same time, however, Boston and
Philadelphia both experienced overall increases in providers, many of
which were for-profit providers new to the system. Macro et al. (2003)
similarly found that most localities experienced an overall increase in
training provider choices for customers. This takes into account that
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many states waived some, if not most, of the reporting requirements for
the initial eligibility period. Few had begun subsequent eligibility, and
most localities anticipated that performance requirements would affect
provider participation during subsequent eligibility once requirements
were enforced. 
The prospect of losing a large number of providers once subse-
quent eligibility began was a concern to many states, including Indi-
ana, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. D’Amico
and Salzman (forthcoming) found that at least 3 of the 28 localities vis-
ited had reported that some training providers refused to participate
due to the reporting requirements, and four other localities believed
that reporting requirements would adversely affect training providers’
participation in the system. 
Performance reporting requirements have been identified as poten-
tial barriers to the continuing participation of certain types of training
providers, especially community colleges and other educational institu-
tions (D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming; Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague 2003). Placement on the state ETPL requires that training pro-
viders submit performance and cost information, e.g., completion,
placement, retention, employment, and wage information. Providers
must also meet WIA performance measures to remain eligible to par-
ticipate. This requires many training providers to establish new sys-
tems of data collection and reporting, which many have considered
onerous. Texas, an early WIA implementing state, experienced an ini-
tial decline in community colleges in response to the introduction of
performance reporting requirements. The programs available to local
customers decreased from 8,000 to 1,000 training programs on the
ETPL once subsequent eligibility began. Texas was later able to recap-
ture its earlier numbers after it took steps to restore participation of
training providers. Other states, such as Oregon and Florida, took simi-
lar efforts to coordinate among the community colleges and the work-
force investment system for continued participation in the local
training programs (D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming).
Despite much of the effort invested into the development of the
ETPL and Consumer Reports Systems (CRS), states have for a number
of reasons requested waivers to extend their initial eligibility period,
thereby delaying subsequent eligibility. As of July 2003, ETA received
requests from 27 states for extensions in the initial period of provider
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eligibility by waiving the 18-month requirement for subsequent eligi-
bility. Most of the states requested extensions of initial eligibility
through June 2004—past the expected WIA reauthorization.25 In order
to relieve information collection by training providers, states are look-
ing at utilizing existing data sources. Some states, such as Texas, are
looking at using state Unemployment Insurance (UI) wage records, and
Florida is using its database on community college enrollees (Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
In addition to data collection, certification became another issue
for some states and localities. In these instances, state policy required
that training providers also be certified or licensed by the state’s higher
education commission (or equivalent).26 In Connecticut, which used
noncertified providers under JTPA for class-size training, localities in
the state could no longer refer ITA customers to those providers until
they became state-certified and approved on the ETPL. In Orlando,
none of the CBOs or nonprofits applied for the state ETPL as a result
of the locality requiring that providers be certified with the Florida
Department of Education (Buck 2002). Georgia, which also imposed a
state certification requirement, provided some initial exceptions for
WIA participation to noncertified providers if they showed that they
had applied for certification (D’Amico et al. 2002). 
The decision of training providers not to participate in WIA was
made easier by the fact that WIA provides for only a small proportion
of the workforce development services and financing around the coun-
try. In Texas, the state Education Agency and the state Higher Educa-
tion Coordinating Board provided at least 40 percent of the workforce
development funds in 2000. Within the Texas Workforce Commission,
WIA provided only one-sixth of the funding for workforce services in
2000, and relied on other sources, such as Welfare-to-Work grants,
Food Stamp program, TANF work programs, and the Employment Ser-
vice (O’Shea and King 2001). In Philadelphia, the first-year WIA allo-
cation was $17 million, which was less than one-seventh of the funding
for workforce services (Buck 2002).27 With WIA funds dwarfed by
other federal sources, training providers may seek to participate in pub-
licly funded training outside the WIA system.
State and local variation in the application and eligibility process
can also be perceived as more burdensome for some training providers.
Some states (e.g., Georgia, Michigan, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania)
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require training providers to submit applications to a central state
office; other states (e.g., California) have training providers submit
applications to their own localities; and others (e.g., North Carolina
and Texas) have providers submit applications to multiple areas for
determination. Additionally, local boards can set up different local per-
formance standards than their neighbors, so long as their policies meet
or exceed their states’ performance standards. In effect, an approved
training provider in one locality does not necessarily translate into an
approved provider for another locality, even within the same state.
These local variations can be a cumbersome and confusing process for
training providers, especially when they serve multiple areas. To create
a more “regional” approach to the requirements, some local boards
have begun work with neighboring boards to develop consistency in
how providers would be used; for example, local boards in Texas have
agreements to use providers approved by their neighboring local
boards, and the local boards of the Detroit and Atlanta areas are also
working towards more consistency in their respective regions (Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003; D’Amico et al. 2002). 
In an effort to encourage training providers to focus on improving
customer outcomes, some local boards have experimented with alter-
native methods, such as “benchmarking” payments made to training
providers. In Southwest Connecticut, 50 percent of the training fees
was paid to a provider when the customer completed the first half of
the program, 25 percent of the fees was paid when the customer com-
pleted the program, and the remaining 25 percent was paid when the
customer entered in employment (D’Amico et al. 2002).28 In Milwau-
kee, 10 percent was paid when a customer enrolled, 40 percent was
paid when a customer completed the program, and the remaining 50
percent was paid when the customer became employed within 60 days
of completing the training program, earned at least $8 per hour, and
retained employment for 30 days. Essex County (New Jersey) also
used employment retention as a factor for payment by providing the
final 10 percent of the costs to the training provider once the customer
retained employment for 60 days (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague
2003). Different types of training providers may or may not assume
this financial risk. CBOs, even if they have a track record for achieving
high performance outcomes, may find this payment structure finan-
cially unstable and offer their services elsewhere, especially if these
156 Javar and Wandner
WIA customers are a small proportion of the provider’s population and
source of revenue. Similarly, other nonprofits and for-profits may sim-
ply decide not to participate if they consider the payment structure to
be too demanding or unfair, especially when non-WIA customers or
other programs are readily available to make full payment of services.
Types of training provider participation
Educational institutions, for-profit/proprietary schools, and non-
profits participate in the WIA training program nationwide, but utiliza-
tion of each type can vary widely by locality. For example, the
important role of community and technical colleges can be seen in
Lane County (Oregon) and Pinellas County (Florida), where nearly 60
percent or more of the customers were referred into community col-
leges, and the Bay Area where more than 90 percent of its customers
were referred into technical colleges in PY 2001.29 On the other hand,
community or technical colleges can also be seldom used, such as in
Northwest (Pennsylvania), Essex County (New Jersey), and Boston
(Massachusetts). Instead, Northwest and Essex counties utilized for-
profits and Boston utilized nonprofits a majority of the time in PY
2001 (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Although localities
may rely on certain types of providers over others, all three types of
providers play an important role for the national workforce investment
system.
Community colleges and other educational institutions. Com-
munity and technical colleges are used for a number of reasons, includ-
ing the reasonable costs associated with a state-subsidized system, the
ability of customers to utilize Pell Grants, strong support from some
states for localities and the public educational system to work together,
and the availability of a wider range of programs than what is generally
offered by for-profits and nonprofits (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague
2003; D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming). Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague (2003) found that educational institutions played an important
role as training providers, receiving a larger percentage of ITAs than
either for-profits or nonprofits in the intermediary study. Among all
public and private educational institutions, community and technical
colleges accounted for over 40 percent of the total ITAs issued by the
localities. However, the certification process under WIA has had an
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adverse impact on the participation of community colleges. In April
2002, only 35 of more than 100 community colleges in California were
participating in the WIA system.30 In fact, based on early experiences
of WIA, community colleges were expected to decrease in WIA partic-
ipation due to state performance requirements for the ETPL (D’Amico
et al. 2001). WIA-funded training customers are a small subset of the
colleges’ entire student body, but these small proportions can constitute
a large proportion of the WIA training population.
Many educational institutions generally believe that they are
responsible for “education, not employment,” and that focusing on
employment is inconsistent with the institutions’ goals (Grubb 1996;
D’Amico et al. 2002). However, community college perception of a
conflict between “education” and “employment” is disappearing. The
community college system in the 1990s placed increasing emphasis on
workforce development. While continuing to maintain a role in sup-
porting academic students who seek to transfer to four-year colleges,
community colleges have aimed to gain an increasing share of the
workforce development training market, whether funded by employers
or publicly, and thereby provide current and future employees with
education, training, competencies, and skills that employers need to
maintain high performance in a competitive market environment
(Forde 2002). Community colleges in some localities, such as
Macomb-St. Clair (Michigan) and Metro Portland, are also tailoring
their programs to WIA customers by developing shorter-term courses
(D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming).
Community colleges have responded to shortages of skilled work-
ers by providing training directly to workers who came to community
colleges on their own or through JTPA and WIA programs. Commu-
nity colleges also increasingly have developed alliances with firms to
provide customized training for incumbent workers, seeking to be a
key or principal source of training for employers. Increased emphasis
on workforce development has not been in response to expected
increases in JTPA/WIA funding, but rather in response to actual large
increases in formal employer training occurrences that began in the
1980s and the projected continued increase in the future (Carnevale
and Desrochers 1997). 
Both JTPA and WIA have put a heavy emphasis on placement.
Under WIA, training providers’ success is documented by the Con-
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sumer Report System. Yet, one study found that the community college
system does not have strong placement programs. Community colleges
as large as 25,000 tend to have understaffed placement offices consist-
ing of two or three staff. Placement offices tend to put more emphasis
on temporary placement during school attendance; as a result, job
openings posted by employers are mostly temporary, low-wage jobs
for students. There are few openings listed for full-time jobs in areas of
study. Placement offices are also perceived by employers as not fol-
lowing up sufficiently or making effective use of employer openings,
and when they do follow up, not referring the best candidates for the
job. A community college was more effective when its state set a
placement goal, had effective co-op programs, and when its placement
office made use of job developers to find job openings for students.
Placement can also be made by occupational instructors, but few
instructors were found to engage in placement activities, and place-
ment is not normally considered part of their job (Grubb 1996).
In the past, community colleges have had limited incentives to col-
lect postenrollment labor force outcome data or serve the disadvan-
taged, especially without any clear guidance from the state.
Community colleges serve students with a wide variety of goals, many
of which do not deal with subsequent employment. Also, transfer
placement rates of students into four-year colleges has often been con-
sidered the “primary measure of success” (Alssid et al. 2002). With
weak incentives, postenrollment labor force outcome data can be diffi-
cult and expensive to collect. It has also not been a high priority for
community colleges because, in most cases, federal, state and local
governments have not pushed colleges to collect the data. The coming
of performance accountability indicators under WIA and the Carl D.
Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act has changed this situ-
ation. While the WIA Consumer Reports System requires that there be
records of customer placement, employment, and earnings, the com-
munity college system generally does not collect this information.
Except in states that have previously emphasized placement as an
important outcome for community colleges, little information has been
collected that could be used for submitting data for certification for the
WIA Eligible Training Provider list. Prior to the enactment of WIA,
Florida, Minnesota, and Ohio were among the few states that devel-
oped tracking systems using telephone surveys. Based on these sys-
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tems, the states developed placement goals of around 70–75 percent.
As a precursor to the approach of WIA, some states were testing the
use of unemployment insurance wage records, but this was only in its
early stages when WIA was enacted (Grubb 1996; Baj et al.1991).
The American Association of Community Colleges (AACC) has
responded to the introduction of WIA performance accountability mea-
sures by asking for more flexible measures that would allow commu-
nity colleges to use data they already collect or data that would be
easiest for them to collect. Community colleges would like flexibility
in what they measure, such as choosing whether the program comple-
tion measure was attainment of a degree/certificate, a measured skill,
an individual’s personal goal, or learning a defined skill. They would
also like to choose the method of measurement, such as measuring
earnings using unemployment insurance wage records or a wage sur-
vey (AACC 2002). This interest in easing the burden of collecting out-
come data is understandable given the small incidence of WIA-funded
students at community colleges, and it may provide the best available,
easily collectible outcome information. However, these changes would
also reduce the comparability of data and, therefore, the degree of
accountability in training and education programs.
More recently, there has been close coordination of policy between
the U.S. Departments of Education and Labor to coordinate the reau-
thorization of the Perkins Act and WIA. The goal of this policy is to
ratify that “community colleges are the engines for workforce develop-
ment in this country” by “examining ways to enhance the community
colleges’ growing role in workforce development” by reexamining
federal policies that “inadvertently discourage community college
activity in workforce development” (D’Amico 2002).
For-profit organizations. Unlike community colleges, proprietary
schools tend to be more flexible and have a greater tendency to use
open-entry exit programs. They also tend to have shorter, more inten-
sive courses that were commonly perceived to be more appropriate for
WIA participants. Proprietary schools often tracked performance for
accreditation or for their own internal records. As a result, proprietary
schools generally do not have as many concerns with reporting data or
outcomes. One-stop staff generally had the sense that proprietary
schools provided active counseling and were more experienced and
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equipped to manage progress and reporting requirements (D’Amico et
al. 2002).
However, not all proprietary schools feel at ease with the transition
to WIA. Some proprietary schools that have depended largely on JTPA
customers have not been able to transition to the unpredictable flows of
customers that came with the new ITA system. Some have begun to
market themselves to other non-WIA customers, while others have
closed down. These types of proprietary schools, like the CBOs that
depended heavily on JTPA customers, are not likely to continue suc-
cessfully as providers under the ITA system (D’Amico 2002). Addi-
tionally, providers that do not offer placement services, or have not
been successful in placing customers into employment, are also likely
to be at risk during subsequent eligibility (Macro, Almandsmith, and
Hague 2003).
Nonprofit organizations. Under JTPA, many CBOs held group
contracts for classroom training. CBOs are usually established in the
localities and specialized with serving specific populations, especially
harder-to-serve populations. The use of open competition and vouchers
instead of group contracts could affect their participation in the WIA
system. For example, CBOs in Boston expected to lose about one-third
of their enrollees during the transition to WIA, based on their experi-
ences with vouchers under a previous pilot program (Buck 2002).
Other localities also believed that CBOs would participate less under
WIA due to the focus on vouchers instead of contracts (D’Amico
2002). 
Unlike contracted group training where CBOs could be guaranteed
a certain number of enrollees based on their contractual agreement
with localities, the use of ITAs could no longer provide such a guaran-
tee. CBOs have observed fluctuations in registered students but have
little experience with planning or responding to unpredictable flows.
As a result, many small nonprofits with modest budgets can be vulner-
able to financial risk when they experience erratic customer flow,
which may lead them to discontinue WIA participation (D’Amico et.
al. 2002; Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). On the other hand,
some CBOs have tried to improve their competitive positions within
the WIA training environment by changing the format of their pro-
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grams into shorter, more intense programs that are similar to the pro-
grams of proprietary schools (D’Amico et al. 2001). 
CBOs also have other alternatives if they continue to experience
difficulty connecting with the ITA system, such as by offering their ser-
vices elsewhere, e.g., the welfare system (Buck 2002). CBOs generally
have a history with other federal programs that support training for
special populations of customers who are harder to serve, such as
TANF recipients. Because welfare programs have a larger funding
stream than WIA in many localities, and because CBOs are specialized
in serving specific populations, CBOs may be able to turn to the TANF
system as a source of training customers. 
Brokering and Consulting Services
Local boards, one-stop operators, and service providers constantly
make operational decisions to improve their management and delivery
of services in the workforce development system. Assistance with
these types of decisions are offered by brokering and consulting orga-
nizations that specialize in working with stakeholders to help them
achieve their goals. The Council for Adult and Experiential Learning
(CAEL) and the Structured Employment Economic Development Cor-
poration (Seedco) are examples of nonprofit organizations that provide
assistance on topics such as capacity building, strategic planning, and
program and financial management. CAEL, for example, provides
technical assistance with seeking funding and developing partnerships
with business, government, labor and higher education (CAEL 2003).31
Seedco, which is discussed further in the next section, provides techni-
cal assistance to small organizations and also helps foster partnerships
among stakeholders. Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague (2003) reported
that a number of the local boards in the intermediary study contracted
with for-profit firms most often for consulting services such as infor-
mation systems development, research, monitoring services, and mar-
keting and public relations. These intermediaries can play an important
role in improving the quality of services and management in the one-
stop system.
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UTILIZATION OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE
This section describes the benefits from economies of scale that
can assist organizations maintain their competitiveness in the work-
force investment system. We then identify four organizations, Good-
will Industries, Affiliated Computer Services, Employment Services,
and Seedco, that actively participate in the system.
Larger organizations, regardless of whether they are nonprofits,
for-profits, or public organizations, have the ability to consolidate
functions and offer to their local offices or affiliates important services
that may not be readily available to smaller organizations. These
advantages include important access to capital as well as expertise on
program and financial management (Winston et al. 2002). National
headquarters can devote full-time staff to focus on specific subject
areas, such as grantwriting or legislation, and provide technical assis-
tance on program and financial management to the local offices. Local
offices can also receive access to listservs, newsletters, policy updates,
and conferences (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Addition-
ally, centralized purchasing of supplies and other items, particularly
software and hardware for management information systems, can con-
tribute to cost-efficiency.
Financial stability and access to capital can affect an organization’s
participation with WIA programs. When an organization has a diverse
set of funding sources, they are less likely to be affected by changes in
WIA funding. For example, Goodwill received $80–$90 million in
ETA Welfare-to-Work grants and has found that the Welfare-to-Work
program is easier to participate in than WIA itself (Crosby 2002).
Organizations that are not reliant on WIA can more easily decide to opt
in or out of the system. On the other hand, organizations who do not
have access to other funding sources can be more vulnerable to WIA
changes. Preliminary observations showed that CBOs and for-profit
training providers alike were susceptible to folding if they were heavily
dependent on JTPA funding but could no longer obtain guarantees of
funding from ITAs (D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming; Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Also, poor financial management and
lack of access to a sufficient line of credit to operate under a cost-reim-
bursement contract were often issues that resulted in turnover for one-
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stop operators (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). Although
smaller organizations may be more susceptible to these problems,
Seedco President William Grinker suggests that developing networks
of small organizations can help them achieve similar benefits of the
larger organizations (Grinker 1999).
Goodwill Industries International, Inc. Goodwill Industries is
one of the largest nonprofit providers of workforce development ser-
vices in the United States, with a mission to serve primarily disadvan-
taged workers. In 2002, 179 local affiliates served over 500,000
workers, providing services in more than 94 percent of the counties in
the country. Goodwill has grown rapidly during a period of shrinking
JTPA programs. Local affiliates of Goodwill workforce services are
autonomous 501(3c) organizations that operate under local-national
agreements. Local affiliates benefit from the Goodwill name and logo,
the exclusive use of the local area to operate its retail stores, and a
range of services provided by the national office.
In 2000, Goodwill’s revenues of $1.85 billion included $364 mil-
lion in workforce development revenues, as grants from government
agencies. Goodwill operated 55 temporary services agencies and was
the one-stop operator in 19 localities (Goodwill Industries International
2001). More than 60 affiliates provide services to more than 125 one-
stop centers. Goodwill provides a range of employment and training
services to customers, including placement services, welfare-to-work
services, case management, and job readiness (Crosby 2002).
The largest customer for Goodwill’s workforce development ser-
vices is TANF, followed by Vocational Rehabilitation and WIA. The
revenue from retail stores provides a majority of the funding (about 80
percent) to deliver employment and training services to customers.
WIA funds are a small proportion of Goodwill’s public funding
sources and are used to supplement revenues generated from the Good-
will stores that are used to subsidize their workforce development
activities. WIA is important to Goodwill because Goodwill staff is bet-
ter linked to customers when they work on-site or closely with the one-
stop centers to deliver services (Crosby 2002).
Local affiliates receive a wide array of services from the national
headquarters that help them with bidding for services and improving
operations. The national headquarters provides grant writing assistance
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to local affiliates by making available a certified federal grants admin-
istrator and full-time grant writers, sponsoring workshops on grant
writing, providing a collection of successful proposals, and offering
online tools. The national headquarters or field staff, who may contract
with consultants, provide technical assistance on an on-going basis,
which can be particularly helpful if new affiliates struggle with service
delivery. The benefits of economies of scale are apparent when the
national headquarters researches and brokers purchasing deals for
items used nationwide, such as computer hardware and software.
Goodwill also develops its own software and plans to create a stan-
dardized client tracking system with financial data to provide the
national headquarters and affiliates with real time data on customers
(Crosby 2002).
Affiliated Computer Services (ACS). Formerly Lockheed Martin
IMS, ACS is one of the leading for-profit organizations that provide
workforce development services. ACS is an information technology
and business process outsourcing Fortune 1000 company that acquired
the Lockheed-Martin IMS unit in June 2001. Lockheed Martin IMS
was the workforce development services portion of Lockheed Martin
that specialized in welfare and workforce services, child support
enforcement, child care management, and electronic toll collection.
The unit has about 4,100 employees located in 275 locations, and is
now called the “Workforce and Community Solutions” unit of ACS,
with headquarters based in Austin, Texas.32 In 2003, ACS provided ser-
vices to about 50 local boards and served as the one-stop operator of
103 one-stop centers. In Texas and Florida, ACS was the one-stop
operator and organization responsible for core and intensive services,
while in California ACS provided services for local areas but did not
serve as the one-stop operator (Zeitler 2003). 
The ACS headquarters provides assistance to the local office staff
in various ways. These include using “train the trainer” sessions and
employing subject matter experts to oversee quality and project status.
Grant writing is centralized at the ACS headquarters, which relieves
local offices from having to devote much of their resources performing
the task. Proprietary software and a client tracking system have been
developed and are available for local offices, but are not required if the
local board prefers to use a different system. Hiring is generally con-
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ducted at the local office, but headquarters can provide assistance to
the local levels if necessary. Despite the recent acquisition to ACS, the
same processes and much of the same staff, in place when the organi-
zation was under Lockheed Martin, remain the same under ACS
(Zeitler 2003).
ACS has financial and staff resources to provide many of the ser-
vices that a national nonprofit organization provides, such as technical
assistance and consolidated functions in a national headquarters.
Unlike Goodwill, which has local affiliates that are autonomous and
responsible for their own financial and accounting mechanisms in
place, ACS retains overall responsibility for local offices. Since ACS
provides numerous services outside of its workforce development unit,
it can likely withstand fluctuations, including decreases, in WIA funds
because of other funding opportunities. ACS receives funds for work-
force development services primarily through WIA, but has seen a
decrease in WIA funding over the past few years. TANF is the next
largest source of funding for these services. ACS is involved primarily
with direct service delivery and limits its involvement to providing
management and consulting services to local boards. Few for-profit
firms in the ETA intermediary study provide youth services, but ACS
plans to expand in this area (Zeitler 2003).33
In 2000, Lockheed Martin IMS had $580 million in revenue, and
ACS estimated that it would increase to $700 million in 2001 (Wake-
man and Welsh 2001). The President and CEO of ACS stated, “Our
objective is to be premier provider of diversified business process out-
sourcing services, delivering a full range of services to multiple verti-
cal markets.” According to an ACS press release, the company
expected a greater percentage of government expenditures to be out-
sourced due to a “rise in fiscal pressures, changing regulations, and
increased accountability . . . to streamline program operations” (Intelli-
gent Transportation System Access 2001).
The Employment Service (ES). The ES is a governmental agency
with over 60 years of experience providing labor exchange and other
services in locations nationwide. Each local ES office is part of a larger
state workforce security agency that operates under a national legisla-
tive mandate and has experienced a relatively fixed though stagnant
funding level. The national office provides information and guidance
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about new rules and procedures. Automated labor market information
and labor exchange programs provide a national system of labor
exchange and labor market information.34 In addition to the national
system, each state ES agency also maintains an automated state labor
market information system and has an established network of employ-
ers across the state that local offices can access. State ES agencies are
able to put in place exclusive hiring agreements with private employers
and provide training and capacity building for local offices, with ser-
vices standardized across localities. Staffing and financial functions are
also standardized, and local offices benefit from central purchasing.
Another important feature is the state ES agencies’ authority to open
new local offices in areas that are determined to be in need of ES ser-
vices.35 Additionally, WIA regulations mandating ES as a required
partner in the one-stop center can provide ES with a physical advan-
tage of co-location within the centers. ES has a long-standing history of
providing labor exchange services, and most localities from studies on
early WIA experiences selected ES as a primary provider of core ser-
vices (D’Amico 2001; Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003). 
Structured Employment Economic Development Corporation
(Seedco). Seedco is a national nonprofit intermediary that assists orga-
nizations improve in areas such as workforce operations, capacity-
building, and performance and financial management. It assists small
organizations consolidate functions, such as accounting and reporting,
to improve their performance so that organizations can focus on direct
service provision. The purpose is to allow small intermediaries to bet-
ter compete with larger intermediaries through sharing of resources.
Seedco also helps nonprofits establish a diverse set of funding sources
to become economically sustainable. To further assist with financial
independence and stability, Seedco brokers funds for community
groups with cash flow needs. Seedco also develops tools, such as the
Performance Measurement and Management (PM&M) system, to
assist nonprofits measure and manage performance (Seedco 2002).
Seedco has provided technical assistance to numerous organiza-
tions, and grants from foundations and the government have helped
support these efforts. For example, a USDOL grant was awarded to
Seedco to provide assistance to CBOs to increase their participation in
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the workforce investment system.36 Seedco has customers located in
twenty states, and Washington, DC (Seedco 2002). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Intermediaries have greater participation in the system under WIA
as a result of new one-stop centers that were created nationwide and
local boards being prohibited from delivering direct services. Based on
early accounts of WIA implementation, the following summarizes
what has been observed of intermediary characteristics and service
provision.
Intermediary Provision of Services
• Nonprofit organizations and consortiums are generally
selected to serve as one-stop operators. Few local boards decide
to deliver one-stop operator services themselves, choosing
instead to use a variety of other providers. 
• ES plays a large role in providing core services, especially as a
primary provider of the services. When ES is not the primary
provider of core services, this responsibility is usually assigned to
the one-stop operators, which tend to be nonprofits.
• Nonprofit organizations are major providers of intensive and
youth services.  Intensive services are often the responsibility of
the organization selected as the one-stop operator. CBOs with
established histories are generally used to deliver services for
specific populations, such as youth, dislocated workers, low-
wage workers, and ex-offenders. 
• Certain types of training providers, especially community col-
leges and smaller CBOs, are reluctant to participate in an
ITA/ETPL system, but for different reasons. Many community
colleges are not willing to provide customer data because of the
resources needed to collect and maintain information for initial
and subsequent eligibility, especially when the WIA customer is a
small fraction of the colleges’ student population. Community
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colleges would prefer to submit data that they have already col-
lected, or data that is easier to collect than the current ETPL
requirements. Smaller CBOs, on the other hand, tend to rely more
on WIA customers and funding. Because of this, they are more
vulnerable to the uncertainties of a voucher system that replaces
group-contracted training. These CBOs may find it financially
beneficial to diversify and provide training elsewhere, outside of
the WIA system.
Intermediary Advantages in the One-Stop Environment
• Larger organizations, regardless of whether they are for-
profits or nonprofits, can have an advantage over smaller
organizations when competing for WIA services. Larger orga-
nizations have resources to support full-time staff to specialize in
services where smaller organizations may find it difficult to do
so, e.g., establish networks with federal government and other
stakeholders, provide technical assistance and training, and assist
with the bidding process. Larger providers may also better with-
stand the implementation of a voucher system that utilizes open
competition, and are less reliant on WIA funding because they
can seek other sources of funding. 
• Small community-based organizations dominate youth ser-
vices. More competition (and more choice for local boards)
appears to exist among intermediaries for youth services. For-
profits are generally not involved in youth services; there may be
too much competition from other organizations, or not enough
profit. 
Notes
The content of this chapter reflects the opinions of the authors and does not represent
the policy or positions of the U.S. Department of Labor. We thank John Colborn and
Norton Grubb for helpful comments.
1.  The term intermediaries has been recently defined and applied in the workforce
investment system in different ways. In this chapter, we apply a broad definition
used by Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague (2003) in an ETA study that referred
intermediaries to public and private organizations who receive funding from local
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boards to serve WIA customers or perform WIA-related functions.  A separate
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services study conducted by Pavetti et al.
(2000) defined intermediaries as organizations that hold formal relationships with
the welfare office (or other administrative entity) responsible for moving welfare
recipients into the labor market, including training providers that provide place-
ment services.  In Workforce Intermediaries for the Twenty-First Century, Leete et
al. (2004) broadly define labor  market intermediaries as organizations that work
at various levels of the labor market (such as job placement, training, and support
services) to help link individuals to jobs. These would include temporary place-
ment agencies and head hunters, unions, CBOs, nonprofits, governmental organi-
zations, community and technical colleges, vocational schools, and associations.
In the same book, Osterman (2004) also considers labor market intermediaries to
include Internet job-matching agencies (such as www.monster.com and
www.guru.com).
However, Giloth (2004) distinguishes another set of intermediaries, which he
labels as workforce intermediaries, as a much narrower subset of organizations
under labor market intermediaries. According to Giloth, workforce intermediar-
ies, among other objectives, specifically serve both employers and low-income/
less-skilled individuals, create and manage different funding streams, and provide
job placement with other services. However, it is the broader definition, and not
this narrow one, that we and (other sources) are more likely to associate with the
term intermediaries.
2. The Employment Service (ES) is also referred to as Job Service in some states.
The responsibilities of ES have evolved over the years as a result of changing leg-
islation and priorities. See National Commission for Employment Policy (1991).
3. See Wandner and Javar (2001) for further discussion of privatization efforts under
UI and ES. See Balducchi and Pasternak (2000) for a discussion of the issue of
privatization of ES.
 4. Employers, state apprenticeship agencies, trade associations, unions, and non-
profit community agencies provided most of the on-the-job training (Levitan and
Mangum 1969). In an MDTA longitudinal evaluation sample of 10 metropolitan
areas, of the 54 training facilities that held contracts funded by the federal govern-
ment (with some facilities receiving more than one contract), approximately two-
thirds were public intermediaries and one-third were private intermediaries. Of
the public intermediaries, most were either skill centers or community colleges.
5. Three large CBOs in particular, the National Urban League, Opportunities Indus-
trialization Centers, and SER, significantly increased their work (Snedeker and
Snedeker 1978).
6. In FY 1975, 700 ES positions were cut as a result of decreased contracts (Snede-
ker and Snedeker 1978).
7. This figure does not include Public Service Employment funding.
8. ES also defined cost categories differently than JTPA programs and did not have a
15 percent limit on administrative costs, which may be another factor for why ES
was selected.
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9. Welfare-to-Work grants were awarded to local governments, local boards, and
other entities (such as community development corporations and CBOs, commu-
nity action agencies, and other private organizations) that applied with a local
board or local government. 
10. Six states (Florida, Texas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Vermont) became
early implementers of WIA. D’Amico et al. (2001) visited these states and locali-
ties as part of their study on early WIA implementation experiences.
11. In developing ETA’s Five-Year Strategic Plan for pilots, demonstrations, research,
and evaluation for July 2000–June 2005, an Expert Panel meeting was convened
to discuss high priority research topics for ETA to focus on in the next five years.
The Expert Panel agreed that intermediaries play a large role in the workforce
development system, but that little information was known about these entities,
and to what extent they were working with local boards in serving the locality’s
customers.
12. According to figures on January 27, 2003, there were 1,933 comprehensive one-
stop centers nationwide, 1,604 affiliate centers, and 591 local workforce invest-
ment areas (www.servicelocator.org).
13. Results are based on data collected from the Workforce System Information and
Evaluation (WSIE) survey (D’Amico et al. 2001). 
14. Minimizing staff training and transitional costs, or desiring continuity of staff, are
some reasons why former staff may be rehired by the new operator, e.g., the
Lower Rio Grande local board (Texas) switched from a for-profit to a nonprofit to
serve as the one-stop operator. The for-profit and nonprofit proposals were rated
as a statistical tie, but the for-profit had an $800,000 cost difference for an 8
month period. Interestingly, the nonprofit that hoped to receive the new contract
was previously the administrative arm of a private industry council, but had been
a separate organization for five years (Lower Rio Grande Workforce Develop-
ment Board 2002).
15. Nearly half (48 percent) of the comprehensive one-stop centers were operated by
nonprofits (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
16. Although collaboratives and consortiums both are associations that band more
than one organization together, Macro et al. (2003) distinguishes “collaboratives”
from “consortiums” because collaboratives do not consist of at least three
required WIA partners.
17. Milwaukee grandfathered the TANF service providers as one-stop operators. The
decision to transform existing employment and training service locations into new
one-stop centers, and select existing organizations as the one-stop operators or
lead operators, has been evident in other localities as well. Consortiums in locali-
ties that transformed their existing ES buildings into new one-stop centers often
had ES staff act as the lead in the consortium (D’Amico et al. 2001).
18. In this case, Lockheed Martin IMS was the former one-stop operator that decided
not to re-compete for the contract (Jacobson 2002).
19. In 7 of the 9 localities, ES was the primary provider of core services (D’Amico et
al. 2001). 
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20. Gulf Coast (Texas) was the only locality that used a for-profit organization (which
was also the one-stop operator) to deliver core services (Macro, Almandsmith,
and Hague 2003).
21. Only about one-sixth of the local boards nationwide received a waiver to provide
core and intensive services, as of October 2000 (D’Amico et al. 2001). In the
intermediary study, none of the local boards delivered intensive services (Macro,
Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
22. Intensive services have also been delivered out of affiliate centers, in addition to
the comprehensive one-stops. Table 5.1 underestimates the total number of inten-
sive service providers that are used in the one-stop system because it represents
those used only in comprehensive one-stops. 
23. The two national for-profit companies included Sylvan Learning Centers and
ACS (Macro, Almandsmith, and Hague 2003).
24. Boston went from 24 to 34 providers, primarily with the entry of new proprietary
schools, but almost one-third of the providers that held contracts under JTPA did
not apply. In Charlotte, the number of providers remained the same at 16, but the
mix of providers was not the same. Houston experienced a decrease from 120 to
95 providers, and officials believed that this was a result of a voluntary loss of
CBO participation due to required performance benchmarks. Philadelphia
increased from 56 to 64 providers, with nearly half of all providers being new to
the workforce development system (Buck 2002).
25. Seventeen of the twenty-seven states requested to extend the initial period of pro-
vider eligibility to June 30, 2004. In fact, several states had submitted second
requests to extend their previously approved dates of initial eligibility to a new
end date of June 30, 2004.
26. In the ITA/ETP Demonstration report, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Mary-
land, Nebraska, Oregon, and Pennsylvania instituted these types of state certifica-
tion or licensing from the state higher education commission, or equivalent
(D’Amico et al. 2002).
27. Other providers were the TANF programs ($70 million), Welfare-to-Work grants
($25 million), secondary vocational education ($9.5 million), and a Community
Services Grant ($3.6 million) (Buck 2002).
28. As of October 2002, the Southwest Connecticut local board changed the bench-
mark payment structure to 50 percent payment when the customer attends the first
class, instead of 50 percent payment after the customer attends half of the training
program.
29. Other states with an extensive system of technical colleges include Georgia, North
Carolina, Texas, and Indiana (D’Amico et al. 2002).
30. Numbers based on April 2002 meeting on WIA reauthorization held in Los Ange-
les.
31. CAEL also works with localities to improve program services, such as working
with Chicago to serve as the Training Assessment and Review Agency in the local
ITA system.
32. The ACS company has about 30,000 employees (Zeitler 2003).
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33. Although ACS has had youth service contracts since 1996, the effort in expanding
these services is fairly new.
34. America’s Job Bank and America’s Career Kit are part of ES services for nation-
wide networks. State ES also maintain electronic labor exchange services for the
state.
35. The ES office must be affiliated with the one-stop system, serving as either a sat-
ellite center, specialty center, or within a comprehensive one-stop center.
36. For more information on this and other grants awarded to Seedco, see “Field-
notes,” available at www.seedco.org/about/field/index.html.
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Individual Training Accounts, 




A crucial change brought about by the Workforce Investment Act
(WIA) of 1998 has been the requirement that local workforce agencies
use training vouchers, known as Individual Training Accounts (ITAs),
to provide training to their customers. Training vouchers are intended
to maximize customer choice in training decisions. Theoretically, if
individuals use vouchers to choose the training occupations and pro-
viders they value the most, the use of training vouchers should also
generally maximize social welfare. However, the success of training
vouchers in maximizing social welfare depends on individuals making
sensible choices based on reliable information. In an actual training
market, it may be difficult for individuals to collect reliable informa-
tion about occupational opportunities and training providers or to use
this information effectively in making sensible training choices. Hence,
the use of a pure, unrestricted training voucher with no further govern-
ment role is probably unrealistic. Instead, the government training
agency needs to 1) ensure that information about occupations and pro-
viders is available and accessible to customers, and 2) help customers
in evaluating the information appropriately.
Under WIA, ITAs are intended to empower adult and dislocated
worker customers to choose the training services they need and to raise
the accountability of states, local areas, and service providers for meet-
ing these needs. Rather than have counselors in local workforce agen-
cies decide who receives what kind of training from which providers,
under WIA, customers use their ITAs to make their own training
choices. The thinking behind this legislative shift was consistent with
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the general argument for vouchers described above—that customers
would improve the quality of training choices by selecting the pro-
grams and providers that were most appropriate for them. The use of
training vouchers was also anticipated to increase competition among
training providers, thereby increasing their responsiveness to custom-
ers’ needs and the overall quality of their offerings.
The ITA system established under WIA also recognizes the need to
maintain an important and appropriate role for local training agencies
in the administration of ITAs. WIA gives states and local areas a great
deal of flexibility in both setting the value and other parameters of
ITAs to maximize customer access to training and deciding how much
guidance and direction counselors provide to customers as they formu-
late their training decisions. This flexibility allows state and local offi-
cials to specify and administer their ITAs in a way that is best suited for
their local customers.
Although customers who are determined eligible for training and
are awarded an ITA can use their ITAs to purchase training, their selec-
tion of a provider is constrained to approved training programs—those
included on the state’s Eligible Training Provider (ETP) list. To be
included on the list, programs must be certified by the state and local
workforce areas as meeting acceptable levels of performance. States
also provide customers with data on provider performance through the
Consumer Report System (CRS), which is intended to help customers
make effective training decisions.
This chapter describes the shift to the use of ITAs under the new
law and some of the issues that local workforce agencies have faced in
designing and implementing ITA programs. Our objectives are to eval-
uate the degree to which local areas have been able to implement the
ITA system envisioned in WIA and, based on this evaluation, discuss
issues that may need to be addressed in WIA reauthorization.  In the
first section, we describe the experience of local workforce agencies
with training vouchers prior to WIA. In the following section, we
describe key provisions of WIA relating to the administration of ITAs
and the selection of training providers. Then we describe the ITA
Experiment, which is being sponsored by the U.S. Department of
Labor (USDOL) to investigate the implications of different designs for
specifying and administering ITAs. In the fourth section, we summa-
rize the experiences of the six local areas participating in the experi-
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ment in implementing ITAs, both in the early days of WIA prior to the
experiment and under the ITA Experiment. Finally, we discuss the
overall feasibility of ITAs as an ongoing approach to providing training
and several challenges that may be addressed in WIA reauthorization.
EXPERIENCE WITH TRAINING VOUCHERS PRIOR TO WIA
To some extent, the establishment of ITAs under WIA is a reflec-
tion of a trend that had already been ongoing for years at the local
level. For example, D’Amico et al. (2001) found that in 13 sites in
which they studied early WIA implementation, almost all had already
moved away from exclusive use of contracted training and toward indi-
vidual referral methods during the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
era. Furthermore, half of the sites had previous experiences with using
vouchers for training, either as a grantee under the Career Management
Account demonstration (Public Policy Associates 1999) or as part of
some other pilot program.
Moreover, a few local training agencies experimented with training
vouchers many years prior to WIA. For example, the Atlanta Regional
Commission first used vouchers in 1991 as a means to provide training
services to about 13,000 dislocated Eastern Airlines workers when the
company went bankrupt. Given the existing training infrastructure and
the size of the dislocation, the commission could not handle the num-
ber of prospective trainees using the contracted class-size training
approach that predominated under JTPA. The commission therefore
established a voucher system and let dislocated workers choose what-
ever training they wanted. It found that many of the dislocated workers
who were issued a voucher made poor training choices, selecting train-
ing for occupations that paid low wages, or had limited opportunities
for career development. In response to this experience, the commission
began to build its vendor list and monitor vendor performance, long
before these responsibilities were officially established under WIA
(D’Amico and Salzman forthcoming).
Local agencies that experimented with voucher programs under
JTPA specifically designed programs that allowed for customer choice
but still required counseling and constrained choices so as to ensure
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customers made informed, appropriate choices. A Trutko and Barnow
(1999) study of nine areas using voucher programs under JTPA found
that eight of the nine areas used a “constrained choice” voucher model,
in which the local training agency played a substantial role in approv-
ing individual training choices.1 Under this model, the local agency
screened approved vendors, limited occupational choices, provided
assessment and counseling on appropriate training choices, and
retained the agency’s authority to reject a participant’s training choice.
Local administrators interviewed as part of the Trutko and Barnow
study felt that a “pure” voucher model, without assessment or restric-
tions on training choices, would result in some participants making
poor training choices and wasting resources.  Many of the elements of
this “constrained choice” voucher model are common under the emerg-
ing local ITA models, as we will describe later in this chapter. Local
administrators in the sites studied by Trutko and Barnow felt that the
use of vouchers in their sites had little effect on customer outcomes or
costs, but that it improved the level of customer satisfaction (Trutko
and Barnow 1999, pp. 35–37).
In the mid 1990s, in anticipation of the possible enactment of train-
ing vouchers as part of new workforce development legislation,
USDOL sponsored the Career Management Account (CMA) Demon-
stration to test the feasibility of providing training for dislocated work-
ers through vouchers. The CMA Demonstration was conducted from
1995 to 1997 in 13 sites (Public Policy Associates 1999). Sites contin-
ued to operate their nonvoucher programs, but they designed and oper-
ated voucher programs to be used for a subsample of their dislocated
workers. The targeting of dislocated workers to receive vouchers var-
ied widely and included, in various states, those determined most in
need, profiled unemployment insurance claimants, nominations by
one-stop staff, and those interested enough to apply for services. Cus-
tomers were free to choose their training programs, but the local agen-
cies required customers to participate in assessment and counseling to
support their decisions. Local agencies felt that if customers had the
choice of using these services or not, they would not invest adequate
resources in planning their training strategy. Overall, the models devel-
oped by local agencies resembled the “constrained choice” models
identified in the Trutko and Barnow (1999) research on voucher pro-
grams under JTPA. The research on the CMA Demonstration con-
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cludes that voucher systems in general are likely to work just as well as
a contracted-training system, and lead to somewhat more satisfied cus-
tomers and staff. 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ITAS UNDER WIA
Under the tiered service structure established by WIA, adults and
dislocated workers can receive training support from local workforce
areas only after they have completed minimum core and intensive ser-
vice requirements established by the local one-stop center.2 Core ser-
vices include basic services to assist individuals in obtaining and
retaining employment. Intensive services generally include counseling,
assessment, and short-term pre-vocational services. 
Once individuals complete their core and intensive service require-
ments, they may be determined eligible for and in need of training.
WIA regulations require that local workforce areas use ITAs to provide
training to adults and dislocated workers, except in some limited cir-
cumstances, to ensure that these individuals can choose their training
providers.  Exceptions to the use of ITAs can include funding of on-
the-job training or customized training provided by an employer or
training provided by an organization designed to assist special popula-
tions facing multiple employment barriers.
ITAs enable individuals to purchase training from any eligible pro-
vider, subject to the limitations established by the states and local
areas. The WIA regulations allow states and local workforce areas to
restrict the type or duration of training they will fund. For example,
training can only be funded for positions that relate to job opportunities
in the local area or to a broader geographic area if the customer is will-
ing to relocate. Similarly, states and local areas can impose limits on
the duration or costs of training. These limits can be either based on
individual circumstances or established across the board.  For example,
the amount of an ITA may be set for an individual based on that indi-
vidual’s training needs. Alternatively, the state or local area may estab-
lish a range of amounts or a maximum amount that is applicable to all
ITAs.
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States and local areas, through their one-stop centers, are also
responsible for ensuring that the training choices made by customers
are supported by high-quality information and guidance. A critical
component in this effort is the ETP list, which specifies training pro-
grams approved for WIA-sponsored training. The WIA legislation
specifies two objectives of the ETP list. First, the list defines the train-
ing programs that may be considered by adults and dislocated workers
who are undertaking training funded by WIA. At the same time, it also
serves as a resource for any individual who is interested in conducting
research on training providers in the state. As pointed out by D’Amico
and Salzman (forthcoming), there is some tension between these two
objectives, because the first objective requires that the list exclude
some providers while the other objective requires that the list include
enough providers to be a useful resource. 
To be included on the ETP list, providers must establish their eligi-
bility to receive ITA funds. ITAs can be used to pay only for training
provided by vendors whose programs have been certified by the states
and local areas as meeting acceptable performance levels on a variety
of outcomes measures, including
1) the percentage of all participants who completed training,
2) the percentage of all participants who obtained unsubsidized
employment,
3) the average wages at placement of all participants,
4) the percentage of WIA-funded participants who completed train-
ing and obtained unsubsidized employment,
5) the percentage of WIA-funded completers who were employed
six months after the start of employment,
6) the average wages received by WIA-funded completers, mea-
sured six months after the first day of employment, and
7) if applicable, the percentage of WIA-funded completers who
obtained a license or certificate, an academic degree or equiva-
lent, or other measures of skills.
States are responsible for establishing acceptable performance lev-
els on these measures and administering the eligibility determination
process. Performance levels for each program are to be adjusted to
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account for the characteristics of the local economy and the clients
served. 
Information on provider performance and other provider character-
istics, including costs, are provided to customers through each state’s
CRS. The CRS is built on the ETP list and contains information pro-
vided by the training providers during the eligibility determination pro-
cess. According to WIA regulations, the system “must contain the
information necessary for an adult or dislocated worker to fully under-
stand the options available to him or her in choosing a program of
training services.”  Although the CRS is built on the ETP list, some
states have chosen to make the CRS as comprehensive as possible by
also including non-ITA eligible providers (D’Amico and Salzman
forthcoming).
The WIA regulations left considerable flexibility for local agencies
to develop their own unique programs within the broad structure
described above. Given this flexibility, together with the limited expe-
rience with vouchers prior to WIA, several questions remained to be
answered at the state and local levels as WIA implementation began,
such as:
• What is the appropriate balance between customer choice and
counselor guidance? 
• How should scarce training dollars be allocated among customers
through ITA awards?
• Are ITAs appropriate for adult customers as well as dislocated
workers?
In the following section we describe the ongoing ITA Experiment,
which is designed to specifically address some of these important ques-
tions related to the design and administration of ITAs. 
THE ITA EXPERIMENT
The ITA specifications set out in WIA, as summarized above,
allow states and local areas great flexibility in deciding how they will
administer their ITAs. The ongoing ITA Experiment (Perez-Johnson et
al. 2000) is providing a test of different approaches to managing cus-
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tomer choice in the administration of ITAs.3 The experiment is testing
three alternative ITA approaches. These approaches differ with respect
to both the resources made available to customers to help them access
training and the involvement of local counselors in guiding customer
choice. 
The ITA approaches are being tested side-by-side in six local areas
using an experimental design.  That is, new customers determined to be
eligible for training are randomly assigned to one of the three ITA
approaches and are directed to participate in the activities of the ITA
approach to which they have been assigned.  All eligible customers
receive some type of ITA offer—there is no control group of customers
who are denied ITAs. The experiment also works with the existing ETP
list and CRS in each of the six sites. Intake in the study sites began
between December 2001 and August 2002 and continued for approxi-
mately 18 months. By the end of intake, in February 2004, 8,331 local
training customers had been enrolled in the ITA Experiment and ran-
domly assigned to one of its three ITA approaches.
The findings from the ITA Experiment will reveal how different
approaches generate different training choices, employment and earn-
ings outcomes, returns on training investments, and customer satisfac-
tion. Importantly, this study will not assess the merits of a voucher-
based approach relative to other approaches (for example, prenegoti-
ated contracts) to helping individuals access training. Rather, the ITA
Experiment departs from the premise that vouchers are the required
approach and asks the questions: “What is the best way to operate
voucher-based training programs?” and “When or for whom might
approaches offering more or less customer choice be most appropri-
ate?” Hence, the objective of the ITA Experiment is to provide state
and local administrators with the information they need to determine
which ITA approach, or combination of approaches, is most appropri-
ate for their customers.
Selection of the ITA Approaches Being Tested
The selection of approaches to be tested in the ITA experiment was
based largely on research on voucher models that existed prior to WIA
or that were emerging in the early days of WIA.4 The information gath-
ered through this research was used to identify ITA approaches that
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were consistent with WIA, had the potential for generating different
training choices and outcomes, and seemed both feasible and likely to
be of interest to sites implementing WIA. 
In making the final selection of the three approaches being tested
in the ITA experiment, we had two broad objectives in mind. First, we
wanted the approaches to generally represent the spectrum of voucher
models that were emerging prior to WIA and in the early days of WIA.
Based on our examination of these emerging models, we developed a
spectrum of ITA approaches that represent different balances between
customer choice and counselor guidance in the formulation of training
decisions. In the middle of the spectrum, we specified the model that
sites were most likely to adopt in the absence of the experiment. Then,
at one end of the spectrum, we specified an ITA approach that placed
greater emphasis on customer choice and less emphasis on counselor
guidance. At the other end of the spectrum, we specified an approach
that reversed this emphasis to depend more on counselor guidance and
somewhat less on customer choice. The limit on the amount of the
voucher varied along this spectrum as well, so that the resources avail-
able to a customer were more limited in the approaches that entailed
greater customer choice of training options.
The second objective in selecting the three approaches to test was
to promote innovation in the use of vouchers. In the early days of WIA,
most local agencies designed ITA models that looked similar to the
“constrained choice” model identified by Trutko and Barnow, and there
was little deviation from this model.  That is, because of the limited
evidence on the effects of alternative approaches and their own limited
experience with vouchers, states and local areas appeared reluctant to
develop voucher models that provided substantial customer choice or,
alternatively, restricted customer choice in notable ways.  Hence, to
make the experiment as informative as possible, we selected
approaches that, while feasible, pushed sites a bit beyond their comfort
zone in the spectrum described above. Thus, we selected models that
offered either greater customer choice or more intensive counseling
than local workforce agencies were inclined to provide on their own. 
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Description of the Approaches Being Tested
The approaches being tested in the ITA Experiment vary along
three dimensions related to the management of customer choice: 1) the
method used to control each customer’s ITA spending, 2) the type of
counseling provided and whether it is mandatory or voluntary, and 3)
the ability of local counselors to restrict the choices of customers. We
use these dimensions of variation as the basis for the three ITA
approaches, whose basic features are summarized in Table 6.1. 
The approaches range from a highly structured approach, which
we call Approach 1 or structured customer choice, to a true voucher
approach, which we call Approach 3, or maximum customer choice. In
the middle of the spectrum, Approach 2, or guided customer choice, is
intended to broadly represent what most sites are doing on their own
under WIA. In contrast, Approaches 1 and 3 are designed to be more or
less structured than what most sites are doing on their own.
• Approach 1 is the most directive of the three approaches. Cus-
tomers assigned to Approach 1 participate in a series of manda-
tory assessment and counseling sessions designed to identify
promising training opportunities. During these sessions, custom-
ers are guided by their counselor through the estimation of the
benefits and costs of alternative training options and directed
toward options expected to yield a high return—that is, programs
that will generate earnings on a new job that are high relative to
the resources invested in training. Counselors can reject training
selections that are not consistent with this approach. Once appro-
priate training has been chosen, customers receive an ITA to fully
cover the costs of training. Therefore, the amount of the ITA is
considered to be customized to the individual based on the train-
ing program approved by the counselor. 
• Approach 2 broadly represents the approach that most local
areas have adopted in the transition to WIA. In comparison with
Approach 1, Approach 2 reduces the service requirements and
allows greater customer choice, but at the same time it offers a
limited, fixed ITA amount to all customers. As in Approach 1,
Approach 2 customers are required to participate in structured
counseling activities, but the activities are less intensive and are
ITAs, ETP Lists, and Consumer Report Systems 187
not specifically focused on the return to the training investment.
Once Approach 2 customers have completed their required coun-
seling, they are free to choose any training program from the state
ETP list—counselors cannot reject choice. Although Approach 2
customers can choose any training program, they receive a fixed
ITA award, which limits the resources they can spend on training. 
• Approach 3 is the least structured of the approaches. It is
intended to represent a true voucher program, where customers
are free to spend a fixed amount of resources on any training pro-
gram they choose. As in Approach 2, all Approach 3 customers
receive the same fixed ITA amount and have final authority to
choose their training providers from the ETP list. Unlike in
Approach 2, however, Approach 3 customers are not required to
participate in any counseling activities (although they may partic-
ipate if they wish) prior to pursuing the training of their choice.
LOCAL EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING ITAS 
AND ETP LISTS 
The six local areas participating in the ITA Experiment are located
in or near Phoenix, Arizona; Chicago, Illinois; Atlanta, Georgia; Jack-
sonville, Florida; Bridgeport, Connecticut; and Charlotte, North Caro-
lina, and include recognized leaders in the workforce development
field. For instance, Phoenix and Atlanta participated in the CMA Dem-
onstration. Most of the local areas also operated individual purchase or
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voucher-based models for training services for five or more years prior
to implementation of the ITA Experiment. Jacksonville, for example,
implemented a program of “scholarship accounts” for its training cus-
tomers in 1995. As we described earlier, Atlanta used vouchers in 1991
to provide training assistance to workers displaced by the bankruptcy
of Eastern Airlines. Chicago had abandoned the traditional JTPA
approach of contracted training 10 years ahead of the passage of WIA,
relying instead on voucher-based training purchases for all of its cus-
tomers since 1988. In the next section, we describe the experiences of
these innovative localities implementing ITAs and related WIA train-
ing provisions. 
Local ITA Models Prior to Implementation of the Experiment
In the design phase of the ITA Experiment, we visited each of the
six local areas to develop an understanding of their procedures under
WIA.5 Table 6.2 summarizes the components of their training programs
in the early days of WIA. Overall, we found that these local areas had,
by late 2001, made substantial progress implementing WIA’s training
provisions.
• Local areas included in the experiment had well-established
policies on the amount and duration of their ITAs prior to the
experiment. For instance, all sites placed caps on ITA awards,
ranging from $3,000 to $8,900, and awards were valid for one or
two years. Customers were not generally aware of the cap unless
they requested training that cost more than the cap. Some local
areas had tiered caps, offering additional support to customers
choosing longer programs.
• Local areas had Internet-based ETP lists available or under
development. Five of the six areas in the experiment had elec-
tronic databases that were accessible via the Internet, while the
sixth area had a system under construction. The systems varied in
the extent to which they could be sorted or searched. Hard-copy
versions of the ETP lists were also available.
• All local areas had voucher procedures in place.  Most local
areas retained their pre-WIA provider payment systems. All but
one local area used paper vouchers to demonstrate their “promise
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to pay” the training provider to serve an approved customer.
None of the local areas used “smart cards” or other high-tech
strategies to handle ITA administration.
Despite their extensive experience operating voucher-based train-
ing programs prior to WIA, the local areas participating in the experi-
ment still faced several important challenges associated with building a
system to administer ITAs.
• Getting programs onto ETP lists. Local training providers that
were active under JTPA programs did not automatically qualify to
serve WIA customers. All local areas indicated that they lost
training offerings in the transition to WIA because some provid-
ers chose not to apply for WIA certification. Public education
institutions, such as community colleges, objected to the perfor-
mance-reporting requirements, as well as the requirement that
they submit an application for each program at each location (as
opposed to one application for a given program at all locations or
even one application for the entire institution). In many cases,
these institutions did not apply for WIA certification, since WIA
customers represented a small proportion of their clientele. In
contrast, proprietary providers more actively sought certification
because WIA customers tended to represent a far larger share of
their students.
• Revising counseling. Some local areas needed to revise their
counseling activities. To implement WIA’s tiered structure of ser-
vices, local areas needed to boost the ability of their staff to assess
customers and to provide more intensive career counseling. Local
areas also needed to focus training-related counseling on options
included in the ETP list (subject to local constraints as well).
• Building the CRS. Development of the CRS proved to be an
ongoing effort. In each local area that we visited, the CRS can be
accessed via the Internet, usually through the ETP list. The CRS
typically contains information on program costs, duration, and so
on. However, these systems still contain little information on pro-
gram performance.
• Making ETP lists and the CRS user-friendly. Both information
systems are continuously being refined to improve user sorting,
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Phoenix and 
Maricopa County, 




County, IL Charlotte, NC
Maximum value 
and duration of 
ITA awards
Phoenix: $3,000 for 
programs less than 6 
mo. in duration; 
















level wages for 
occupation: 
• $4,600 if less than 
$8.78 per hour
• $5,800 if $8.79 to 
$14.44 per hour
• $8,900 if more 
than $14.44 per 
hour
• Training support 
for up to 2 years
Atlanta: Tiered 
approach with 
$5,000 for first year 




with $3,000 for first 
year and $2,000 for 
second year
$3,000 per year, for 
up to 2 years
$4,000 in total 
support, usable over 














• Supervised job 
search or job club
• Assessments of 
basic skills and 
interests/ aptitudes 






• Review of recent 
job search 
activities
• Assessments of 
basic skills and 
interests/ aptitudes




search for 2 to 4 
weeks
• Assessments of 
basic skills and 
interests/aptitudes
• Career counseling
• Review of recent 
job search 
activities









• Review of recent 
job search 
activities
• Testing for 












Criteria used to 
determine 
eligibility for 
and need of 
training 
servicesa








• No basic skills 
deficiencies
• No severe barriers 











• No severe barriers 
to participation in 
training
• Conducted “valid” 








• No basic skills 
deficiencies
• No severe barriers 
to participation in 
training







• No basic skills 
deficiencies
• No severe barriers 
to participation in 
training








• No basic skills 
deficiencies
• No severe barriers 
to participation in 
training








• No basic skills 
deficiencies
• No severe barriers 











• Labor market 
research
• Research and 
comparison of 
training programs











• Labor market 
research
• Research and 
comparison of 
training programs






• Labor market 
research
• Research and 
comparison of 
training programs
• Research and 
comparison of 
training programs

































































County, IL Charlotte, NC
Implementation 
status and key 
characteristics 
of ETP list
• Fully developed, 
operational





• Links to CRS
• Fully developed, 
operational














• Hardcopy lists of 
approved vendors 
for region, linked 
to Regional List of 
Targeted 
Occupations 
• Fully developed, 
implemented




• Links to CRS
• Fully developed, 
operational




• Links to CRS
• Fully developed, 
operational
• Available to 
customers online 
(www.ncstars.org)
• Links to CRS
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Implementation 







































ETP system, but 
still being fine-
tuned
• Available to staff 
and customers 
online















annual earnings at 
placement); 
information not 
yet available for 
many programs
• Operational
• Available to 
customers online










yet available for 
many programs
• Operational, but 
still being fine-
tuned
• Can be accessed 
online by staff or 
customers
• Placeholders for 







earnings 6 mos. 
after graduating; 
information not 





















available for all 
providers











County, IL Charlotte, NC
ITA payment 
systems
• Customers receive 




• Vendors invoice 
grantee directly
• No funds released 
directly to 
customers
• Counselors submit 
paper voucher to 
provider/ vendor
• Vendors invoice 
grantee directly 
for training costs; 
no funds released 
directly to 
customers 
• Grantees issue a 
list of approved 
trainees for 
individual vendors
• Vendors invoice 
grantee directly 
for training costs; 
no funds released 
directly to 
customers
• Counselors submit 
paper voucher to 
provider/ vendor
• Vendors invoice 
grantee directly 
for training costs; 
no funds released 
directly to 
customers 
• Customers receive 





• Vendors invoice 
grantee directly 
for training costs; 
no funds released 
directly to 
customers
• Use American 
Fundware to track 
obligations and 
payments 
• Counselors submit 




voucher to take to 
vendor when 
enrolling
• Vendors invoice 
grantee directly 
for training costs; 





• Tuition and fees
• Books and other 
required supplies 
• Tuition and fees
• Books and other 
required supplies
• Tuition and fees




• Tuition and fees
• Books and other 
vendor-required 
supplies
• Tuition and fees
• Books and other 
required supplies
• Tuition and fees





needs while in 
training



















None offered • Limited resources 













• Counselors follow 
up with customers 
about every two 
weeks once they 
begin training
• Vendors submit 
periodic 
attendance/grade 
reports to the 
grantee





• Vendors required 
to submit periodic 
attendance/grade 




• Customers were 
required to submit 
monthly 
attendance sheets, 
in person, to their 













reports (signed by 
instructor)
Northeast GA: 





required to maintain 
monthly contact 


































50 percent of 
training costs








rarely (on need 
basis only)










cover at least 50 
percent of training 
costs















• Other special 
grants
Northeast GA:





• No other forms of 
non-ITA training























rarely (on need 
basis only)
• No other forms of 
non-ITA training
a All grantees followed WIA requirements for sequential eligibility for core, intensive, and training services. Hence, in addition to the criteria
listed in this table, customers must have been determined eligible for WIA services and received at least one staff-assisted core service and one
intensive service.
ITAs, ETP Lists, and Consumer Report Systems 197
searching, and comparison capabilities. Substantial progress has
been made over time. For example, the Georgia systems can be
used to search training programs and providers and generate com-
parisons more effectively now than a year ago.
Implementation of the ITA Experiment
Based on the findings from our exploratory visits to participating
local areas, we selected a site to pilot-test the experiment’s proposed
operational procedures. Chicago was selected to serve as the pilot site
and began operations in December 2001. The ITA Experiment oper-
ated as a pilot at this site for about six months, and we used the site’s
experiences to refine the experiment’s procedures before starting oper-
ations in the five remaining local areas.6 The other localities began
operating the experiment in stages, from May through August 2002.
Commonalities across local ITA programs
The experiment’s ITA approaches are operated fundamentally in
the same way across the participating local areas. That is, each local
area is testing all three approaches side by side and counselors work
with customers assigned to all three approaches. ITA operations are
also the same in other important ways.
• Counseling services made available. The same types of train-
ing-related counseling services are made available to all ITA cus-
tomers, regardless of the approach to which they are assigned.
What varies across the approaches is whether participating in par-
ticular services is mandatory or not. Moreover, the experiment’s
counseling services represent the minimal set made available to
customers. Local areas can offer, though not require, additional
counseling.
• Allowable uses of ITA funds. Study participants have access to
ITA funds to cover the same types of training-related expenses.
The ITAs of customers assigned to all three approaches include
funds to cover only their direct training costs—that is, tuition,
fees, and other expenses directly related to the program chosen
(for example, books and supplies). Customers can still access
support for other training-related needs not covered by their ITAs
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(for example, child care or transportation). If offered with WIA
funds, such assistance must be provided through methods other
than the ITA (supportive payments, for example).
• Use of other sources of support for training. Consistent with
WIA regulations, when approving release of ITA funds, local
staff always take into consideration other sources of support
available to the customer (for example, state scholarships or Pell
grants). As part of the experiment’s counseling activities, local
staff help their assigned ITA customers identify and apply to all
relevant sources of training support before tapping WIA funds.
There are no restrictions on customers’ use of training funds from
sources other than WIA.
• Case manager approval of ITA expenditures. Study partici-
pants do not have direct control of the funds in their ITA
accounts. After a training program and vendor have been
approved, disbursement of ITA funds still requires authorization
by local staff. Thus, customers cannot receive approval for a pro-
gram and then decide unilaterally to apply the approved ITA
funds to a different selection.
Differences across local ITA programs
Implementation of the ITA Experiment did not completely homog-
enize WIA training operations across the participating local areas. Dif-
ferences in their ITA programs reflect practices left unchanged by the
experiment, local circumstances, or both:
• Services delivered prior to random assignment. For the most
part, implementation of the ITA Experiment left unchanged the
core and intensive services that local areas delivered prior to
determining a customer’s eligibility for WIA-funded training.
Prior to the experiment, the local areas varied in how they formu-
lated sequential eligibility procedures under WIA and their mini-
mal service requirements prior to approving a customer for
training. For instance, to ensure that a “valid” job search has been
conducted, Jacksonville requires customers to document fully
recent work search efforts, participate in supervised job search
activities, or both. In contrast, in Chicago, counselors may
approve WIA training services based solely on semistructured
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discussions with the customer. These philosophical differences
persist under the ITA Experiment.
• ITA values. Across all local areas, the cap on Approach 2 and
Approach 3 fixed ITA awards is more modest than the maximum
potential value of Approach 1 customized awards. However, the
actual caps for fixed and customized ITAs vary across the local
areas, reflecting differences in their WIA training budgets,
expected client flow, and the prices of local training options.
• ETP lists and CRS. The experiment relies on the ETP lists and
CRSs available at each of the participating local areas. As
required by WIA regulations, all study participants are instructed
to make their selection from their states’ ETP lists. Similarly, cus-
tomers are encouraged to use the CRS when researching their
training options. These systems vary nevertheless in the range of
available training options, the costs and durations of these
options, and the information that is available to customers to sup-
port their decisions about training.
Preliminary Implementation Findings from the ITA Experiment
Once the local areas began operations, we held regularly scheduled
telephone conferences with key staff to discuss issues related to imple-
mentation of the ITA Experiment. These conversations served as an
opportunity to answer staff questions, clarify procedures, and provide
technical assistance when it was needed. About 1½–2 months after the
start of operations, we also conducted intensive in-person monitoring
and technical assistance visits. In preparation for these visits, we
reviewed selected case files of participants assigned to each of the
experiment’s approaches.7 In addition, evaluation staff have been peri-
odically reviewing data entered into the experiment’s Study Tracking
System, which collects information on ITA counseling activities com-
pleted by participants, ITA award amounts, training selections (includ-
ing program costs and other training resources tapped prior to ITA
funds), and payments made out of the customers’ accounts.8
Implementation of the experiment in six local areas has demon-
strated that each of the ITA approaches is broadly feasible, in the sense
that local staff report no major difficulties in the administration or
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operation of any approach. The key distinctions among the three
approaches are clear to staff, and customers are generally reported to
be completing their ITA requirements with few questions or objections.
Local staff confirm that Approach 2 is similar to the local programs
that were in place prior to the experiment, except that the forms and
worksheets used in the experiment provide a bit more structure and
consistency in the counseling process. In contrast, Approaches 1 and 3
clearly differ from the preexperiment ITA programs—Approach 1 in
requiring more intensive counseling and in attempting to match indi-
vidual customers to the training choice expected to generate high earn-
ings relative to resources invested (high return), and Approach 3 in
having no counseling requirements and allowing customers full control
over their training decisions. Staff have generally expressed satisfac-
tion with the forms and worksheets used under Approach 1, although
some counselors feel that Approach 1 is too intensive to be applied to
all customers seeking an ITA, particularly those that have already
developed their own training plans. 
Our observations of the early operations of the ITA Experiment
suggest additional tentative conclusions, which we will eventually test
more rigorously in our data analysis.
• Counseling can influence customer choice.  Local staff report
that the structured mandatory counseling for Approaches 1 and 2
has helped some customers explore their training options more
broadly and more carefully. Staff cite cases in which customers
who come into a one-stop center with a specific training plan
have reconsidered their initial plans and have instead selected
alternative training plans that promise higher earnings, better
opportunities for advancement, or greater compatibility with their
personal circumstances. For example, counselors in Florida
report that they have persuaded some Approach 1 customers that
were originally focused on information technology (IT) training
to instead pursue careers in a medical field that would better
match their skills and offer better local employment prospects. 
• Some staff struggle with being directive under Approach 1.
Although many counselors appear to be influencing customer
training decisions in Approach 1, some counselors struggle with
being as directive with these customers as is required under the
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approach. These counselors are reluctant to disapprove custom-
ers’ training choices, even when those choices are expected to
generate relatively low returns. They tend to weigh heavily non-
cost factors—such as a school’s proximity to the customer’s
home, the program’s start date and duration, or the vendor’s repu-
tation—when evaluating training alternatives. One challenge is
that many counselors are relatively young and inexperienced,
which makes it hard for them to confidently guide their custom-
ers, especially when they are highly experienced workers. The
Chicago site responded to this challenge by having a senior staff
member sit in on Approach 1 counseling sessions to provide rein-
forcement in guiding customer choices. 
• ITA caps may constrain customer choice. Local staff assert that
customers prefer shorter, intensive programs (typically offered by
proprietary schools), since these programs help customers return
to work sooner. However, these programs tend to be expensive—
often costing more than the Approach 2 and 3 fixed ITA
awards—and few customers qualify for alternative sources of
support for training. Hence, many Approach 2 and 3 customers
are not able to access these programs, while these selections are
often approved and fully covered for Approach 1 customers.
Examples of this difference in training access were observed in
Chicago, where one customer who was laid off from an IT
employer and assigned to Approach 1 used his customized ITA to
fully pay for a proprietary school IT certification course costing
$8,000. In contrast, a customer who was laid off from the same
employer and assigned to Approach 2 received a fixed ITA of
$3,000, which did not fully cover the costs of the same IT certifi-
cation program. Since this customer could not afford to pay the
remaining training costs, he decided not to enter that program.
• Customers seldom use voluntary services. Although counseling
services are offered on a voluntary basis to customers assigned to
Approach 3, most of these customers are not taking advantage of
the services. Among customers enrolled in the ITA Experiment
for one month or longer as of late January 2003, only 5 percent of
Approach 3 customers participated in any ITA counseling beyond
their mandatory orientation, compared with 56 percent of
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Approach 2 customers and 60 percent of Approach 1 customers.9
Local staff report that many Approach 3 customers submit their
program selections immediately after orientation, based on infor-
mation they have gathered on their own prior to orientation.
• Training rates may vary by approach. While data on actual
enrollment in training and program completion are still scarce,
rates of program approval already appear to vary across the three
ITA approaches. Tracking system data show that 65 percent of
Approach 3 customers secured ITA program approval, compared
to 58 percent of Approach 2 customers and 59 percent of
Approach 1 customers.10 The higher program approval rate for
Approach 3 customers is not surprising given the approach’s
“pure voucher” design. However, the lower approval rates for
Approaches 1 and 2 could also reflect delays as these customers
complete their counseling requirements. We are confident that the
differences in training rates by approach are not due to differ-
ences in the timing of customers’ program approval. Tracking
system data show that, at the time of our data extract, study par-
ticipants had been enrolled in the ITA Experiment for an average
of 14 months. Tracking system data also show that study partici-
pants secured program approval, on average between six and
eight weeks after random assignment, depending on their
approach assignment. This suggests that tracking system data are
likely to capture entry into training for the vast majority of ITA
customers who reached this milestone.
ISSUES IN DESIGNING AND ADMINISTERING 
ITA PROGRAMS 
In this chapter, we have sought to answer important questions
related to the implementation of ITAs and other training-related provi-
sions of the WIA. The information presented herein represents some of
the most current evidence available to evaluate the program changes
introduced by WIA and to help manage programs sponsored by the
legislation. In this section, we attempt to shed light on important policy
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questions likely to be debated in preparation for WIA reauthorization,
in particular:
• Should prominent WIA innovations—ITAs, ETP lists, and
CRSs—be preserved as part of reauthorization?
• What legislative or regulatory modifications might help ease
some of the challenges that states and localities have encountered
implementing key WIA provisions?
Overall Soundness of the ITA Approach
Our observations suggest that local areas are able to implement
ITA programs that are consistent with the objectives of WIA in the fol-
lowing sense:
• Local areas are able to use ITAs as their principal method of
paying for training. The local areas participating in the ITA
experiment have moved decisively away from prenegotiated con-
tracts for training. At the same time, they continue to make some
use of alternative training arrangements, such as on-the-job train-
ing or customized training. These alternatives extend customer
choice beyond ITAs and help workforce agencies respond to spe-
cial customer and employer needs (for example, when a customer
needs to upgrade skills while working or when an employer has
difficulties finding applicants for desirable job openings). 
• Local areas can specify ITAs so as to achieve different bal-
ances between customer choice and counselor guidance. Local
areas are apprehensive about the effect of customer choice on
local WIA performance. Thus, in the absence of the ITA experi-
ment, local areas have tended to develop similar programs that
constrain the training choices and resources available to any cus-
tomer. Yet, the ITA Experiment demonstrates that local areas can
operate alternative programs that either minimize the constraints
on customer choice (as under Approach 3) or maximize the role
of counselors in directing customers to promising opportunities
and matching the training resources to those opportunities (as
under Approach 1).
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• The ETP lists provide sufficient training options to support
the ITA approach. Despite widespread and ongoing concerns
about provider participation in the ITA system, the ETP lists in
the local areas participating in the ITA Experiment have provided
most urban customers with a real choice of providers. Hence, the
current system seems to provide a foundation from which to build
and enhance customer choice.
Importantly, the kind of institutional change envisioned by WIA
may take longer to occur in other local areas. As we noted, the local
areas participating in the ITA Experiment are recognized leaders for
innovation and relatively experienced in the operation of voucher-
based training programs. Hence, their experiences implementing ITAs,
ETP lists, and CRSs likely represent a better-than-typical or best-case
scenario. At the same time, they demonstrate the overall feasibility and
soundness of the ITA approach.
Further Consideration Needed: ETP Lists and the CRS
As WIA reauthorization proceeds, there are several issues related
to the ETP lists and the CRS that may require further attention and
revision.
• States could play a larger role in building the training pro-
vider network. Future legislation and regulations could specify,
or at least highlight the potential for, a larger role for states in pro-
moting the ITA system. Local staff tend to recruit local providers
and support them in the certification process. However, they lack
sufficient leverage with larger providers to gain their support for
and participation in the system. States could do more, such as
requiring public educational institutions to comply with WIA
requirements. For example, prior to WIA, Florida had already
mandated that all state-funded postsecondary educational institu-
tions (including community colleges) provide data on various
performance measures. Once WIA was passed, these same data
provision requirements were simply carried over to the WIA pro-
vider approval process.
• The certification and performance reporting requirements
should be reexamined. To become an eligible provider of train-
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ing services and maintain such eligibility, WIA requires educa-
tional institutions to submit information on program costs and (at
least annually) verifiable, program-specific information on a vari-
ety of “all student” and “WIA student” performance measures.
Providers that serve relatively few WIA customers find these per-
formance-reporting requirements burdensome and, therefore, a
disincentive to participation in the ITA system. As evidenced by
the limited availability of performance information in CRSs, they
have also proven challenging to meet for those providers that
have elected to participate in the ITA system. Some states have
attempted to make participation in the ITA system less burden-
some for providers by working out data-sharing agreements to
enable workforce agency staff to evaluate provider performance
using UI wage records. For example, Georgia worked out agree-
ments with the governing agencies of the two postsecondary sys-
tems by which the workforce agency would match and compile
data on customers from the UI wage records and provide those
data to the postsecondary agencies.
• Building user-friendly systems will take time. Local areas have
made important progress in developing and implementing their
ETP lists and CRSs. Progress has been slow, since the technical
development of the systems and the assembly of program infor-
mation has required substantial time, effort, and resources. Nearly
every state now has a Web-accessible ETP list and CRS contain-
ing descriptive information on approved programs. However,
many states still need to fill gaps in the program information pro-
vided on the CRS—especially on provider performance.
Improvements to user sorting, searching, and comparison capa-
bilities also continue to be made. Refinements to both systems are
likely to continue for some time.   
CONCLUSION
Empowering customers and increasing accountability are key
goals of the workforce investment system established under WIA. The
use of ITAs and the creation of ETP lists and CRSs are important ele-
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ments in the overall strategy for achieving these goals. By enabling
customers to choose training from among a menu of eligible providers,
ITAs are intended to empower customers to obtain the training services
that best fit their needs. Training providers, in turn, have to demon-
strate successful performance to remain eligible to receive funds under
WIA. The CRS makes available key information on the performance of
training providers, empowering customers—with their ITAs and the
guidance and support of one-stop staff—to make well-informed train-
ing decisions.
Looking ahead to WIA reauthorization, the emerging ITA systems
appear to provide the customer choice and empowerment intended by
the legislation. If adjustments are needed, they are less in the overall
approach and more in the infrastructure that is used to control and
monitor access to training providers. Securing broad participation of
training providers in the ITA system and getting reliable performance
data on the providers remain a challenge. The incentives for provider
participation and the burden of performance reporting requirements
could be better balanced.
The ITA Experiment will eventually provide information on how
three distinct ITA approaches affect the training decisions and out-
comes of training customers. We will use these data to evaluate the rel-
ative cost-effectiveness of the approaches. Intake into the experiment
continued for a total of 18 months, with an additional 6 months for the
pilot site. Over that period, we have conducted additional visits to each
site to observe intake and operations, and continue to gather feedback
on the experiment from customers, training providers, counselors, and
other local staff. A 15-month follow-up survey of the customers in the
experiment is already under way. This survey collects information on
customer satisfaction, service and training use, employment and earn-
ings, and a variety of other outcomes. Along with the 15-month follow-
up survey, UI wage records will be the primary source of employment
and earnings data for the evaluation. Employment and earnings will be
measured for the full sample in the four calendar quarters after random
assignment; additional quarters may be available for early enrollees.
An interim report on the preliminary findings from the experiment will
be produced in the summer of 2004, and a final report will be produced
in 2005.11
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As evidenced by President Bush’s proposal of a new program of
Personal Reemployment Accounts (PRAs), the appeal of “pure vouch-
ers” continues to be strong. Embodied in H.R. 444, the Back to Work
Incentive Act, which was introduced in Congress on January 29, 2003,
the goal of PRAs is to provide unemployed workers who are likely to
exhaust their unemployment insurance benefits with additional assis-
tance and incentives to help them get back to work sooner. The pro-
posed PRAs would have two components—a reemployment bonus and
a broad service voucher component. Under the service voucher compo-
nent, PRA recipients could use their accounts, containing up to $3,000
each, to pay for intensive services, training, supportive services, and
even assistance to purchase or lease an automobile the worker needs to
accept a promising job offer. Moreover, as in Approach 3 of the ITA
Experiment, PRAs would have no counseling requirements. Recipients
would be able to choose the combination of services that best meet
their needs and use their PRAs to pay for those services.  Thus, PRAs
would extend the application of vouchers to the full range of assistance
offered by one-stop centers, not just training, and give individuals even
greater flexibility and control over the use of these resources. This sug-
gests that the findings from the ITA Experiment should be of interest
not only to local areas charged with implementing ITA programs, but
to the wider workforce development community and potentially to pro-
ponents and critics of vouchers alike.
Notes
We thank Ralph Smith for helpful comments.
1. The one exception was the Thumb Area Employment and Training Consortium
located in eastern Michigan. The program in this area was closer to a pure training
voucher model. Customers in this site were eligible to open a Tool Chest, which
was essentially a checking account against which customers could spend down
resources to purchase education, training, and a wide range of support services.
Customers could spend these resources at virtually any public or private school in
the local area, as well as at a range of retail stores (for example, for work clothes).
The size of the account was set for customers based on their eligibility for various
programs run by the consortium. 
2. Some local workforce agencies originally interpreted the tiered service structure
specified in WIA as requiring that local agencies use a work-first approach in
serving customers. That is, agencies felt they were to focus most of their effort
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and resources on getting customers into jobs and provide training only as a last
resort for customers who failed to find a job. However, USDOL subsequently
clarified that WIA did not require a work-first philosophy and emphasized the
importance that should be placed on customers’ needs.
3. The ITA Experiment is being conducted by Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.,
and its subcontractor, Social Policy Research. A related project, the Individual
Training Account/Eligible Training Provider (ITA/ETP) Demonstration, was con-
ducted primarily by Social Policy Research under the same contract. The ITA/
ETP Demonstration examined a set of pilot sites that have designed and imple-
mented their own models for providing ITAs to one-stop customers who seek
training. D’Amico and Salzman (forthcoming) describe the ITA/ETP Demonstra-
tion in detail. 
4. During the design phase of the experiment, MPR staff visited one-stop centers in
Phoenix, Arizona; Baltimore, Maryland; Lowell, Massachusetts; Marlette, Michi-
gan; and Killeen, Texas. These localities were selected principally because of
their experience with training vouchers. All except Michigan had participated in
the CMA Demonstration. Michigan had been operating a voucher program for all
of its JTPA customers since 1996. The information from these visits was supple-
mented with information from 1) a review of findings from the evaluation of the
CMA demonstration (Policy Research Associates 1999) and 2) site visits to two
WIA early implementation states (Pennsylvania and Texas) conducted by staff
from Social Policy Research.
5. These visits were conducted between July and December 2001.
6. No major changes to the experiment’s operational procedures were implemented
as a result of pilot operations. The only adjustments needed were providing addi-
tional guidance on Approach 1 implementation and developing some tools in
Excel form to facilitate counselor use.
7. MPR staff selected these cases from lists of all individuals enrolled to date in the
study. Generally, we selected two to three cases for each of the staff delivering
ITA services to study participants. To allow sufficient time for participants to have
received at least some ITA counseling services, we only selected cases that had
been assigned to one of the experiment’s approaches at least three weeks earlier.
8. Data from this system showed that, by the end of intake, a total of 8,331 custom-
ers had been enrolled in the ITA Experiment across our six study sites. As of mid-
May 2004, 99 percent of these customers had been enrolled in the study for one
month or longer; 92 percent had been enrolled for six months or longer.
9. The differences in participation rates for Approaches 1 and 2 relative to Approach
3 are statistically significant from zero at the 0.01 confidence level, two-tailed
test.
10. The differences in program approval rates for Approaches 1 and 2 relative to
Approach 3 are also statistically significant from zero at the 0.01 confidence level,
two-tailed test.
11. An important limitation of the evaluation is its relatively short follow-up period
(12 months for wage records and about 15 months for the survey). Because many
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people in the sample will be in training for most of the follow-up period, they are
likely to work less or possibly not at all in the short term. Some sample members
may still be in training one year after random assignment. Thus, it may not be pos-
sible to assess posttraining impacts on employment and earnings. We will assess
these impacts within the context of the proportion of the sample still in training.
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Only 12 years ago, former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall and
Marc Tucker (1992) suggested that frontline workers in the United
States were the least skilled among all industrial nations. Sparked by
this concern that U.S. workers lacked the skills to compete in an
increasingly technological global economy, policymakers in the early
1990s called for increased investments in human capital. And although
the rapid U.S. productivity growth of the late 1990s demonstrated that
U.S. workers were, in fact, able to keep pace with their foreign compet-
itors, improving education and training is still a key ingredient in
achieving long-term economic growth (Hanushek 2002; Griliches
1997). Not only is a well-trained workforce better able to implement
new technology (Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987), but the returns to edu-
cation and training are high for workers themselves (Mincer 1994).
Encouraging or even requiring employers to sponsor more worker
training is among the many proposals for dealing with skill shortfalls.
Certainly, some firms are active trainers, but are they the exception or
the rule? A Wall Street Journal article (Wessell 2001) featured the
apparent exceptionally generous training subsidies provided by United
Technologies Corporation. This large manufacturer not only covers the
cost of college tuition and fees for any credit course its employees want
to take, but it also offers up to three hours off each week—with pay—
to study. The article suggested that United Technologies is the excep-
tion. But, are other firms so far behind? Are employers increasing the
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amount of training they sponsor in response to their rising demand for
skilled workers? Despite high returns and the rising demand for skill,
employer investment in training may be falling short of the socially
optimal level. Some firms (especially small ones) and workers face
capital constraints that limit their ability to invest in training. Workers
face the risk that the training will be poorly tailored to their careers and
do little to raise their wages. For firms, a key problem is that spending
to train workers might yield little reward if the trained workers are bid
away by other employers or if their wages are bid up to reflect their
added productivity. Still, firms like United Technologies offer employ-
ees substantial amounts of training and even sponsor education in
fields not related to the worker’s current or next job. 
Theory offers clues about why firms may or may not sponsor train-
ing, and we briefly review the relevant hypotheses. Our focus, how-
ever, is empirical; we describe the actual amounts of employer-
provided training using data from four different surveys. Guiding the
analysis are the following questions: 
• How much: What is the incidence and intensity of employer-pro-
vided training overall and by size of employer? Have employers
increased the amount of training they sponsor over the last two
decades?
• Who: Which workers receive employer-provided training? 
• Where: Which employers provide the most training?
• What: What types of training do employers provide? 
EXPECTATIONS OF EMPLOYER-PROVIDED TRAINING
Becker’s (1964) classical view of human capital emphasizes the
distinction between training for general and specific skills. General
skills increase a worker’s productivity at any firm, while specific skills
raise the worker’s productivity only for his or her current employer.
Once workers receive general training, they become more valuable to
all employers and can consequently demand a higher wage or opt to
take their skills elsewhere. Because workers, not employers, will reap
the full benefits from general training, Becker suggests that employers
The Scope of Employer-Provided Training in the United States 213
have no incentive to pay for general training. In contrast, employers
may well sponsor training in specific skills since they can reap at least
some of the benefits of the training-induced productivity gains.
Because the skills are specific to the individual firm, trained workers
are no more valuable to outside firms than they would have been with-
out the training. 
Given the differences in returns to general and specific training, we
would expect to see employers providing specific training, but not gen-
eral training. If so, United Technologies is an obvious exception, since
it pays for workers to get general training—they can take credit courses
in any subject. But maybe United Technologies is not such an excep-
tion. Barron, Berger, and Black (1999) find that when firms were asked
about the composition of the training they provide, nearly 70 percent
claimed that most or almost all of the skills learned by new employees
were general training. Veum (1999) also cites evidence that employers
are paying for general training. Still, as Barron, Berger, and Black
(1997) point out in an earlier study, firms may overstate the amount of
training they provide, and some training that they claim is general may
very well be specific. 
If employers do provide general training, do their workers tend to
leave the firm in search of higher wages, as Becker’s theory suggests?
When United Technology’s go-back-to-college program began, man-
agers were concerned that employees would be “educated on our
nickel and then take off and go work for someone else” (Wessel 2001,
p. 1). However, most workers who participated in the program stayed.
In fact, attrition was much lower among those who received company-
financed degrees—just 4 percent, compared to 9 percent among those
who did not participate in the go-back-to college program (Wessell
2001).
So what is the role of general training? Might general training pro-
mote worker loyalty, as it seems to do in the case of United Technolo-
gies? Do workers regard access to general training a worthwhile fringe
benefit? Or are there alternative explanations for the apparent
employer funding of general training?
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) challenge the applicability of
Becker’s theory to many employers and provide theoretical and empir-
ical findings showing why employers often have incentives to offer
general training. They argue that the presence of transaction costs in
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the labor market, including matching and search costs, makes it diffi-
cult for workers to quit their jobs and costly for firms to replace their
employees. By avoiding turnover, employers and workers reduce these
transaction costs, allowing both to benefit when the training-induced
addition to productivity exceeds the increase in the worker’s wage. 
Asymmetric information is another reason why general training
may raise productivity faster than wages and thereby create a gain for
employers. Firms providing the training may know more about the
content and value of training than outside firms. As a result, outside
firms will not be willing to compensate the newly trained workers by
an amount equal to their increased productivity (Chiang and Chiang
1990; Katz and Ziderman 1990). A second form of asymmetry arises
when high-ability workers benefit more from training than other work-
ers (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). As Barron, Berger, and Black
(1999) argue, since firms are most likely to lay off the low-ability
workers who receive occupational training, outside firms will assume
that the trained workers available in the market are the least capable of
those trained. High-ability workers will not be able to quit and demon-
strate their high ability to outside firms. Thus, the firm providing the
training can keep the highly productive worker without paying the full
value of the enhanced productivity.
The complementarity between specific and general skills is another
reason firms may sponsor training. The ability to benefit from general
training (for example, knowing how to use a specific piece of software)
may increase when the worker knows the strategy of the company
(specific training). Thus, the higher the worker’s general skills, the
more valuable the employer-provided specific training is to the com-
pany.
The theory also sheds light on which workers we expect to receive
the most training. Because specific and general skills are often comple-
mentary, employers are more likely to invest in those who already have
a high level of general skills. Several studies have corroborated the lat-
ter point, finding that those with higher education levels receive more
training (Lillard and Tan 1986; Brown 1990; Lynch 1992; Barnow,
Giannarelli, and Long 1996; Barron, Berger, and Black 1997; Lynch
and Black 1998; Holzer and Reaser 1999). In addition, these studies
often have found differences by race and gender, with white males typ-
ically receiving more training than other groups.
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Which firms do we expect to provide the most training? According
to Becker’s theory, training levels should be sensitive to the turnover in
the organization because the higher the turnover, the greater the chance
that workers will leave before the firm can reap the benefits of the
training—especially when it comes to general training. In addition,
past studies typically find that large firms offer more training (Barron,
Berger, and Black 1997; Lynch and Black 1998; Holzer and Reaser
1999), but there is no dominant theory as to why this is the case.
Because larger firms pay higher wages, they typically have lower turn-
over and a more qualified workforce (Holzer and Reaser 1999; Leuven
and Oosterbeek 1999). They may also face fewer capital constraints
and can gain from economies of scale in the operation of formal train-
ing programs.
Other expectations relate to the connection between technical
change and training. Firms trying to achieve high levels of technical
change are most likely to invest in training. Indeed, Bartel and Sicher-
man (1998) find that rapid technical change causes companies to invest
more in production workers, thereby narrowing the training gap
between the more- and less-educated workers. As more companies pur-
sued strategies to increase their rates of technical change, especially in
the early to mid 1990s, we should observe an increase in the level of
training and a narrowing of the training gaps between types of workers. 
Expanding the amount of employer-provided training may or may
not affect wage levels and wage differentials. If the benefits from train-
ing accrue largely to firms making the investments rather than the
employees, differences in the receipt of training by groups of workers
may not influence wage differentials. 
This chapter adds to the empirical literature by compiling and ana-
lyzing estimates of the overall extent and composition of employer-
sponsored training in the United States. Keeping in mind theoretical
considerations, we describe the patterns and trends in employer-pro-
vided training, the distribution of training by type of worker, and dif-
ferences in the types of employer-provided training across workers and
firms. 
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RECENT SURVEYS WITH DATA ON 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED TRAINING
The four recent surveys that yield empirical evidence on the total
amount of employer-provided training in the United States are the 1997
National Employer Survey (NES), the 1995 Survey of Employer-Pro-
vided Training (SEPT), the 1995 Adult Education Component of the
National Household Education Survey (NHES), and the 1996 Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) topical modules. Before
presenting results, we describe the four surveys and their training ques-
tions. 
1997 National Employer Survey
The 1997 NES, administered by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, is a
telephone survey of over 3,000 establishments. These establishments
represent more than 5,400 private U.S. establishments with 20 or more
employees (Shapiro and Goertz 1998). The survey provides informa-
tion on the incidence and intensity of formal employer-provided train-
ing by worker occupation. It also provides detailed information on
establishment characteristics. The 1997 NES asks each employer if
they pay for or provide any formal training either on-the-job or at a
school or technical institute. It defines formal training as any type of
training activity with a pre-defined objective that may occur during or
outside working hours. 
1995 Survey of Employer-Provided Training
The 1995 SEPT is a personal interview survey of approximately
1,000 establishments and approximately 1,000 employees at those
establishments. It provides information on both formal and informal
training from private establishments with 50 or more employees. 
The Establishment Survey portion of 1995 SEPT collected infor-
mation on formal training using two survey instruments—an employer
questionnaire and an employer training log. Like the 1997 NES, the
1995 SEPT Employer Survey defines formal training as training that is
planned in advance and has a structured format and defined curricu-
lum. Employer-provided training is formal training provided or
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financed by the establishment. With its emphasis on financing, this
measure should include tuition reimbursement programs and other
training that takes place off-site and outside working hours. 
The Employee Survey portion of the 1995 SEPT collects informa-
tion from up to two employees from each establishment using survey
instruments similar to those in the Employer Survey, but the training
questions in the Employee Survey are quite different. The Employee
Survey focuses on training that the employees received from the
employer and does not mention training that the employer paid for.
Also, the Employee Survey log provides information on hours of train-
ing that took place from May to October 1995, a time when many edu-
cational institutions are closed, rather than a full year period. For these
reasons, the Employee Survey may not capture training that was paid
for by the employer, but provided off-site and outside working hours.
The SEPT Employee Survey also includes a broad measure of informal
training. Informal training in the SEPT includes any unstructured and
unplanned activities that taught a skill or provided information to help
workers do their jobs better. Both informal and formal training activi-
ties need only have lasted five minutes to be recorded in employee
logs. 
1995 National Household Education Survey
The Adult Education component of the 1995 NHES is a cross-sec-
tional telephone survey of approximately 20,000 adults age 16 and
older who were not enrolled in elementary or secondary school. The
survey emphasizes formal courses and programs since it first asks its
respondents to focus on education and training programs, courses,
workshops, and seminars that they took during the past 12 months. The
survey then asks about English as a second language, basic skills and
GED preparation, credential classes, apprenticeships, and career or
job-related courses. For non-self-employed workers, the survey also
asks whether the employer provided instruction for these courses and
whether the employer supported the courses in various ways. We
define employer-provided training to include all apprenticeships, and
any type of training for which an employer provided instruction, gave
time off from work with or without pay, provided classroom space, or
paid all or part of the cost. 
218 Lerman, McKernan, and Riegg
1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation 
Topical Modules
The 1996 SIPP is a national survey of approximately 36,000
households (including roughly 90,000 individuals) conducted by the
U.S. Census Bureau. In addition to its core survey data, the SIPP
includes a number of topical modules that ask about specific subjects
of interest. The Education and Training History topical module admin-
istered in Wave 2 (August to November 1996) provides information on
work-related training apart from high school or college, specifically
training that 1) helps persons search for or be trained for a new job, and
2) training that helps improve skills in a person’s current job. Both
training types are included in our formal training definition. Next, the
survey asks how many training activities of each type, lasting one hour
or more, were received by the worker in the past 12 months. Only then
is the respondent asked who sponsored or paid for their most recent
training. If the current or previous employer sponsored or paid for this
training, we include it in our measure of employer-provided training.
The 1996 SIPP School Enrollment and Financing topical module
administered in Wave 5 (August through November of 1997), provides
information specifically on employer-financed educational assistance.
It asked persons enrolled in school in the past year if they received
financial assistance from their employers. It also asked if students
could take classes during work hours and if the student is paid for time
spent in class. We use these questions to assess the level of and reasons
for employer-financed educational assistance.
Differences in the samples and training questions in the four sur-
veys are likely to affect estimates of employer-provided training. Sur-
vey results from the 1997 NES and the 1995 SEPT exclude training in
establishments with fewer than 20 employees (NES) and fewer than 50
employees (SEPT). Moreover, definitions of employer-provided train-
ing vary and play a crucial role in estimates of the scope of employer-
provided training. The 1995 NHES focuses more on courses, the 1995
SEPT captures more informal and very quick training activities, and
the 1996 SIPP emphasizes only the most recent training activities last-
ing over an hour. But considered together, the 1997 NES, the 1995
SEPT, the 1995 NHES, and the 1996 SIPP offer a comprehensive pic-
ture of the status of employer-provided training in the United States.
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HOW MUCH: THE INCIDENCE AND INTENSITY OF 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED TRAINING
Incidence
Most establishments offer some type of formal training. The 1997
NES and the 1995 SEPT employer surveys find that 78 percent (NES)
to 93 percent (SEPT) of establishments with 50 or more employees
provided formal training over the past year. Considered with the addi-
tional NES finding that 72 percent of establishments with 20 or more
employees provided formal training, the results suggest that approxi-
mately 85 percent of establishments with 50 or more employees pro-
vided formal training and approximately 70 percent of all
establishments provided formal training.1
Turning to the incidence of employer-provided training among
workers, rather than establishments, we find clear results for informal
training but mixed results for formal training. Informal training is ubiq-
uitous. The 1995 SEPT (the only one of our four focal surveys with this
information) finds that over 95 percent of workers in establishments
with 50 or more employees receive employer-provided informal train-
ing. Though this number sounds quite high, it makes sense when we
consider the broad definition that the SEPT uses—a definition that
includes training activities lasting just five minutes. Nonetheless, other
studies have found similar incidences of informal training. Using the
1994 NES, Lynch and Black (1998) find that 97 percent of establish-
ments with 20 or more employees provide informal training. Evidently,
the networks of informal training are reaching most employees.
The incidence of formal training is less clear, with findings from
the surveys varying substantially. The 1995 SEPT finds that 70 percent
of workers in establishments with 50 or more employees receive for-
mal employer-provided training, while the 1995 NHES finds that just
37 percent of all workers receive formal employer-provided training.
But lower still is the 1996 SIPP. Though this survey asked respondents
only if their most recent training was employer-provided (only 24 per-
cent of workers received), adding in employer-provided educational
assistance (another 2 percent) and the probabilistic incidence of
employer-provided training for those whose most recent training was
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not employer-provided over the past year would still only raise this fig-
ure to just over 26 percent.
Part of the difference between these results can be accounted for by
samples—the SEPT includes only workers at larger firms, while the
NHES and SIPP include all workers age 16 and over. And, as men-
tioned above, the NHES’s focus on classes may result in a narrower
measure of training than that used in the SEPT. Moreover, the SEPT’s
requirement that training activities last just five minutes, rather than the
1 hour required by the SIPP and the “programs, courses, workshops,
and seminars” emphasized in the NHES, may account for the large dif-
ference in magnitude between these figures. The SIPP figure provides
a lower bound (26 percent of workers reporting most recent training
paid for by their employer), and the SEPT yields an upper bound (up to
70 percent of workers in large establishments received at least some
short formal training). 
Intensity
How many hours of training do workers receive? Averaged over all
workers, whether they received training or not, the hours per worker of
employer-sponsored training vary widely by survey. As with incidence,
the amount of training is highest for informal training. The SEPT
Employee Survey reports an average 31 hours of informal training per
worker over six months. But average amounts of formal training are
much less. The 1995 SEPT Employer and Employee Surveys yield
estimates of 11–13 hours of training per worker over the six-month
period from May to October 1995. The SIPP, which measures only the
most recent training activity, yields an average of 14 hours per worker.
The proximity of these figures is no surprise. Both the SEPT and the
SIPP typically omit coursework from the employer-provided training
definition and the SEPT’s six-month focus is likely to capture a mea-
sure of intensity similar to that of the most recent training in the SIPP,
since the most recent training likely occurred in the past six months.
The slightly higher SIPP number makes sense because the SIPP survey
takes place a year after the SEPT and we expect that training is grow-
ing over time. The 1995 NHES finds a much higher number—an aver-
age of 33 hours per worker per six-month period. This is likely due to
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its emphasis on coursework, activities that tend to have much higher
intensity. 
These modest levels of mean intensity across all workers do not
reflect the extent of training among workers actually trained.2 On aver-
age, trained workers engaged in 15–19 hours of training in the 1995
SEPT over a six-month period, 60 hours in the SIPP during the most
recent training, and 89 hours of training in the 1995 NHES over a six-
month period.
The effectiveness of training would be questionable if almost all
workers received very few hours of training. But, as shown in Figure
7.1, about 21 percent of all workers (57 percent of trained workers)
participated in more than one full week of training over the past year.3
A small percentage, about 10 percent of workers, report more than one
month of training. These are likely to be workers enrolled in courses
and degree programs. The Figure 7.1 results come from NHES data,
but we find a very similar distribution using the SIPP data. Holzer and
Reaser (1999) also find that a small but significant percentage of firms
(about 5 percent) report providing more than one month of training to
their most recent hire. 
Training over Time
How has the incidence of employer-provided training changed
over time? Have employers responded to the increased importance of
skill by sponsoring more training? Figure 7.2 presents the incidence of
employer-provided training over time by data source. The evidence
within surveys shows large increases in employer-provided training in
the past two decades. 
According to the NHES, the percentage of workers receiving train-
ing appears to have doubled, from 19 percent in 1990 to 37 percent in
1994. However, the gains may be overstated because of differences in
the training questions in the two years. The 1991 initial training ques-
tion asked: “Not counting full-time school or courses taken toward a
degree . . . have you been involved in . . . educational or training activ-
ities given by an employer or labor organization . . . in the past 12
months?” (Barnow, Giannarelli, and Long 1996). On the other hand,
the 1995 questions, as discussed above, enable us to measure any type
of training (including English as a second language, basic skills and
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Figure 7.1 Distribution of Training by Hours of Training Received 
in One Year (1995 NHES)
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GED preparation, credential courses, career or job-related activities,
and apprenticeships) provided or supported by the employer. But if we
focus only on employer-provided or -supported career or job-related
courses in the 1995 NHES, we find that the percentage of workers
receiving training in 1995 falls from 37 percent to 27 percent. The
additional questions in the 1995 NHES instrument that enable us to
include employer support may account for a few more percentage
points, further lowering the comparable 1995 NHES estimate to 25
percent of workers. This would leave a lower, though still respectable,
six-percentage-point change between 1991 and 1995. 
The SIPP provides more accurate data over time by using the same
universe and questions in each survey. It shows the percentage of all
persons age 18–64 that receive training rising from 6 percent in the
1984 SIPP, to 20 percent in the 1996 SIPP—with the largest jump
between 1993 and 1996.4 The CPS also shows increases in employer-
provided training over time, from 5 percent in the 1981 CPS to 16 per-
cent in the 1991 CPS.5 These steady increases add up to a 14 percent-
age point increase over a 12-year period in the SIPP and a comparable
11-point increase over a 10-year period in the CPS. 
Previous research also has found evidence that training increased
over this period. Lynch and Black (1998) find that 57 percent of firms
reported that they increased the amount of training they offered
between 1991 and 1994, and only 2 percent of firms reported decreases
over that period (all others presumably experienced no changes in the
amount of training offered). Rapid technological change is responsible,
as Bartel and Sicherman (1998) find. This is especially plausible given
the boom in personal computing and Internet technology in the early
1990s. Or, perhaps the increase is due to higher corporate profits with a
good economy, or simply a shift in corporate culture that now empha-
sizes lifelong learning. 
WHO: THE WORKERS RECEIVING 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED TRAINING
Who is receiving employer-provided training? Table 7.1 presents
tabulations on the incidence and intensity of employer-provided train-
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ing by various worker characteristics for each of the three surveys.
Despite absolute differences in the numbers due to survey design and
universe, as discussed in previous sections, we find patterns of training
common to all three surveys, together with some important exceptions.
Although the data show that employer-provided training does not reach
all types of workers equally, many disadvantaged groups are appar-
ently receiving higher amounts of training than previously thought.
In all surveys, the incidence of employer-provided training
increases with education—a finding consistent with other empirical
studies (Lillard and Tan 1986; Lynch 1992; Brown 1990; Barnow,
Giannarelli, and Long 1996; Barron, Berger, and Black 1997; Holzer
and Reaser 1999). Figure 7.3a confirms this common view that training
levels rise with formal education. In all three employee surveys, work-
ers with a high school diploma or less are the least likely to receive
training of any educational group while those with a bachelor’s degree
or higher are the most likely to receive training. This tendency suggests
the worker’s existing stock of training may raise the benefits to
employers of additional training. 
More surprising are the data on the intensity of training in Figure
7.3b. The NHES, which captures substantially more educational activi-
ties than the other surveys, shows that the “some college” group has by
far the highest intensity of training, suggesting that employers are help-
ing these workers go back to school. 
To further investigate this hypothesis, we examine data from the
SIPP School Enrollment and Financing topical module, data not
included in our SIPP measures of employer-provided training. These
data provide further evidence that more-educated workers do not nec-
essarily receive more employer-provided training, when the training
comes in the form of educational assistance. In the SIPP, workers with
some college experience almost exactly the same incidence of
employer-provided educational assistance as workers with at least a
bachelor’s degree.
Similar variations by data set arise with regard to training by earn-
ings level, age, and job characteristics. Both the SEPT and the SIPP
report that workers with the lowest earnings receive the least amount of
employer-provided training—both in incidence and intensity. This
finding again supports the findings of past research. All three surveys
reveal that the incidence of employer-provided training is positively
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Figure 7.3a Incidence of Employer-Provided Training, by Education



















































226Table 7.1 Incidence and Intensity of Employer-Provided Formal Training, by Worker Characteristics
Survey
1995 SEPT 1995 NHES 1996 SIPP
Worker characteristics




Mean hours per 




% workers in all 
estabs. 
(past year)
Mean hours per 
worker in all 
estabs. 
(6 months)
% workers in all 
estabs. (most 
recent)
Mean hours per 
worker in all 
estabs. (most 
recent)
Total (formal training) 69.8 13.4 36.7 32.7 23.6 14.2
Educational attainment
High school graduate or less 60.1 10.9 22.2 15.0 14.5 9.9
Some college 67.8 14.3 44.1 55.6 28.1 18.0
Bachelor’s degree or higher 89.7 16.1 50.0 33.8 33.9 16.9
Earnings quartile
First 61.8 4.1 27.1 41.6 10.9 6.2
Second 74.5 11.6 31.3 25.9 17.8 12.9
Third 62.0 15.9 42.1 27.6 29.6 18.3
Fourth 84.0 22.8 49.3 27.7 35.4 18.6
Age
25 and younger 63.4 2.7 43.1 83.9 16.4 12.6
25–34 78.5 14.0 37.3 32.5 26.5 17.0
35–44 74.7 15.4 39.5 23.8 27.3 15.7
45–54 64.7 17.2 36.9 17.7 26.2 14.4
55+ 50.7 5.7 20.3 7.9 14.3 6.5
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Usual hours worked per week
Under 35 56.1 4.8 34.8 52.7 14.7 7.5
35 or more 71.6 14.6 38.6 25.4 28.6 17.5
Tenure with current employer
Up to 2 years 67.5 8.9 32.8 35.1 — —
More than 2 years and up to 
5 years
56.8 4.5 36.5 36.7 — —
More than 5 years and up to 
10 years
79.7 19.5 36.7 32.3 — —
More than 10 years 75.3 21.1 39.4 20.9 — —
Gender
Men 66.5 12.2 36.0 34.1 22.1 14.3
Women 73.1 14.6 37.5 31.2 25.3 14.0
Race and origin
White 70.4 13.6 37.8 31.7 24.2 14.1
Black 70.6 13.8 32.5 35.3 20.9 16.2
American Indian/Alaskan 
Native
— 36.5 29.9 22.3 13.3
Asian/Pacific Islander — 36.3 44.9 17.2 10.0
Hispanic 73.7 11.0 24.6 52.5 14.5 9.2
NOTE: — = data unavailable.
SOURCE: 1995 Survey of Employer-Provided Training (SEPT) figures are from Frazis et al. (1998). 1995 National Household Education Survey
(NHES) figures are from authors’ weighted tabulations of the 1995 NHES publice-use data. 1996 Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) figures are from authors’ weighted tabulation of the 1996 SIPP public-use data.
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related to earnings, but the results on intensity differ for the NHES.
The SEPT and SIPP both show a lower training intensity among work-
ers in the lowest earnings quartiles while the NHES shows a higher
training intensity—the lowest earnings quartile report obtaining far
more training than higher earning workers in the NHES. Workers earn-
ing below $15,000 per year were receiving 42 hours of training on
average over six months, well above the 28 hours of training reported
by workers earning over $39,000. This reversal of expected patterns is
apparently explained by the NHES’s emphasis on credit courses.
Workers taking advantage of employer-sponsored tuition often have
lower than average earnings, are younger and less-experienced, and
spend less time at work.
The estimates by age follow similar patterns. In the SEPT and SIPP
data sets, workers 25 years old and younger are less likely to partici-
pate in employer-provided training than all other age groups except the
55 and older group. The youngest cohort also engages in far fewer
hours of training than most older cohorts in these two surveys. The
NHES, on the other hand, shows that workers age 25 and younger are
experiencing a higher incidence and intensity of training than any other
age group. The survey reports that 43 percent of workers age 25 and
younger receive employer-sponsored training compared to 37 percent
of workers age 25–34. Moreover, according to the NHES, this young-
est cohort is averaging 84 hours of training per six months, compared
to 33 hours for workers age 25–34.
The pattern is even the same by job characteristics. Full-time
workers and workers with longer tenure have a higher incidence of
training in all surveys, but the NHES reports that part-time workers and
those with less tenure have a much higher intensity of training. Accord-
ing to the NHES, workers who put in less than 35 hours per week
receive more than double the number of hours of training than their
full-time counterparts—53 hours per week compared to 25. 
All of these results for education level, earnings, age, and job char-
acteristics are likely attributable to the NHES’s measure of training. As
the survey includes for-credit vocational and college programs in its
definition of training, it includes workers who are receiving employer
support to attend school full or part time. These students are likely to
be 25 years old or younger and recent high school graduates with
“some college.” The hours of training they receive are likely to be
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much higher than those of other workers as they are enrolled in formal
college or vocational classes, often for several weeks at a time.
Unlike past research, we find no significant differences in the
receipt of training by sex or race and ethnicity in any of the surveys.
In general, we find a more mixed picture of differences in training
by worker characteristics than reported in most other studies. On one
hand, we find evidence for the commonly cited result that employer-
provided training is disproportionately reaching more-educated work-
ers and higher-income workers. Data from SEPT and NHES confirm
this pattern with regard to the incidence of training. However, in an
important departure from other studies, we find average hours of train-
ing per worker are generally higher (rather than lower) for young, part-
time, and less-experienced workers in the NHES—presumably because
these characteristics are common to workers enrolled in credit courses.
Still, overall, less advantaged workers average fewer hours of training
across all workers than more advantaged workers because their higher
NHES intensity figures do not fully compensate for their lower inci-
dence of training. 
WHERE: THE EMPLOYERS OFFERING THE 
MOST TRAINING 
The 1997 NES and both the 1995 SEPT Employer and Employee
Surveys provide information on which employers offer the most train-
ing. As shown in Table 7.2, the estimates for all three of these surveys
indicate that the amount of training steadily increases with establish-
ment size and number of workplace benefits. According to the 1997
NES, 69 percent of small establishments (20–50 employees) provided
formal training, while 93 percent of large establishments (1,000 or
more employees) provided formal training. And though the magnitudes
of the SEPT surveys are different, the pattern is the same as in the
NES—larger establishments provide more training. Measures of the
intensity of training indicate the same result—workers in large estab-
lishments receive considerably more hours of training than workers in
small establishments. These findings are consistent with the literature
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Survey
1997 NES 1995 SEPT employer 1995 SEPT employee
Establishment 
characteristics
% estabs. w/20+ 
employees 
(past year)
% estabs. w/50+ 
employees 
(past year)
% estabs. w/50+ 
employees 
(past year)
Mean hours per 
worker in estabs. 
w/50+ employees 
(6 months)









Total (formal training) 72.4 77.6 92.5 10.7 69.8 13.4
Number of employees
20–50 69.2 — — —
50–99 72.4 — 90.8 5.7 61.6 8.2
100–249 82.3 — — —
250–999 86.5 — — —
100–499 — — 94.4 12.1 73.0 13.5
500 or more — — 98.1 12.0 71.0 16.6
1,000 or more 93.0 — — —
Turnover
Low 71.5 73.4 92.7 10.8 78.3 27.3
Medium 73.0 81.9 96.0 12.5 74.7 15.6








74.2 73.7 90.6 9.7 65.7 12.1
Number of selected
benefits
Six or fewer 63.6 63.6 89.5 7.1 62.9 10.2
Seven or more 84.3 87.0 99.6 14.8 76.9 16.7
NOTE: — = data unavailable.
SOURCE: 1997 National Employer Survey (NES) figures are from authors’ weighted tabulations of the 1997 NES public-use data. 1995
Survey of Employer Provided Training (SEPT) figures are from Frazis et al. (1998).
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(Lynch and Black 1998; Barron, Berger, and Black 1997; Holzer and
Reaser 1999) and with expectations from theory.
Employer-provided training rises with the number of benefits a
firm offers. Benefits may include perks such as paid vacation, paid sick
leave, health insurance, pension plans, family leave, and child care.
Establishments that provide more of these types of benefits also pro-
vide more formal training, both in incidence and intensity. According
to the SEPT, the percentage of establishments providing training and
the percentage of workers receiving training is at least 10 percentage
points higher in establishments that provide seven or more selected
benefits, than in establishments that provide six or fewer of these bene-
fits. 
A powerful expectation is that employers provide less training in
establishments with high turnover, because of the greater chance that
workers will leave before the firm can recoup their investment in train-
ing. But surprisingly, the evidence on training by turnover is mixed.
The 1995 SEPT incidence and intensity measures presented in Table
7.2 generally support the expected negative relationship between turn-
over and training. Fewer high-turnover establishments report providing
formal training and fewer workers in high-turnover establishments
receive formal training than workers in low-turnover establishments.
On the other hand, the 1997 NES reports that the percentage of estab-
lishments providing training does not vary significantly with turnover.6 
Previous studies find mixed results on differences in training by
union presence. Using the 1992 Small Business Administration–
funded survey, Barron, Berger, and Black (1997) find that newly hired
workers receive more training if they belong to a union. But the authors
find no significant difference for firms with and without unions when
using the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project survey. We also
find that employer-provided training varies little by union status in
both the 1997 NES and the 1995 SEPT. There is a small difference of
two percentage points by union status in both the NES and the SEPT
Employer Survey, but this difference is not statistically significant. The
same is true of intensity measures. 
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WHAT: THE TYPES OF TRAINING
EMPLOYERS PROVIDE
So far, the surveys suggest the importance of looking not only at
employer-provided general versus specific training, but at a particular
form of general training—employer-sponsored educational assistance.
Is this form of general training widespread? When fully accounting for
educational assistance, is the mix of training still in accord with
Becker’s theory and with the common view that that lower-earning,
younger, and less-educated workers have limited access to employer-
sponsored training?
In Table 7.3, where we report the scale of various types of
employer-provided training, there is evidence for Becker’s theory that
firms choose to provide more specific than general training. The 1997
NES, 1995 SEPT, and the 1995 NHES all find that employers empha-
size occupational safety training (66 percent, 72 percent, and 43 per-
cent, respectively), which is generally firm-specific, and provide little
basic or remedial skill training (17 percent, 9 percent, and 2 percent,
respectively), which is general. Lynch and Black (1998) find similar
results in the 1994 NES. They find that roughly three-fourths of
employers provide specific training, but only one-quarter of establish-
ments provide remedial skills. 
In our focal surveys, the high percentage of establishments offering
computer training might be an exception to this pattern and to Becker’s
theory, but some computer training could involve a combination of
specific and general training. In any event, note that the NES finds that
73 percent of firms with more than 50 employees offered computer
skills training in the past year—the highest incidence of any type of
training. Similarly, training intensity measures are highest for com-
puter skills in both the SEPT Employer and Employee Surveys. More
information on the specific versus general content of computer training
would be necessary before judging whether the high levels of this form
of training constitute employer-provided general training. Nonetheless,
these findings on computer training suggest that rapid technological
growth may have played a large role in encouraging increased
employer investments in training over the 1990s. 
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Survey

































for all workers 
(6 months)
Total (formal training) 72.4 77.6 92.5 10.7 69.8 13.4 36.7 32.7
Type of training —
Management — — 66.8 0.8 16.3 0.6 — —
Professional and 
technical skills
— — 49.4 1.3 21.4 1.9 — —




38.1 0.5 8.4 0.6 — —
Sales and customer 
relations
58.9 58.5 50.5 0.8 15.1 0.6 — —
Service-related — — 27.0 0.6 5.9 0.3 — —
Production and 
construction-related
— — 29.6 1.1 11.3 2.0 — —
Basic or remedial 
skills
16.4 17.3 9.4 0 .1 2.3 0.0 — —
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Occupational safety 58.5 65.8 71.7 1.2 42.8 0.6 — —
Communication, 
employee
— — 45.7 1.4 22.8 1.5 — —
Development and 
quality
Employee wellness — — 37.3 0.1 — — — —
Orientation — — 72.5 0.2 — — — —
Awareness — — 51.7 0.6 — — — —
Other — — 0.3 0.1 1.4 0.2 — —
Teamwork and 
problem solving
62.8 69.4 — — — — — —
English as a second 
language
— — — — — — 0.2 0.1
Basic skills or GED 
prep
— — — — — — 0.4 0.3
Credit courses/
programs
— — — — — — 10.3 20.7
Apprenticeship 9.1 9.9 24.4 — — — 1.6 1.9
Career or job-related 
courses
— — — — — — 27.1 9.7
Mentoring programs 9.5 10.1 44.1 — — — — —
NOTE: — = data unavailable.
SOURCE: 1997 National Employer Survey (NES) figures are from authors’ weighted tabulations of the 1997 NES public-use data. 1995
Survey of Employer Provided Training (SEPT) figures are from Frazis et al. (1998) and (1997). 1995 National Household Education
Survey (NHES) figures are from authors’ weighted tabulations of the 1995 NHES public-use data.
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The NHES provides a different breakdown of training—one that
helps explain the wide variation in incidence and intensity figures
between the SEPT and the NHES and gives us an insight into the inci-
dence and intensity of employer-supported education. The NHES’s
nearly exclusive focus on courses and the SEPT’s lack of focus on
courses mean that the NHES misses many of the higher incidence, but
lower intensity types of training captured in the SEPT (e.g., occupa-
tional safety), and the SEPT misses many of the lower incidence, but
higher intensity types of training captured in the NHES. For example,
the NHES reports that 10 percent of workers were enrolled in
employer-supported credit courses or programs in the last year. Though
the incidence of this type of training is low, the intensity is high. Work-
ers engaging in this employer-sponsored training attend an average of
21 hours of class time in six months. Adding this type of training to the
equation nearly triples the number of hours of training for all workers
in the NHES figures.
Taking workers receiving employer-supported credit courses out of
the NHES calculations would lower the number of hours of training for
all workers to 12 hours—almost equal to the SEPT figure of 13 hours,
which is based on a sample of only large firms. We are not advocating
omitting employer-supported credit courses from the definition of
employer-provided training, but think it worthwhile to distinguish
employer-supported education from other forms of employer-provided
training.
As suggested above, keeping employer-supported credit courses in
the calculations appears to modify the conventional conclusions about
training patterns that appear in the literature and are present in the
SEPT data. Because many of the workers who take advantage of credit
courses are likely more traditional college students or only slightly
older, they tend to be younger, less-educated, in a lower earnings quar-
tile. They also may work fewer hours per week, as they are likely to be
spending more time in the classroom. As discussed above, the NHES
reports both higher levels of employer-sponsored education and much
higher amounts of training for younger, less educated, and low earning
workers than does the SEPT.
The 1996 SIPP offers additional insights about the levels and rea-
sons for employer-financed educational assistance in its School Enroll-
ment and Financing topical module. First, the topical module shows
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employer-provided educational assistance as affecting only 2 percent
of workers, far less than the 10 percent found in the NHES. Part of the
reason is that the NHES uses a broader definition, one that includes any
type of employer support (such as time off to go to school), while the
SIPP includes only those whose employer actually paid directly for
some part of the education. 
The low share of workers reporting employer-provided educational
assistance in the SIPP does not mean that employers are not offering
tuition support. In a separate question in the NES (not included in our
prior tabulations of employer-provided training), firms were asked if
they reimburse the cost of tuition for an approved course. Surprisingly,
more than 82 percent of firms reported offering this type of tuition
reimbursement to managers, supervisors, and administrators and 69
percent offered the same support to frontline workers. Data from other
employer surveys reported by Cappelli (2002) confirm the high shares
of employers offering tuition subsidies.
Although only a minority of workers use the tuition and paid leave
subsidies in a given year, the impact on adult education is substantial.
Of all adults enrolled in postsecondary degree–granting programs, 24
percent received an employer-provided tuition subsidy and 53 percent
obtained employer support either from tuition or paid leave.7 
The SIPP School Enrollment and Financing topical module yields
information on why employers might sponsor educational assistance.
Of workers taking courses with employer support, almost 50 percent
are required to enroll in courses to maintain skills (25 percent), retrain
(3 percent), or receive a promotion or salary increase (21 percent). And
only 27 percent of those employees are paid for their time spent in
class. According to Cappelli (2002), a major reason employers offer
the apparently general training is the reduction in turnover and the abil-
ity to attract above average workers. Employers believe workers stay
longer with the firm because of the chance to use the educational subsi-
dies. 
The picture based on the observed types of training is only partly
consistent with Becker’s theory. Employers are indeed providing a sig-
nificant amount of specific training, such as orientation and occupa-
tional safety, but the widely prevalent computer skills training is likely
to have a significant general component. Finally, a large percentage of
establishments offer employer-provided educational assistance and a
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small but significant proportion of workers use this support for courses
related to jobs or careers. 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
EMPLOYER-PROVIDED TRAINING PATTERNS 
What generalizations can be made about recent patterns and trends
in employer-provided training? First, employer-provided training
increased substantially over the 1980s and early 1990s. The percentage
of workers receiving training grew about one percent per year with
even more rapid growth in the mid 1990s. The question remains, how-
ever, as to what drove this increase. Rapid technological growth, a
booming economy, or a shift in corporate culture that now emphasizes
lifelong learning, may all be possible explanations. Whether we can
sustain this growth in employer-provided training through an economic
downturn remains to be seen.
Second, alternative data sets yield similar estimates concerning the
large percentages of establishments (about 85 percent of establish-
ments with 50 or more employees and 70 percent of all establishments)
providing formal training. But, the data sets differ on the share of
workers participating in employer-sponsored formal training; the range
runs from 26 to 65 percent of workers.
Third, the surveys providing measures of intensity of training
report widely different amounts. Among workers participating in
employer-sponsored training, the average number of hours in training
over a six-month period ranged from 15–19 hours in the 1995 SEPT to
89 hours in the 1995 NHES. The primary reason for these disparate
estimates is apparently the inclusion of employer-supported formal
schooling in the NHES, but not in the SEPT. 
Fourth, the distribution of hours of formal training in the NHES
and SIPP suggests that some workers are receiving intensive employer-
provided training. Fifteen percent of all workers in the NHES received
more than two full weeks of employer-provided formal training in
1994. Although 15 percent may sound like a low share obtaining train-
ing of at least moderate intensity, over a three- to four-year period, the
share of the workforce participating in some intensive training could
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reach 40–60 percent, depending on whether workers intensively
trained in one year do so in the adjacent years. 
Fifth, unlike formal training, informal training is ubiquitous. The
1995 SEPT finds that nearly all workers—over 95 percent—at estab-
lishments with 50 or more employees receive informal training. This
finding is not surprising, given the SEPT’s broad definition of informal
training. The SEPT also finds that workers receive an average of 31
hours of employer-provided informal training per worker for the six-
month period from May through October, 1995.
Sixth, how employer training varies by worker characteristics is
sensitive to the inclusion of employer-sponsored educational assis-
tance. Ignoring such educational assistance, the data support the com-
monly cited result that employer-provided training is
disproportionately reaching more advantaged (e.g., well-educated,
higher earnings) workers. However, the NHES survey, which best cap-
tures data on employer assistance in education, finds surprising evi-
dence that the intensity of training is generally higher for young, part-
time, and less-experienced workers. 
Seventh, the amount of training received varies by employer char-
acteristics. The 1997 NES, 1995 SEPT, and the 1995 NHES estimates
indicate that the amount of training provided rises substantially with
establishment size and number of work place benefits, but is only mod-
estly affected by turnover and barely affected at all by union status.
Finally, the data support Becker’s theory that employers emphasize
specific training, but we also find evidence of a considerable amount of
employer-supported general training, both in the form of computer
training and employer-provided educational assistance.
What are the implications of these findings for policy? Certainly,
employers are already receptive to training and, on average, are spend-
ing more on training than the one percent of payroll requirement pro-
posed as a mandate by the Commission on the Skills of the American
Workforce (Marshall and Tucker 1992). The spending covers a broad
spectrum of workers, though it is least concentrated on the less-edu-
cated workers but more concentrated on workers in the middle than at
the top. Not surprisingly, much employer-supported training is for
tasks specific to the employer. However, almost all employers offer
tuition subsidies or paid leave to workers taking an approved course in
a postsecondary degree–granting institution—although only a minority
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of workers take up these offers. The widespread availability of
employer-subsidized tuition suggests that substantial increases in
employer-sponsored training could take place if more workers chose to
take advantage of existing offers. 
With evidence pointing to substantial growth in employer-spon-
sored training and to widespread offers of employer-subsidized tuition,
the case for a government training mandate receded somewhat in the
1990s. Although progress has been made, it is far from clear that
employer-provided training on its own can achieve and sustain a
socially optimal level of training or that current training practices are
effective. 
As the United States continues its transition from an industrial
economy to an information economy, academic and technical literacy
will become increasingly important for workers and for continued U.S.
productivity growth. This growing need for training may well outpace
increases in training opportunities provided by employers, especially in
a recession, making the gap between the need and level of training ever
wider. Rather than simply requiring firms to spend a percentage of their
payroll on employee training, government policies should instead
focus their efforts on increasing access to training for underrepresented
groups, encouraging take-up of existing opportunities, and ensuring
that training is of high quality to help U.S. workers keep their competi-
tive edge. At the same time, the government should recognize that
many if not most companies are, like United Technologies, willing to
play an active role in raising the skills of American workers.
Notes
The authors would like to thank Kevin Hollenbeck, Harry Holzer, and other partici-
pants at the Conference on Job Training and Labor Exchange in the United States for
their comments and suggestions. The authors are grateful to the U.S. Department of
Labor for research support. 
1. The 1993 SEPT also found that approximately 70 percent of all establishments
provided formal training (Frazis, Herz, and Horrigan 1995).
2. To compare our results from the 1995 NHES with Frazis et al.’s (1998) results
from the 1995 SEPT, we report results for all workers not just workers trained
(i.e., we average in the zeros for workers who did not receive training). Results for
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workers trained can be derived by dividing the average hours of training for all
workers by the incidence rate.
3. These figures indicate higher hours of training than found by Holzer and Reaser
(1999) for training provided to newly hired workers in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit,
and Los Angeles.
4. The 20 percent incidence among all persons reported here for the 1996 SIPP dif-
fers from the 24–26 percent incidence among all workers because of the differ-
ence universes (all persons age 18–62 versus all workers age 16+) used in the
calculations.
5. Note that the training questions in the CPS are much narrower than those in the
other surveys and hence result in much lower and (not very comparable) figures
of employer-provided training. The CPS includes only training to improve skills
taken in a formal company training program. Moreover, the CPS asks about train-
ing with the current employer not training over the past year (NHES and SEPT) or
the most recent training (SIPP).
6. Turnover in the 1995 SEPT is measured as the ratio of hires and separations to
employment during a 3-month period. The low-, medium-, and high-turnover cat-
egories contain 7, 49, and 44 percent of establishments, respectively (Frazis et al.
1998). We measure turnover in the 1997 NES as the ratio of separations to
employment during a one-year period. The low-, medium-, and high-turnover cat-
egories contain 19, 49, and 33 percent of the weighted establishments, respec-
tively.
7. These data come from Hudson’s report on the Adult Education Survey, as cited in
Cappelli (2002).
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Lessons for the United States
Lori G. Kletzer
William L. Koch
During the last three decades, concern about the skills of the U.S.
workforce has emerged as a persistent public policy issue. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, sluggish U.S. labor productivity growth gener-
ated alarm over a perceived gap between the skills of U.S. workers and
workers in other industrialized countries. In the 1990s, concerns arose
about Americans being left behind as substantial changes in the labor
market reduced the real earnings and labor force participation of less-
skilled workers. The current focus on skills and their importance in the
working lives of Americans is not new, rather a renewal. Federal train-
ing policy has its roots in New Deal public works programs. Today’s
programs are the descendants of programs initiated during the Johnson
Administration’s War on Poverty. 
Several factors can be tied to the renewed public interest in skill
development. Globalization, technological change, and the reorganiza-
tion of work have combined to produce dramatic changes in the
demand for workers’ skill. Into the late 1970s, workers without any
college experience could anticipate a (manufacturing) job at good pay
with attainable skill requirements. Most necessary skills could be
acquired on the job. Today, “good” jobs increasingly require a strong
base of analytical, quantitative and verbal skills.1 In the United States,
these skills are produced, for the most part, by the educational system,
followed in sequence by private employers. For most Americans, train-
ing occurs within firms as part of the normal course of business. Pub-
licly provided job training is different; these programs (and other active
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labor market policies) offer a second chance to many workers. In
nearly all countries, these programs have a stated goal of integrating
the unemployed and economically disadvantaged into the workforce. 
In this chapter, we review recent evidence on training programs for
a small group of mostly industrialized countries, and try to distill some
lessons for the United States in its employment and training policy. We
concentrate primarily on publicly funded programs targeted at unem-
ployed and economically disadvantaged workers. Where appropriate,
we make note of a country’s overall training environment. We are not
the first authors seeking an international perspective on employment
and training policy. Interested readers are directed to two highly useful
and readable earlier papers, Haveman and Saks (1985) and Casey and
Bruche (1985). 
Training is just one tool in the kit of active labor market policies
(ALMP). Active labor market policies are geared toward enhancing the
employment and long-run earnings prospects of unemployed workers
and those with low skill levels and/or little work experience. These
measures include public employment services and administration (job
placement, information, counseling, job matching, referrals, adminis-
trating unemployment benefits); training for adults (vocational and
remedial training for the unemployed and training for labor market rea-
sons for the employed); youth programs (training and employment for
unemployed youth and apprenticeship training for school leavers); pro-
grams for the disabled; and subsidized employment for the unem-
ployed and other groups, excluding the disabled and youth (hiring
subsidies, assistance in self-employment, direct job creation). Active
labor market policies are grounded in a widely shared value that people
need opportunities to work and advance themselves.2 
For the most part, we will not discuss passive labor market poli-
cies, such as unemployment compensation and subsidies for health
insurance.3 These policies are part of the social safety net, and are
geared toward reducing economic hardship resulting from joblessness. 
We acknowledge at the outset that private training expenditures
vastly exceed spending by governments. As we show in Table 8.1, the
United States spent 0.04 percent of GDP on public training in 2000.
Public spending is estimated at just under 10 percent of total training
expenditures (see Chapter 1). Even in Sweden, where spending on
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Table 8.1 Public Expenditure on Labor Market Policies as a Percentage of GDP for 2000






















Canada 1.49 0.98 0.50 0.40 0.34 0.06 0.16 0.06
Germany 3.13 1.89 1.23 0.19 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.22
Hungary 0.87 0.48 0.39 0.28 0.18 — 0.56 —
Japan 0.82 0.54 0.28 0.39 0.11 — 0.46 0.04
Korea 0.55 0.09 0.46 0.09 0.20 0.02 0.67 0.02
Sweden 2.72 1.34 1.38 0.19 0.22 0.01 0.20 0.38
United Kingdom 0.94 0.58 0.37 0.35 0.14 0.41 0.03 0.05
United States 0.38 0.23 0.15 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.07 0.20
Cross-country 
averageb
1.36 0.77 0.60 0.24 0.23 0.07 0.28 0.19
NOTE: — = data unavailable.
a Categories for each country may not sum to 1 due to rounding error.
b Unweighted average.
SOURCE: OECD (2000, Table H).
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active labor market policy is much higher, public expenditures on
training in 2000 amounted to 0.31 percent of GDP.
The countries in our sample are Canada, Germany, Hungary,
Japan, Korea, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. All are
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD), with Hungary joining the organization in 1995 and
Korea joining in 1996. We chose these countries as examples of differ-
ent approaches to labor market policy in general and training in partic-
ular. Most clearly for the advanced industrialized countries, we were
looking for countries with potential to yield useful lessons for the
United States. Hungary was added as an interesting case of labor mar-
ket policy in a transition economy, and Korea as an example of a rap-
idly developing economy.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, we examine recent pat-
terns of public spending on labor market programs in general and job
training specifically. Then we review recent cross-country trends in
access to training, both in the private and public sectors. The third sec-
tion briefly discusses what is known about training programs and the
evaluation literature that provides these findings. The fourth section is
devoted to country profiles, followed by profiles of displaced worker
programs. In the final section, we offer concluding remarks, including
lessons for the United States. 
PUBLIC SPENDING ON LABOR MARKET POLICIES
As background to our discussion of spending, Table 8.2 presents
standardized national unemployment rates and measures of the inci-
dence of long-term unemployment. Unemployment rates generally fell
over the late 1990s, with the exception of Japan. Unemployment fell
dramatically in Canada, Hungary, and Sweden, and it reached a con-
temporary historic low in the United States. Long-term unemployment
is a serious concern in Germany and Hungary and is a much greater
problem now in Sweden than it was in the late 1980s. Long-term
unemployment remains a problem in the United Kingdom, although it
has diminished somewhat from the late 1980s. Canada has more long-
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Table 8.2 Unemployment Rates and Incidence of Long-Term Unemployment, by Country
Standardized unemployment rate 
as a percentage of total labor force
Long-term unemployment 
as a percentage of total unemployment
6 months and over 12 months and over
Country 1985–88 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000
Canada 9.1 8.3 7.6 6.8 24.1 21.4 19.5 13.7 11.6 11.2
Germany 6.5 9.3 8.6 8.1 69.6 67.2 67.6 52.6 51.7 51.5
Hungary — 8.0 7.1 6.5 71.0 70.4 69.7 49.8 49.5 48.9
Japan 2.7 4.1 4.7 4.7 39.3 44.5 46.9 20.9 22.4 25.5
Korea — — — 4.3 14.7 18.6 14.3 1.6 3.8 2.3
Sweden 2.3 8.3 7.2 5.9 49.2 45.2 41.5 33.5 30.1 26.4
United Kingdom 10.2 6.3 6.1 5.5 47.3 45.4 43.2 32.7 29.6 28.0
United States 6.4 4.5 4.2 4.0 14.1 12.3 11.4 8.0 6.8 6.0
NOTE: — = data unavailable.
SOURCE: OECD Employment Outlook (2001, Tables A and G).
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term unemployment than the United States, and both countries have
seen little change since the late 1980s. 
The OECD has been collecting comparable data on public spend-
ing on labor market measures since 1985. As reported in Martin and
Grubb (2001), the typical OECD country spent just over two percent of
GDP on active and passive labor market measures in 2000. Spending
by the countries in our sample for the year 2000 is reported in Table
8.1. Our sample contains both some of the highest spending countries
(Sweden and Germany), as well as the lowest spending countries (the
United States). The (unweighted) average for these countries is 1.36
percent of GDP. Passive spending accounts for around one-half to two-
thirds of total spending on labor market policy. Korea is an exception,
where passive policies account for just 16 percent of total spending.
For the most part, spending on passive programs in 2000 was a lesser
share of GDP than it was for 1985–1988 (see Table 8.3). Germany,
Japan, and Sweden are exceptions, where passive spending was higher
in the late 1990s than in the mid-to-late 1980s. Since both passive and
active spending are positively correlated with the unemployment rate,
and passive more so than active, higher unemployment in these coun-
tries may explain the increase in spending (see Martin and Grubb
2001). 
The relative importance accorded to active labor market policy
varies considerably across the countries in our study. The average for
the sample in 2000 was 0.6 percent of GDP on active measures, com-
pared to an average of 0.8 percent of GDP for OECD countries. It is the
variation in spending in our sample of countries that is remarkable.
Sweden devotes the greatest share of GDP to these measures, but its
spending as a share of GDP has fallen. Spending was almost two per-
cent of GDP over the late 1980s, and as recently as 1997, it was 2.03
percent of GDP (see Table 8.3). But spending dropped to 1.38 percent
of GDP in 2000. Germany is the only other country in our sample with
significant resources devoted to ALMP, just over 1 percent of GDP in
2000. Other countries in the sample spend far less; the United States is
the lowest, at 0.15 percent of GDP in 2000, down from a 1985–1988
average of 0.26 percent of GDP. Despite widespread recognition that
governments should shift the balance of spending toward active labor
market policies, the active share of spending has increased in a few
countries (Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan), but
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Table 8.3 Labor Market Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, by Active and Passive Categories
Active measures Passive measures
1985–88
Average 1997 1998 1999 2000
1985–88
average 1997 1998 1999 2000
Canadaa,b 0.58 0.56 0.47 0.46 0.50 1.74 1.29 1.16 1.01 0.98
Germany 0.95 1.23 1.26 1.30 1.23 1.36 2.52 2.28 2.12 1.89
Hungary — 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.39 — 0.63 0.62 0.56 0.48
Japana,c 0.19 0.34 0.33 0.25 0.28 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.50 0.54
Korea — 0.09 0.46 0.69 0.46 — 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.09
Sweden 1.96 2.03 1.96 1.82 1.38 0.80 2.10 1.93 1.68 1.34
United Kingdoma,d 0.80 — 0.39 0.34 0.37 1.89 — 0.80 0.64 0.58
United Statese 0.26 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.51 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.23
NOTE: — = data unavailable.
a Fiscal years starting April 1.
b Data are from 1995–96 to 1996–99.
c Data are from 1996–97 to 1999–2000. Japanese LMP data have been revised.
d Excluding Northern Ireland.
e Fiscal years starting on October 1.
SOURCE: OECD (2001) and Leigh (1995, Table 2.1).
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fallen in others (Germany, Sweden). As noted, the share of ALMP in
total labor market policy spending varies across the business cycle,
with some similarities across countries. In general, the active share
falls as unemployment rises.4 
Turning to the separate active measures, training and retraining
programs are the traditional core of government labor market policy,
perhaps most strongly so in Western Europe. Training accounts for the
largest share of total public spending on active measures for the OECD
as a whole. In 2000 on average, OECD countries devoted 23 percent of
total active spending to training programs, and that fraction has
remained fairly constant since 1985 (see Martin and Grubb 2001, Fig-
ure 2). Our sample of countries acts somewhat similarly, spending on
average 21 percent of total active spending on training, but the average
masks a wide variation. Canada spends 34 percent of their total active
expenditures on training, with Germany at 28 percent, the United
States at 26 percent, and Sweden at 22 percent, while Hungary and
Korea spend just under 20 percent and the United Kingdom 13 percent.
Qualitatively, Sweden and Germany have stable, nationwide employ-
ment and training programs (as does Japan, in a fundamentally differ-
ent way). The Public Employment Service (PES) is the largest share of
total active spending for a number of countries in our sample (Canada,
Japan, United Kingdom). For most countries, the PES serves two cen-
tral functions: 1) as a clearinghouse between potential employers and
workers (as the central labor exchange), and 2) as the interface for
sources of assistance for the unemployed (payment of unemployment
benefits, providing job search assistance).
CROSS-COUNTRY TRENDS IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
TRAINING ACCESS 
The International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) is our primary
source of information on private and public training access and partici-
pation.5 There are some clear patterns in the data (see Table 8.4). In the
overall population, about one-third to one-half of adults ages 25–64
were engaged in some form of education or training outside of formal
schooling. Employed adults were considerably more likely to receive
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Table 8.4 Cross-Country Comparisons for Adults Aged 25–64 of All Education and Training, by Labor Force 
Status, Gender, Age, and Educational Attainment (%)

















Canada 36.5 41.9 30.1 23.1 37.0 36.0 43.6 41.9 26.6 19.6 31.1 54.9
(29.5) (37.5) (22.0) (9.9) (33.4) (25.8) (35.3) (32.3) (22.8) (13.6) (25.1) (46.5)



























United States 41.9 49.0 30.2b 17.1 41.8 42.1 45.7 45.9 37.1 13.3 32.6 62.4
(37.8) (45.6) (28.5) (10.1) (39.0) (36.7) (41.8) (41.9) (32.8) (10.5) (28.9) (57.2)
NOTE: Values in parentheses are for job-related training only.
a Job-related training data unavailable.
b Less than 30 cases in sample cell.
SOURCE: O’Connell (1999).
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training than either the unemployed or the inactive (individuals out of
the labor force). Separating job-related training from all education and
training, we see that for the employed, most training is job-related.6 In
our sample of countries, women tend to receive roughly the same over-
all level of education and training as men, but somewhat less job-spe-
cific training. Younger workers were more likely to receive training
than older workers. 
Perhaps the most striking pattern in access to training is the direct
relationship it has with the level of formal educational attainment.
There are three main educational attainment categories used in the
IALS: 1) below upper secondary, equivalent to less than a high school
diploma; 2) upper secondary, equivalent to a high school diploma; and
3) tertiary, equivalent to a college or university degree. Across three of
the four countries in Table 8.4, adults in the tertiary category were
more than twice as likely to receive education and training than adults
in the below upper secondary category.7 The differences are particu-
larly large for Canada and the United States, with the ratio of tertiary to
below upper secondary in the range of 2.8–4.7. Even in Sweden, the
ratio of tertiary to below upper secondary receiving training was close
to 2 (1.87). Given these numbers, the overall message is clear: those
who are employed, young, and with some college education are likely
to receive some kind of training, whether job-related or not, in any
given year. A virtuous cycle, with respect to the recent literature on
labor market trends and skill-biased technological change, seems to
exist for workers fitting this description. Skill upgrading is provided
for the already skilled, and for the lesser-skilled, there is far less access
to training. This pattern of providing services (skills) to those most
likely to succeed is strikingly consistent across countries, despite their
diverse labor market policies. It is not surprising, given the prevalence
of employer-provided training. Employers can be expected to provide
training to workers for whom it will yield the highest return.
When the focus is shifted to employed adults and their job-related
training, similar patterns across groups are evident (see Table 8.5).
Several observations stand out. Training participation in Hungary is
quite limited, focused on the young, somewhat more on women, and in
particular, on those with a university degree. Training participation in
the United States is much broader, with about half of all employed
adults involved in some kind of job-related training. The United States
255
Table 8.5 Cross-Country Differences in Various Training Indicators, Employees Aged 25–64 in the 1990s
Countrya
Participation rate 
in career or 
job-related training
Volume of career or job-









rates for workers 
aged 25–29 to 
50–54 
Ratios of participation rates 
for workers with a university 
degree to those not 
having finished upper 
secondary schooling 
Canada 37.70 41.10 0.94 1.96 2.34
Germany 20.00 40.50 1.15 1.79 1.96
Hungary 4.20 13.50 1.15 3.67 12.05
Swedenb 55.50 11.60 1.09 0.93 1.58
United Kingdom 58.00 52.10 1.00 1.56 1.70
United States 48.80 46.60 1.00 0.97 4.09
a Hungary source: ELFS 1997, other countries IALS 1994–1995.
b Source for average hours of training: ELFS 1997.
SOURCE: OECD Employment Outlook (1999).
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also displays a strong association between educational attainment and
access to training. A college-educated worker is four times more likely
than a high school dropout to receive training (in Hungary, the differ-
ence is 12:1). In Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,
the education bias in training access is considerably weaker, on the
order of 2:1. It is clear from the evidence that an adult high school
dropout begins his working career at a large disadvantage and that dis-
advantage is compounded by the lack of job-related training opportuni-
ties. 
Sweden provides not only the highest level of training access, but
is also the most egalitarian provider of training across groups differing
in gender, age, and education. From Table 8.5 we see that Sweden also
provides more training to unemployed workers than the other coun-
tries. However, even from its egalitarian perch, Sweden is a strong
illustration of the literacy-training association. 
Job-related training is just one type of human capital investment,
and at the country level, enhancements to human capital are strongly
positively related. Analyses reported in OECD (1999) reveal that par-
ticipation rates in job-related training are positively correlated with
school spending, educational attainment, spending on research and
development, and the share of the labor force working as researchers
(see OECD 1999, Table 3.10). We find it striking the degree to which
literacy is a foundation for skill training. Literacy skills themselves are
mostly acquired in school, but there is an interaction between literacy
and the labor market. Improved literacy is associated with more
employment opportunities (and less unemployment), and within the
employed, training is more readily available to the more literate. Given
the fact that basic literacy skills are developed in school, it is not sur-
prising that cross-country differences in education are associated with
literacy differences. But even within education categories, stronger lit-
eracy skills are associated with greater access to training.8
Information on the financing of training further highlights the per-
vasiveness of privately provided and sponsored training (see Table
8.6). Among workers with access to training, about one-third report
employer financial support (slightly more for the employed), with
workers and families contributing the next largest share (about one-
fifth report self financing). Government financing plays a considerably
International Experience with Job Training 257
Table 8.6 Percent of the General and Employed Populations in Adult 
Education Who Receive Financial Support from Various 
Sources, 1994–1998
General population Employed population
Country Men Women Men Women
Canada Self or family 22.9 27.7 25.7 23.9
Employers 26.0 19.8 31.9 24.2
Government 9.8 13.9 8.2 10.3
Other 5.9 5.2 5.9 5.3
Hungary Self or family 19.2 23.0 16.3 22.1
Employers 27.4 31.3 29.3 34.2
Government 6.4a 8.8 7.0a 9.1
Other 7.4a 7.9 6.4a 7.9
Sweden Self or family —b — — —
Employers 48.5 51.5 48.7 51.3
Government — — — —
Other — — — —
United 
Kingdom
Self or family 9.6 14.4 9.2 11.7
Employers 37.7 29.2 42.3 32.9
Government 9.6 10.6 7.8 8.2
Other 5.2 3.7 5.1 3.2
United States Self or family 16.1 21.1 17.1 17.8
Employers 32.4 30.1 35.4 31.3
Government 4.8 6.5 5.1 5.9
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reduced role. Across countries, women report more government
financing than men, even among the employed. 
To summarize, most access to training is through employers, with
more educated, full-time, large-firm workers more likely to receive
training. Numerous studies have shown firm-based training to have a
higher rate of return than other forms of postschooling training. We
consider it most likely that in the United States, private sector training
will continue to yield a (much) higher return than publicly financed job
training, and that the vast majority of job training will continue to be
provided by the private sector. Yet it is important to recognize that pri-
vate sector training has a strong skill/literacy bias; the more literate and
skilled, the greater the access to private training. The relative lack of
private training access for less-skilled workers seems likely to further
disadvantage them, creating a need for training funded by the public
sector. 
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT PUBLICLY FUNDED TRAINING
Before turning to our country profiles of training programs, it is
useful to discuss how we know what we know about program impacts.
The central question any program evaluation has to answer is whether
and to what degree the treatment had an impact on the treated. For the
most part, it is generally accepted that the most reliable evidence on the
efficacy of training programs is provided by formal statistical evalua-
tion of program impacts, whether experimental or nonexperimental.
Experimental evaluations, where the treatment and control groups are
randomly assigned, are commonly seen to be the state of the art in sta-
tistical evaluations, due to relative ease of methodology and interpreta-
tion of results. Experimental approaches do have limitations,
particularly in situations where programs are ongoing with potential
substitutes. Random assignment evaluations also raise ethical ques-
tions, and have institutional limitations and potentially considerable
implementation costs.9 In nonexperimental evaluations, it is more diffi-
cult to answer the counterfactual question of what would have hap-
pened to the treatment group in the absence of the program. This is a
considerable challenge, and there have been important recent method-
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ological advances in nonexperimental evaluations that address this
challenge. These advances are centered on improving data quality and
designing matching techniques that yield more reliable comparison
groups.10 
With its legislative mandates requiring program evaluation, the
United States has a more extensive statistical evaluation history than
does Europe, although the evaluation “gap” is likely to narrow when
recently established European multi-country evaluation efforts bear
fruit.11 The difference between the United States and Europe on this
point is quite sharp. Europe has its well-funded, stable nationwide pro-
grams aimed at reducing unemployment, particularly long-term unem-
ployment. In the United States, government funding for programs is at
a low level and subject to instability, with uneven management, aimed
at improving the earnings prospects of the disadvantaged. Although we
can expect these differences to narrow in the near future, within the
OECD, the understanding of what works and for whom is currently
based heavily on evaluations of U.S. programs (see Martin and Grubb
2001).12 
In their comprehensive review of active labor market policy evalu-
ations, Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999, p. 2053) conclude, “The
evidence both from North American and European studies indicates
that government employment and training programs have at best a
modest positive impact on adult earnings.” Most gains are in employ-
ment, not in wages.13 Formal classroom training appears to help
women, whether displaced workers, welfare recipients, or reentrants.
Best results are seen when classroom training is strongly linked to
employers. Displaced men and otherwise unemployed men with low
levels of educational attainment gain little from classroom training.
One exception for displaced men is rigorous technical training in com-
munity college settings that does produce gains (see Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan 2001). On-the-job training similarly appears to
help women, but not men, provided again that the training is closely
linked with local employers.
The United States has very little funding for out-of-school youths,
with the exception of Job Corps. Job Corps results are positive, with
results likely associated with its considerable per-participant costs.
Early studies indicated modest positive effects on employment and
earnings, and a recent study found significant earnings gains (Burghardt
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2001). Reduced participation in criminal activities is an additional
important positive impact.
Due in part to a different political culture surrounding employment
and training programs and the absence of legislative mandates on eval-
uation, European evaluations are later entries and less numerous in the
literature. Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) discuss evaluations
up to the early 1990s, and Kluve and Schmidt (2002) provide a review
into the late 1990s.14 Youth programs are a particular European focus,
due to concerns about high youth unemployment. In general, studies of
European youth programs find increased employment rates, and the
increases can be substantial. Higher youth employment rates are
thought to be due to improved transitions out of unemployment. There
is much more limited evidence of program effects on European youth
wages. For comparison purposes, it is important to note that European
youth are generally less economically disadvantaged than targeted
American youth. 
Across the number of European studies reviewed by Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999), a common finding is a significant impact
of training on employment, but not on wages (where point estimates of
a positive impact on wages are large, statistical significance is often
lacking). The same is true for the somewhat smaller number of late
1990s studies reviewed by Kluve and Schmidt (2002). Kluve and
Schmidt (p. 438) take a slightly nuanced view, concluding that training
(and job search assistance), “are more likely than subsidy-type
schemes to display a positive impact on programme participants.” This
conclusion rests more on the failure of job creation and subsidy
schemes than on the success of training programs. Recent studies do
find positive impacts of training on employment, although not for all
groups in all countries.
While outside the direct focus of this chapter on job training, job
search assistance (JSA) appears to help most unemployed workers,
particularly displaced workers. Both European and U.S. evidence sup-
ports the provision of JSA. Its key advantage is its low-cost, but it also
offers many unemployed workers what they most need, an upgrading
of search skills. Access to JSA raises employment rates. 
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COUNTRY PROFILES OF PUBLICLY FUNDED JOB 
TRAINING PROGRAMS
This section offers a profile discussion of key features of publicly
funded training programs for each country in our select sample. Our
aim is to convey a sense of how each country approaches training, the
target populations, and the basic institutional structure of service provi-
sion. With an eye to distilling lessons, our sample of countries concen-
trates on those with a history of active labor market programs, along
with a few countries that have successfully adapted key elements of
these systems. We start with Sweden, Germany, and the United King-
dom, recognizing the European history of (mostly) well-established
ALMPs. Hungary is included as part of the region, and as an example
of how programs can be adapted to transition economy needs. From
Europe we turn to North America, to discuss Canada and the United
States. We conclude with Japan and Korea. 
Sweden
Haveman and Saks (1985) denote key characteristics of a Western
European employment and training model. These characteristics
describe well both Sweden and Germany and are 1) a single primary
agency established by the national government but often independent,
2) an extensive network of local offices with outreach, 3) participation
by employer groups and trade unions in policy formation and imple-
mentation, and 4) money is spent developing a professional staff. Swe-
den has a broad-based, large-scale training and retraining system that is
grounded in its stable, comprehensive nationwide employment and
training system.
Sweden’s ALMP is best understood within the country’s overall
policy of wage solidarity, and with that, some uniqueness. If the wage
policy establishes a floor on wages, workers with low productivity will
find it difficult to obtain employment. This aspect increases the benefit
of enhancing worker productivity through training. With wage equal-
ization, ALMP is needed to facilitate worker mobility because the sig-
naling aspects of wage movements are reduced. Firms are required to
list vacancies with the Employment Service, and relocation expenses
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are funded by the government. These policies explicitly entail a work
principle, with a focus on employment rather than income transfers.
Although more recently decentralized, up to the early 1990s, train-
ing was centralized through the National Employment Training Board
(AMU). This entity sold training services to any customer willing to
pay, although its primary customer was the National Labor Market
Board (AMS) and its Employment Service offices. The national AMU
board operates a system of 100 skill centers located across the country.
We note that this training system is independent of the educational sys-
tem. The training system offers about 450 general curricula, available
in all 100 centers. Each of the 25 regions may develop additional cur-
ricula. Most training courses are vocationally oriented and aimed at the
upper secondary level. There are also basic education courses. Courses
may last up to one year. AMU training is widely used, by both the
employed and the unemployed. Training of unemployed workers is by
referral from the Employment Service and is free, with a stipend
roughly equivalent to unemployment compensation. Using data for
1990, Forslund and Krueger (1994) estimate that 62 percent of Swed-
ish unemployed participate in government training.15
The Swedish training system was decentralized more recently,
moving away from standardized training in government training cen-
ters to firm-based training meeting the needs of employers with a more
flexible curriculum.
Forslund and Krueger (1994) surveyed a small number of early
studies, noting a percentage wage effect in the range of –0.2 to +0.4
(and four studies are between –0.05 and +0.05).16 Three recent evalua-
tions of Swedish training programs (reviewed in Kluve and Schmidt
2002, Table 2) show very modest (zero to some negative) impacts on
employment and earnings for programs targeted at youth and adult
unemployed. With these studies as the evidence, one is hard-pressed to
conclude for Sweden that the payoff from training is more than modest.
Germany
Germany’s “dual” apprenticeship system gets its name from the
way vocational training and education are provided simultaneously by
employers and the state. The state is responsible for the financing, cur-
ricula, and provision of general training along with the theoretical
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aspects of vocational education. Firms provide the setting for practical,
“hands-on” aspects of vocational training. This setup strengthens the
connection between education and employment and is seen as an effec-
tive method of maintaining both low youth unemployment and supply-
ing an adequate number of skilled workers for the German economy.17
Educational tracking is an element of the German system. Second-
ary schools lead either to a university or to vocational education and
training (VET). There are outlets, however, where students can go to
university after completing VET (and the reverse). For VET student
apprentices, the dual system consists of one or two days a week spent
in the classroom at vocational schools. Other workdays are spent at the
firm usually under the guidance of an older “meister” worker or in spe-
cialized training centers organized by the firm (Gill, Fluitman, and Dar
2000).
The government organizes all aspects of training regulations, laws,
and curricula for a given industry, along with monitoring costs and
effectiveness of training via periodic national surveys. Curricula are
drawn up by groups consisting of employers’ associations, unions, and
government officials. The vocational schools themselves are run by
state education ministries and financed by local governments that pro-
vide equipment and material, and state (länder) governments that pro-
vide personnel.
Employers are all part of 480 regional employer associations
(chambers) that regulate vocational training via vocational training
committees (VTCs). Employers pay vocational training costs including
wages for the apprentice. Supervision of training is performed by
VTCs. These committees also include union and vocational teacher
representatives.
One strength of the dual system is the cooperative and stable rela-
tionship among parties and participants. Overall societal acceptance of
the need for such a system is high, the division of responsibility
between government and private firms is clear, and long-term financ-
ing, both through general government monies and firm contributions,
is assured. Secure financial and political support insures that training is
provided for both employed and unemployed workers throughout the
business cycle. 
The apprenticeship system is the most visible component in Ger-
man labor market policy. The Federal Employment Service (FES)
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administers unemployment insurance, job matching, and training pro-
grams. One-stop job centers are the starting point for the unemployed
and for employed workers looking to upgrade skills.18 Unemployed
workers in training programs are eligible for unemployment insurance.
Although the dual system is seen as a model for other countries to
emulate—Korea in particular, for the purposes of this chapter—it does
have some fundamental weaknesses and limitations. First, it is expen-
sive. In 1990–1991 annual figures, total cost per student in U.S. dollars
was $21,000, and since then costs have been rising faster than formal
university expenses. Second, small firms take part in the system at a
much lower rate than larger firms (between 35 percent and 60 percent
for firms with 5–49 workers versus greater than 90 percent for firms
with 100 or more workers). Smaller firms also have a lower retention
rate of apprentices after completion of training as compared to larger
firms (65 percent or less compared to over 80 percent for larger firms).
Third, given its size, and the extent to which government, industry, and
labor have a stake in the system, it suffers from institutional inertia.
Any major changes in regulations concerning what is taught in voca-
tional schools requires consensus among major societal groups. And
even when consensus is reached and new curricula are drawn up, voca-
tional schools are slow to respond. Curricular changes in certain sub-
jects can take up to two decades. Firms are often accused of
indifference where vocational education is concerned.19 Thus, while
government and firms acknowledge the other’s legitimacy in the pro-
cess, communication between the two is often lacking. These charac-
teristics may not bode well for flexible skill-updating in a global
economic environment characterized by rapid technological change.
The German government has been concerned with this problem
since at least the mid 1990s. The concept of “modularisation/unitisa-
tion,” a decentralization where training is offered in smaller, individu-
ally certified blocks within an occupation, has been discussed as a
method of providing greater flexibility to both training providers and
students (Reuling 2000). Smaller training units give firms greater flex-
ibility to tailor courses to actual production requirements, and offer
trainees greater opportunities to take targeted courses that address
focused skill needs. Smaller, targeted classes could improve incentives
for firms to provide training. Across the system, designing shorter,
more targeted, and flexible training opportunities spells could allow
International Experience with Job Training 265
market signals to play a greater role in determining training content
and student enrollment.
One sticking point in the implementation of this more flexible plan
is the need to accommodate certification with flexible focused training.
Certification is an important and successful component of the German
system. Certificated training enhances the transferability of skill and
allows workers to be more mobile across firms. Yet, certification is
built on a foundation of standardized and comprehensive training
courses. It may be necessary to reform the certification process to bring
in line the goals of flexible training with recognized credentials.20
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom’s active labor market policy looked consider-
ably different in 2000 than it did in the late 1980s. Overall spending
fell, from 2.69 percent of GDP averaged over 1985–1988, to 0.94 per-
cent of GDP in 2000. Spending on training, as a share of GDP, dropped
by just more than half, although spending on active policies, as a share
of total labor market policy spending, increased to 39 percent in 2000
from 29 percent in 1985–1988. 
Following a set of 1988 reforms, a national network of Training
and Enterprise Councils (TECs) was established as the central training
institution. Following a common theme, these councils were intended
to decentralize the provision of training services and increase the
involvement of employers.21 As part of a government reorganization in
2001, the Learning and Skills Council (LSC) superseded the TECs and
became responsible for post–age 16 education and training (apart from
the university sector). The LSC seems to reestablish the central author-
ity of the government, with a national office in Coventry running a set
of 47 local offices. This is in contrast to the TECs, which were struc-
tured as independent private sector enterprises, created when a group
of local employers entered into a contract with the national Department
of Education and Employment.22 Moving back to a more unified
approach, the LSC is charged with the planning and funding of work-
based learning for young people; workforce development; adult and
community learning; and information, advice, and guidance for adults.
Local councils continue to include upper-level management from local
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private sector enterprises. The overall system remains decentralized in
spirit, with considerable local authority over financing and curriculum.
Work-Based Learning for Adults (WBLA) (formerly Training for
Work) is the main state-funded program for unemployed adults. Indi-
viduals aged 18–63 who have been unemployed six months or longer
are eligible, with priority to those unemployed 12 months or longer.
Access to services is facilitated for individuals needing basic skills
training, those jobless from large-scale redundancies, and those return-
ing to the labor force. The LSCs manage the program. State funding
has been reduced over the recent past. The focus seems to be on plac-
ing workers with employers, and most training occurs on the job, in the
context of ongoing production. Trainees continue to receive unemploy-
ment benefits. Employers are not obligated to hire the worker after the
training period. Outcomes are not overly impressive, with about 46
percent of trainees who complete training finding jobs or entering self-
employment, full-time education, or further training. It is not known
whether this outcome would occur without any state intervention
(Crowley-Bainton 1997). 
Work-Based Training for Young People (WBTYP) (formerly
Youth Training [YT]) is the main state-funded program for young peo-
ple. YT was developed from the highly successful former Youth Train-
ing Scheme, and it offers a place for all young people ages 16–17 who
are unable to find a job. Funding is administered by the LSC. About
one-third of trainees are employed by an enterprise while in training.
Nonemployed trainees receive a small training allowance. Trainees aim
to achieve a National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) level 2
(craftsperson) qualification. According to Crowley-Bainton (1997),
YT suffered from bad publicity regarding the quality of training pro-
vided by some schemes and the low attainments of some trainees.
A more traditional apprenticeship program, called Modern
Apprenticeships, was started in 1994, and reformed in 2001–2002.
There are two programs, both administered by the LSC. Foundation
Modern Apprenticeship (formerly National Traineeship) is targeted at
16–17-year-olds, but also open to individuals over 18 if training can be
completed before age 25. The goal is a NVQ level 2 qualification.
Advanced Modern Apprenticeship is aimed at school and college leav-
ers, and these work-based training options lead to at least a NVQ level
3. Starting with the 2001–2002 reforms, these apprenticeships are
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available in over 60 sectors, including some sectors without a tradition
of apprenticeships, such as information technology and retail trade.23
It has been generally accepted within European countries that
youth training should incorporate general transferable skills in addition
to occupation-specific and industry-specific training. During the
1990s, concerns were voiced about a downgrading of the general and
technical content of vocational training in YT, arising from the inter-
ests of local groups of firms (via the TECs) in reducing the general
educational content of training curricula in favor of specific skills (see
Oulton and Steedman 1994).
Hungary
Any assessment of Hungary’s publicly funded training schemes
requires a look at the macroeconomic context. With the disintegration
of the Soviet bloc in 1990, Hungary experienced a dramatic decline in
GDP and an increase in unemployment. The unemployment rate rose
from a negligible level in 1990 to a peak of 13.4 percent in February
1993. Unemployment fell in the late 1990s, but a considerable part of
the decline was due to a shrinkage in the labor force (due to early
retirements and informal sector employment). Although there is con-
siderable optimism about Hungary’s prospects for completing the tran-
sition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, the
transition path for the Hungarian labor market has been bumpy, and
difficulties remain. Long-term unemployment remains high (the high-
est for our set of countries). Industrial restructuring has resulted in a
large number of unemployed workers needing retraining, along with
training demands of students finishing formal education and desiring
places in the training system (Gill, Fluitman, and Dar 2000). Large
public sector budget deficits place a constraint on spending. 
Despite these constraints, Hungary has an impressive array of
active labor market policies. In 2000, spending on ALMP accounted
for about 44 percent of total labor market policy expenditures, with
training accounting for 18 percent of active program spending. Along
with retraining, public service employment, a wage subsidy program,
and self-employment assistance constitute the set of active labor mar-
ket programs. O’Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar (1998) report that
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about one million people use Hungary’s labor programs each year, with
about 30 percent participating in an active program.
Hungary uses an extensive system of performance indicators to
monitor the cost-effectiveness of active labor market programs. This
system of indicators has been in place since 1994, and it tracks out-
comes such as reemployment rates and costs. One issue, common
across countries, that arises with performance indicators is “creaming.”
When program managers are encouraged to achieve a high reemploy-
ment rate as a measure of program success, they may react by selecting
the most able individuals, those already equipped with the skills to find
new jobs on their own. These individuals may be more skilled than the
group of unemployed as a whole. If workers are positively selected into
programs by management on the basis of ability, programs may pro-
duce high rates of reemployment (success), yet the impact of the pro-
gram (the effect of the training) may well be lower. When the
Hungarian performance indicator system was implemented, program
managers were warned about creaming and were encouraged to target
services to those most in need.24 
O’Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar (1998) provide a comprehen-
sive summary and assessment of ALMP in Hungary. Workers eligible
for retraining include the unemployed, those expecting to lose their
jobs, workers in public service employment, and recent school-leavers.
Training programs are short-term, to provide workers for job vacan-
cies. Participants receive a stipend worth 10 percent more than their
unemployment compensation payment. Training costs are paid by the
local labor office. 
Hungary’s retraining of the unemployed takes place within a back-
drop of its vocational education and training system. There are two
aspects: vocational schools that provide theory and general education,
and firms and public and private institutes that provide practical train-
ing. Government financing relies on enterprise training levies.
Regional Training Centers (RTCs), set up to augment other public and
private training schools, are partially funded by the World Bank. Both
public and private training schools bid for training contracts from the
local labor offices to retrain the unemployed. 
In a statistical analysis that controls for observed differences
between unemployed workers participating in retraining and unem-
ployed workers not participating, O’Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar
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(1998) find that individual retraining produced an increase of 11 per-
centage points in the likelihood of finding unsubsidized work or self-
employment, and an increase of 9 percentage points in those still in a
job at their survey date. Similar to many other studies, these authors
found no impact on average monthly earnings. Reemployment was
higher for those bearing some of the direct costs of retraining. Group
retraining produced similar, if a bit smaller, increases in reemployment
and no effect on earnings.
At the beginning of the transition from a centrally planned to a
market-based economy, enterprises provided the bulk of the training
for workers. In the years since, enterprise training has collapsed as
firms have gone bankrupt. RTCs and government-run vocational train-
ing institutes are attempting to pick up where enterprise training has
fallen off. In addition, these government training institutes and RTCs
are facing competition from an increasing number of private training
institutes (UNEVCO 1998). Although this higher level of activity may
eventually produce improved training opportunities, there is currently
little if any official accreditation of these private institutes or certifica-
tion of training results. This clouds the environment for assessing the
impact of training. 
For Hungary, ALMPs are likely to remain an imperative, given
conditions of employment instability. Assessments yield mixed and
modest results, outcomes that are well in line with the experience of
other countries. 
Canada
In Canada, the federal government is responsible for the state of
the economy and the provincial governments have responsibility for
education. Because training relates to both concerns, it falls under both
federal and provincial responsibility. As in the United States, program
initiatives undergo fairly frequent repackaging and reform (see Gun-
derson and Riddell 2001). A major reform was undertaken in 1996,
when the federal government replaced Unemployment Insurance (UI)
with Employment Insurance (EI), in the Employment Insurance Act.
The revamped EI program reflects an emphasis on reemployment ben-
efits and support measures targeted at unemployed workers available
and able to work but unable to find a job. Also in 1996, the federal gov-
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ernment began offering provinces and territories an opportunity to
design and deliver EI-funded active employment measures.
Relative to other countries in our sample, passive labor market pol-
icies are used more extensively in Canada. Principally, this feature is
due to Canada’s comprehensive and generous EI (formerly UI) bene-
fits. Within active measures, Canada has the highest ratio of spending
for employment services of the countries in our sample (40 percent of
active spending is on employment services). A number of support mea-
sures, including job search assistance, a labor exchange network, and
an automated labor market information system, are provided by the
National Employment Service. Spending on training is an even larger
share of active measures, at 34 percent in 2000. 
For the 30 years prior to the 1996 reforms, the Government of Can-
ada ran a series of training programs to improve the reemployment
prospects of adult workers. Classroom training from community col-
leges and other training institutions was available, and on-the-job train-
ing from private employers. Labor market assistance to various target
groups was coordinated through the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS).
These groups include the long-term unemployed (through a program
called Job Development); reentry women (Job Entry); training in des-
ignated areas of current or anticipated occupational skill shortages
(Skill Shortages); and UI claimants in training who remained eligible
for UI without a search requirement paying the cost of training (Fee-
payer). CJS programs were available to employed workers as well as
unemployed. Park, Power, Riddell, and Wong (1996) reported esti-
mated impact on earnings for the Skill Shortages, Feepayer, and Job
Entry programs that are large in size and highly statistically significant.
The estimated impact of Job Development is insignificantly different
from zero.
The revamping of the EI system set two explicit goals: getting peo-
ple back to work, and producing savings to the EI account. To further
these goals, there are four main areas of Active Employment Benefits:
1) targeted wage subsidies; 2) self-employment assistance; 3) job cre-
ation partnerships; and 4) skills development, which includes training.
The Skills Development program provides financial assistance to help
unemployed EI claimants (or recent EI exhaustees) pay for the costs of
skills training and related expenses while they are enrolled in an
approved training program. The level of financial support provided is
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based on need, and participants are normally required to pay a share of
the cost. Skills Development participants currently on an EI claim may
continue to receive their regular EI benefits until the end of the benefit
period. The usual skills training duration is up to 52 weeks, with the
potential for an extended period up to three years.
Although there is scant evaluation evidence regarding these recent
reforms, we note that the direction of reform is consistent with earlier
evaluation studies for Canada. As noted by Gunderson and Riddell
(2001), there has been a reorientation away from basic and classroom
training toward training in the private sector combined with work
experience. Through the federal–provincial agreements that devolve
responsibility to the provinces (Labour Market Development Agree-
ments), there is more employer involvement in the delivery of training.
United States
Our discussion of U.S. federal job training programs will be brief
here, as other chapters in this volume (see Chapters 1 and 3) offer more
detailed perspectives. Our aim is to facilitate our own cross-country
comparisons and to provide a background for the lessons we distill in
the concluding section.
As summarized by Krueger and Rouse (2002), each decade since
the 1960s has seen a major reform in federal job training programs.
Unemployed and underemployed workers were the target of training
initiatives introduced in the Manpower Development and Training Act
(MDTA) in 1962, with particular focus on low-income and welfare
recipients. The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA)
was introduced by the Nixon Administration in 1973, and it continued
to focus on unemployed and underemployed adult workers, with pro-
grams for disadvantaged youths. Decentralization, visible through a
transfer of decision-making authority from the federal level to states
and localities, emerged as a theme in CETA. State and local govern-
ment gained responsibility for designing, implementing, and evaluat-
ing programs. CETA evaluations produced the first findings of no
measurable program impacts for men and modest yet positive, signifi-
cant impacts for women. The evaluations also found that on-the-job
training was more effective than classroom training. 
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Program decentralization continued as a major theme in the 1983
replacement of CETA with the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA).
The steep recession of the early 1980s prompted the addition of dis-
placed worker programs. The Private Industry Councils established
under CETA were strengthened on the private employer side to limit
training content to skills in demand by private employers. Public ser-
vice employment, in place in MDTA and CETA, vanished. A distinc-
tive component of JTPA was its congressionally mandated national
evaluation. As the 1990s drew to a close, there were numerous employ-
ment and training programs funded by the federal government (see
Chapter 1 for a summary). In 1999, the final year of JTPA authoriza-
tion, the Department of Labor had $5.3 billion in budgetary authority
for its job training programs. Just under 70 percent of that spending
went to three programs: JTPA Dislocated Workers, Job Corps, and
JTPA Adult Training Grants (see Krueger and Rouse 2002, Table
10.6).
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) replaced JTPA in 1998. The
goal of WIA is a comprehensive workforce investment system, where
all workers, disadvantaged or not, can gain access to information about
jobs and life-long skills training, and where employers can find skilled
workers. Two features are central to WIA: 1) one-stop centers where
all employment and training programs can be accessed in one physical
location, and 2) universal access to core employment services, with
more restricted and sequential access to intensive services for workers
who need more help. It is still the case under WIA that job training is
targeted at economically disadvantaged and dislocated workers. In fis-
cal year 2001, $6.4 billion was spent on public job training in the
United States, with 63 percent in a similar set of programs as discussed
above: adult and dislocated workers, TAA and NAFTA-TAA training
(also dislocated workers), and Job Corps (see Table 1.3 in Chapter 1). 
Japan
Japanese labor market policy is tied closely to its overall system of
employment practices in the sense that both are enterprise-based with
importance attached to long-term employment and seniority related
pay. For our focus on training, an essential feature of Japanese employ-
ment is investment by firms in skill development. Table 8.1 shows that
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the Japanese spend very little on labor market measures (more than
Korea and the United States as a share of GDP, but less than all the
other countries). Expenditures on adult training are even lower than
those of the United States. Enterprises, and networks of enterprises, are
responsible for employment and training. With respect to training, the
firm-based model is built up from a strong foundation of skills estab-
lished by the educational system. Skills are not just those of literacy
and technical competency, but also teamwork. With a homogeneous set
of school completers, all with solid basic education, firms focus on
specific training. Workers are rotated through positions so that they
become broadly trained within the enterprise. There are strong social
norms against poaching, and a steep wage-tenure profile keeps turn-
over low.
As Leigh (1995) summarized, several characteristics are essential
parts of the Japanese firm-based training system: homogeneity in basic
skills, willingness to learn and teach others, and functioning as part of a
team. These characteristics lower training costs. Are they transferable
to the United States, where basic academic skills are lower and more
heterogeneous? Leigh, based on Hashimoto (1994), concluded yes,
given the success of Japanese automobile transplant operations.
For Japan, the overarching question is how to restore the macro-
economy to some reasonably robust state of health. There are also con-
cerns about the labor market. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, low
turnover and high levels of specific training were strengths. Labor
immobility helped keep unemployment low. As Japan contends with
the restructuring needed to address global competitive pressures,
increasing labor mobility across firms will be a key issue for the future. 
Korea
Korean active labor market policy should be viewed through the
lens of recent history, societal attitudes toward higher education, and
the government’s reputation for program oversight and cost–benefit
testing. Recent economic history, the still-developing political system,
success in raising basic education levels, and a societal aversion to
nonuniversity higher education degrees all provide a backdrop for the
government’s attempts to impose an extensive system of publicly and
privately financed vocational training and education.
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Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Korea experienced remarkable
growth stopped only by the regional financial crisis in 1997. This
growth period allowed the government to experiment extensively with
a variety of vocational education and training programs funded by lev-
ies on firms. These efforts included an explicit attempt to duplicate the
German dual system of vocational education and training in 1994. 
Korea has been remarkably successful in raising the level of basic
education: in 1970, 75 percent of Korea had only an elementary educa-
tion, and by 1990, only 30 percent of the population had a similar level
of education. Over the same period of time, the number of students in
vocational and academic secondary education jumped from 600,000 to
2 million, and university enrollment increased from 200,000 to 1.6 mil-
lion. The number of vocational trainees rose dramatically. The country
as a whole experienced sizeable increases in labor productivity and
wages.
Vocational education in Korea is administered by the Ministry of
Education and provided by vocational high schools, junior technical
colleges, and open colleges. Education lasts from two to three years
with classes in a major field. The breakdown of theory and practice in
classes is roughly 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively. The training
side of the equation is either administered directly (through the Korea
Manpower Agency [KOMA]), or overseen by the Ministry of Labor.
The actual provision of vocational training is split between privately
financed in-plant institutes, public institutes and government autho-
rized private institutes. 
In attempting to implement its employment and training policy
through vocational education and training programs, the Korean gov-
ernment had to contend with a negative social attitude towards voca-
tional training. University degrees are prized and accorded much
higher status than that accorded to a degree from a vocational school
associated with practical training. There is a recognized preference
among parents for children to go to university rather than participate in
vocational education and training, despite a higher incidence of unem-
ployment for university graduates than for vocational school graduates
(Gill, Fluitman, and Dar 2000). 
The Korean government in the 1980s, responding to political and
societal pressure, increased access to general higher education. As a
result, a shortage developed for production workers. Starting in 1990,
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an attempt was made to address this particular skill shortage by setting
a goal of a 1:1 ratio of vocational to general secondary school enroll-
ment by 1995. By the late 1990s, some additional students had been
induced to enroll in vocational secondary schools; however shortages
remained for skilled production workers in various industries
(KRIVET 1999).
In 1994, to increase the relevance and flexibility of training in a
changing technological environment, and to facilitate communication
between the education and training parts of the system, a “2+1” pro-
gram, patterned after the German dual system, was implemented. The
“2+1” label indicates two years of education followed by one year of
training with a firm. Implementation of the “2+1” system has been left
to the discretion of technical training schools since 1999. The program
has not been successful at generating large numbers of appropriately
skilled workers. While it is difficult to pinpoint the precise reasons (to
date) for the disappointing results, there are some broad outlines. In
Germany, labor and industry enjoy a cooperative relationship—a col-
laboration that increases the chances for designing and implementing
relatively effective training policies. Current and historical Korean
industrial and labor relations cannot be similarly characterized. More
generally, the close cooperation between government, business, and
labor in financing and administering the “dual” system in Germany
does not exist in Korea. In addition, Korea exhibits a distinct societal
preference for nonvocational higher education, whereas the tradition of
vocational training in Germany is well established. The weaknesses of
Korea’s “2+1” system reveal the importance of having a solid infra-
structure foundation of vocational training and social partner coopera-
tion from which to build an apprenticeship program. 
Summary
Table 8.7 summarizes the key features of the country training pro-
grams profiled in this section. All countries maintain an array of active
labor market policies, with the exception of Japan, where the govern-
ment’s role is notably secondary to private firms. All countries face the
need for systems that can respond to the diversity of known and emerg-
ing skill needs. Most countries focus on the unemployed and at-risk (of
unemployment) youth, although many countries are moving to
276Table 8.7 Key Features of Publicly Funded Job Training Programs, by Country
2000 
spending
(% GDP)a Administrative structure Main target groups Issues for the future
Canadab 0.18 Centralized historically, with movement toward decentralization 




Reorientation from basic & 
classroom training toward 
training in private sector 
with work experience.
Germanyc 0.35 Highly centralized and established vocational education and 
training system, with explicit coordination of social partners. 
Firms and federal government share costs.
Youth entering job 
market; unemployed
Making the system more 
flexible & responsive to 
emerging skill needs 
Hungaryd 0.07 Retraining programs within overall context of a centralized 
national coordination of vocational training funding and 
evaluation, with decentralized provision by local governments 
and enterprises. 
General unemployed Addressing transition 
economy problems of high 
unemployment & low labor 
demand with limited public 
budgets
Japand 0.03 Training system is private and enterprise-based. Firms and 
networks of firms provide training within context of long-term 
employment system. Low levels of public funding, within this 
system, for core workers at risk of displacement.
Core workers at risk 
of displacement
Revamping the delivery of 
training as long-term 
employment continues to 
decline in influence.
Koread 0.09 Centralized with national government coordinating funding, 
provision and curricula of formal vocational education. 




Delivering large number of 
skilled workers to growing 
economy
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Swedend 0.31 Large-scale training and retraining system. Single agency with 
local offices. Until early 1990s, standardized training (w/ std. 
teaching methods & materials) in gov. training centers. Recent 




Making the established 
system more flexible & 




0.05 Decentralized, with central funding authority at national level, 
training devolving to localities. Curriculum decided by local 
providers & local councils (business leaders, political leaders, 
labor). Local units receive Whitehall funding, and use 











0.05 Decentralized, with central funding authority at federal level, 
training devolving to states/localities. Curriculum decided by 
local providers & local councils (business leaders, political 
leaders, labor). State/local units receive federal funding, and use 
subcontracts (especially for classroom training) to private 
providers (proprietary schools, community colleges). One-stop 







services for heterogeneous 
groups; obtaining sufficient 
funding
a Labor market training includes support of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training.
b Provisional data.
c Does not include training for employed adults.
d Data do not include youth training.
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improve training access for employed workers. In almost all countries,
the trend in administration is toward decentralization of training provi-
sion. 
The countries in our select sample represent a variety of training
systems, in a diverse set of political systems. There are some common-
alities in motivations, goals, and principles. The common motivations
are to supply adequate numbers of skilled workers to insure global
competitiveness while providing programs to lower unemployment.
More advanced industrialized countries share a common goal of
addressing the needs of economically disadvantaged workers. We see
the following common principles:
1) Build flexibility into any training system to allow for rapid curric-
ula changes in response to market signals.
2) Be able to adequately evaluate and certify any occupation or sub-
occupation training program on a countrywide basis to maintain
training standards and to encourage mobility.
3) Maintain close links at the local level between workers, training
providers, and firms to assure the supply of skilled workers
appropriate to the demands of local business.
4) Provide for the specific training needs of different worker groups
in society (i.e., unemployed adults, low-skilled adults, youth and
the disabled). Targeted groups are heterogeneous, making it
unlikely that a “one size fits all” approach will be effective in
improving worker welfare and in yielding positive cost–benefit
analyses.
5) Maintain a high level of consensus between government, busi-
ness, and labor and be clear about the responsibilities of each
group. 
6) Fund at a level that is adequate and sustainable given the current
(nearly global) constraints on government activity.
One challenge presented by those principles is that while a given
subset may be followed, it is very difficult to adhere to all simulta-
neously. For example, if the training system is designed to be flexible
and react quickly to market signals (principle 1), it may not be possible
to adequately evaluate and/or certify changing curricula (2) and main-
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tain the quick reaction ability. If an effort is made to adequately address
the training needs for all groups in society (4), such a system could be
prohibitively expensive in the long run (6) and may not even work
given the heterogeneity of needs. Maintaining a high level of consen-
sus among major groups (5) implies a great deal of bureaucratic inertia
and makes it difficult to react quickly to changing market conditions
(1). If strong links are maintained at the local level (3), any country-
wide training certification system (2) might not address a given
region’s requirements.
DISPLACED WORKER PROGRAMS
Starting with the 1960s’ fears of automation, displaced worker pro-
grams have been a mainstay of labor market policy within the OECD.
The United States is a particularly strong example of the central role of
displaced worker programs in federal training efforts. Displaced work-
ers, however, have some characteristics different from the other main
target group for publicly funded training, the economically disadvan-
taged. Displaced workers are often older, experienced, and established
workers, whose needs are related to abrupt structural economic change
rather than to lifetime low skill. As Leigh (1992) highlighted, displaced
workers want jobs, not training. For the most part, job search assistance
produces favorable cost–benefit evidence, in large part because it is
low-cost, and for many displaced workers, rusty job search skills are a
real barrier to reemployment. Two key difficulties for training are the
design of effective programs for these (often) experienced workers,
and allocating sufficient funds. Evidence from various JTPA demon-
strations, conducted over the 1980s, reveals mixed evidence on the
benefits of training, with the best training being intensive and skills-
based, not longer term. Yet for some workers, more expensive and
longer-term classroom training yields earnings gains, but only where
training is relatively rigorous at the vocational and academic commu-
nity college level (see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 2001).
For these workers, Leigh (1992) concludes that a training system
needs to separate from the educational system and be permanent and
institutionalized. One key advantage of a separate training system is its
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open-entry/open-exit flexibility, allowing intensive short-term skills-
based courses with employer ties. 
Canada’s Industrial Adjustment Service (IAS) is a federally funded
agency specializing in job development. Its goal is to bring together
local labor and business interests to find job opportunities for displaced
workers. IAS offers assistance to firms in advance of mass layoff, and
helps negotiate an agreement on an adjustment plan. According to
Leigh (1995), the basic thrust of IAS is to place unemployed workers
in jobs that are never publicly announced, but rather filled by word-of-
mouth. The emphasis is on prompt local placement rather than retrain-
ing, relocation, or counseling. Workers who cannot be placed are
referred to the CEC system for relocation or retraining assistance.
An essential characteristic of this IAS assistance is its local compo-
nent. People with experience in local business, from either a labor or
management perspective, are involved in making the placements. “. . .
[T]he basic philosophy of the IAS [is] that displaced workers are to be
assisted individually by persons who know them personally” Leigh
(1995, p. 151).
For Swedish displaced workers, a key aspect of the AMU training
system is its open admission and individualized study plans. The cur-
riculum is organized in a modular system, providing flexibility in
scheduling. Trainees receive a diploma upon completion that conveys
clear information about curriculum and skills. Training centers are
organized to mimic work environments rather than schools.
For Germany, the focus is on avoiding layoffs (with the exception
of restructuring in the former East Germany, where the main policy
response was unemployment insurance after massive layoffs). The
German employment adjustment process is based on codetermination,
or structured decision making, among the social partners. With layoffs
costly (due to collective bargaining agreements and statutory employ-
ment protection) firms face incentives to use other options. Two impor-
tant options are UI compensation for reduced work hours and early
retirement. Evans-Klock et al. (1998) notes that redeployment within
the enterprise is possibly facilitated by the broad-based job skill train-
ing that is a result of the apprenticeship system. If layoffs are used, the
General Dismissal Protection Act requires a selection of workers for
layoff to be socially justified, based on criteria such as age and income. 
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The Japanese have a two-tier system. For core, or permanent,
employees (approximately one-quarter to one-half of the workforce),
the Japanese response is based in the enterprise or in networks of enter-
prises. The state pays part of retraining and relocation costs when firms
take these steps to avoid layoffs. More generally, there is public fund-
ing for enterprise-based training that targets workers at risk of displace-
ment. Japanese firms retain flexibility in employment levels through
the hiring and layoffs of temporary, or contingent, employees. For
these workers, there is little or no employment security. With no secure
link to an enterprise, there is little access to training when laid off.
CONCLUSION
Looking across our selective sample, we find striking the evidence
in favor of a “virtuous” cycle between basic education, literacy, skill,
and training. A strong foundation in basic education, especially liter-
acy, is associated with greater access to training, not only through
improved access to employment, but also through occupations with
greater training content.
This link has three implications. The first is that training, in the
main, belongs in the private sector, where it is closely tied to basic
skill. The second implication of the schooling–training association is
that strengthening schooling is an indirect, if slow, method for
strengthening training. The third implication follows from the first two:
whereas individuals in the “virtuous cycle” are well served by the cur-
rent system, there is a “vicious” cycle for the individuals who are not
well-served by the educational system. That “vicious” cycle consists of
skill deficits, continued underinvestment in skills, low earnings, and
declining employment (see Betcherman, McMullen, and Davidman
1998). Workers who face this cycle present heterogeneous needs. The
literacy, education, and training needs of out-of-school youth are very
different from the needs of established workers who lose their footing
in employment (the displaced). Another group faces the complications
of work and family (single parents, usually mothers). For these individ-
uals and other workers tenuously connected to the labor market, pub-
licly funded training offers a crucial second chance to recover from
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“falling through the cracks” of the private training system. The failure
of the basic educational system followed by employer-provided train-
ing to provide skills to these workers stands as a “market failure” justi-
fication for publicly funded training.
Our view is that increased awareness of how ALMP/training pro-
grams work in other countries can improve (or at least inform) the way
the United States addresses the issue of publicly funded training. Some
of the lessons put forth in Haveman and Saks (1985) bear repeating.
They emphasize the comprehensive and stable institutional structure
for (most) Western European employment and training systems. This
structure includes 1) a single primary agency established by the
national government but often independent, 2) a network of local
offices emphasizing outreach to employers and employees, 3) partici-
pation in policy development and implementation by employers groups
and trade unions, and 4) expenditures for the development of a profes-
sional staff of placement, counseling, and training personnel. 
More recently, Martin and Grubb (2001) offer four features crucial
to the design of effective public training programs: 1) targeting on par-
ticipants, 2) relatively small scale programs, 3) programs should pro-
duce a qualification or certificate that is recognized by the market, and
4) a strong on-the-job component to establish links to employers.
These features are on exhibit in the programs of a number of countries.
It seems clear that successful programs involve the private sector,
particularly from the perspective of offering a curriculum of relevant
classes teaching marketable skills. Integration is key. Skills training
needs to be integrated with jobs, remedial skill training integrated with
occupational skill training, private sector demands integrated with pub-
lic sponsorship, and employee supply with employer demand. With an
integrated approach, training can be tailored to the needs of local
employers. To do this, the training system needs up-to-date, compre-
hensive labor market information. 
It is commonplace for literature in this area to conclude by noting
that evaluations find programs to have modest or mixed results at best.
Even modest gains can make the economically disadvantaged less poor
and raise, albeit modestly, the employment prospects of the unem-
ployed. Expecting otherwise may be unrealistic, given traditional U.S.
politics and programs. In his review of government-sponsored training
programs and their evaluations, LaLonde (1995) writes, “The best
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summary of the evidence about the impact of past programs is that we
got what we paid for. Public sector investments in training are exceed-
ingly modest compared to the magnitude of the skill deficiencies that
policymakers are trying to address. Not surprisingly, modest invest-
ments usually yield modest gains . . .” (p. 149). 
Notes
We appreciate the comments and suggestions of Gerard Pfann and Christopher
O’Leary. Financial support was provided by the Social Sciences Division and Aca-
demic Senate Committee on Research, University of California, Santa Cruz. 
1. Workers increasingly need problem-solving skills and skills that cross jobs as
teamwork and quality control replace simpler and more hierachical production
processes. See Lynch (1994) for a discussion.
2. The OECD countries promoted that goal in 1994 in the OECD Jobs Strategy,
when they agreed to move labor market policy toward active programs (see
OECD 1994). That goal has not been uniformly met within the OECD.
3. The reauthorization of Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), contained in the
Trade Act of 2002, included a program of refundable tax credits, payable in
advance, to cover 65 percent of the cost of health insurance for TAA eligible
workers.
4. This observation is related to the received wisdom that countries with greater
spending on active labor market policies tend to have lower unemployment (see
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991 and Forslund and Krueger 1994).
5. See OECD (2000). Although the IALS offers a wealth of information on literacy
skills and training, information is not currently available for Korea and Japan.
6. The distinction between all education and training and job-related training is not
available for Sweden in the IALS.
7. Unfortunately, the information reported in Table 4 is available only for a limited
subset of our sample.
8. For more on this point, see OECD (2000).
9. The existence of established ongoing programs, with substitutes, may be a con-
cern for European training programs. In this situation, the risk of program disrup-
tion is higher, complicating the interpretation of the program effect. See
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
10. Interested readers are directed to the detailed discussion of the evaluation of
active labor market programs in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
11. New Techniques for the Evaluation of European Labour Market Policies is a
research project bringing together eight research institutions from seven European
Union countries. The Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) is coordinat-
ing the study. For information, visit http://www.cepr.org/research/Networks/
LERTN/Summary.htm.
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12. Given the overall institutional background of U.S. training, its evaluation context
has limitations for inference to other countries. There are questions of external
validity, or the extent to which estimated program effects can be generalized to
different locations. Social attitudes, government institutions, the business cycle,
and skill demands all differ across countries. In addition, many U.S. evaluations
are of small demonstration or pilot programs. Scaling these programs up to more
universal participation could influence community perceptions and/or combine
with institutions and other forms of social interaction in ways that influence pro-
gram success (see Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins 2000).
13. An important follow-up question to a finding of employment gains is the nature of
employment displacement for nonparticipants. See Davidson and Woodbury
(1993) for an insightful discussion.
14. A central point in Kluve and Schmidt (2002) is that Europe needs to catch up to
the U.S. “evaluation culture.”
15. The comparable figures for the United States in 1990 was 19 percent.
16. See Forslund and Krueger (1994, Figure 3). They report a weighted average per-
centage wage effect of –0.8 that is not statistically significantly different from
zero.
17. See Soskice (1994) for an analysis of the incentives faced by the various actors in
the German system, and for citations to the larger research literature on the Ger-
man system.
18. Firm-based training is much less common for workers over age 24 in Germany
(see Lynch 1994).
19. In practice, employers do not have much input in how vocational education is
structured and what classes are offered.
20. This issue has an interesting parallel in the United Kingdom, where a system of
“unit certification” is being implemented to bring coherence to a decentralized
flexible training system (Reuling 2000).
21. Prior to 1988, much training of adult workers was the responsibility of industry
employers, through a system of industry-specific Industrial Training Boards.
22. The Learning and Skill Council is part of a reorganized Department for Education
and Skills.
23. In July 2002, an Advanced Modern Apprenticeship program with Swan Hunter, a
Tyneside shipbuilder, was extended to workers in their thirties.
24. See O’Leary, Kolodziejczyk, and Lazar (1998) for evidence of creaming in
retraining programs in Hungary.
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Federal job training policy in the United States has been a case of
learning by doing. New and proposed policy represents a synthesis of
lessons learned from previous programs. The United States is currently
operating under the fourth major federal administrative structure since
the 1960s. It can be argued that despite the inevitable political wran-
gling over employment policy, each incarnation has brought improve-
ments born from lessons of previous arrangements.
Although the Great Depression witnessed some public works pro-
grams, including on-the-job training, focused and federally funded job
skill training policy did not begin in the United States until 1962, with
the passage of the Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA). Ini-
tially, training authorized under MDTA was viewed as motivated by an
antipoverty agenda. MDTA’s structure called for the federal govern-
ment to administer the program directly to local service providers serv-
ing specific target groups. MDTA expired in 1969, largely due to the
federally oriented administrative structure, which circumvented state
and local authority—an arrangement deemed politically unacceptable. 
While most workforce development programs have evolved, incor-
porating lessons learned from previous initiatives, the Job Corps pro-
gram, designed to offer disadvantaged youth a one-year residential
workforce development program, has continued virtually unchanged
since it was established by the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964.
Today, the Job Corps program continues to operate within its original
structure, serving an estimated 60,000 youth per year, with an annual
budget of approximately $1 billion. Job Corps provides remedial aca-
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demic instruction, job training, and other supportive services, in an
environment that encourages participation and successful program
completion. Relative to other similar programs for youth, Job Corps
participants achieve significant earnings gains. 
Following MDTA, the next major workforce development program
was the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) of
1973. CETA introduced the private industry council (PIC) as a local
advisory board. CETA job training was targeted toward the economi-
cally disadvantaged, welfare recipients, and disadvantaged youth.
Evaluations of programs authorized by CETA found no measurable
employment or earnings impacts for men; conversely, impacts for
women were positive and significant. CETA evaluations also found on-
the-job training usually to be more effective than classroom training in
terms of job placement and cost per placement. CETA also included
the last federal public service employment (PSE) program. The
improper enrollment and spending practices documented for PSE
under CETA spelled the end for the program. 
CETA was succeeded by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)
of 1982. The new workforce development agenda under JTPA limited
training choices to skills in demand by local employers. The program
was performance-driven through a system of standards for participant
reemployment rates and earnings. The JTPA-targeted population for
job training included dislocated workers and economically disadvan-
taged welfare recipients. JTPA training had positive net benefits for
both men and women. The net benefit to society for both genders was
just over $500 per participant. 
The experience of the past 40 years has taught us that women often
benefit from job training, while men sometimes benefit. The most
effective job training programs for youth have been costly and of long
duration. 
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 devolved authority
from the federal government to the states, and increased customer
choice in selecting job training. It increased the private sector presence
on local workforce investment boards, institutionalized one-stop cen-
ters, revised performance monitoring practices, and emphasized job
placement services over skill training. The most pioneering addition to
workforce development service delivery adopted under WIA is the
introduction of training vouchers as Individual Training Accounts
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(ITAs). A review of vouchers and ITAs is provided in this summary
chapter. Under WIA, requirements for performance measurement and
reporting were greatly simplified. Additionally, WIA required estab-
lishment of Eligible Training Provider (ETP) lists, and thereby the idea
of accountability and competition among training providers. These sys-
temic service delivery changes authorized under WIA represent a new
approach to workforce development service delivery. However, WIA
was given modest funding compared to previous federal employment
and training programs. 
In the next two sections of this final chapter, we briefly review the
two sides of the market for job training under WIA: the choice environ-
ment for job training participants, and the regulatory environment gov-
erning job training providers. The fourth section offers speculation on
the shape of future federal workforce development policy. A final sec-
tion provides a summary and concluding remarks. 
CHOICE OF JOB TRAINING UNDER WIA
Vouchers are WIA’s key structural innovation. A voucher is a “sub-
sidy that grants limited purchasing power to an individual to choose
among a restricted set of goods and services” (Steuerle 2000, p. 4).
Vouchers are one of many ways that the government can provide ser-
vices. Alternative delivery mechanisms include direct government
delivery, contracting out government services, and use of competitive
public suppliers, providing loans or cash payment (Steuerle 2000, pp.
12–17).
Vouchers are viewed as a mechanism for making government more
effective and efficient by making use of the market mechanism. Vouch-
ers introduce multitraining provider competition in contrast to the
usual way government services are provided. They have been found to
be useful in a wide variety of contexts (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).
Under MDTA, CETA, and JTPA, classroom training was mostly
provided as slots in classes through contracts with training providers.
Since the private sector has been providing training with government
funding, privatization per se was not a major aim of WIA. Instead,
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vouchers were introduced to increase customer choice, with the hope
that it would lead to better employment outcomes. 
To introduce job training vouchers under WIA, a variety of practi-
cal implementation issues had to be resolved. As documented in Chap-
ters 4 through 6 of this book, identifying the best institutional
arrangements for job training vouchers under WIA involved a review
of vouchers in other contexts, local demonstrations of voucher meth-
ods, and a random trial evaluation of alternative voucher designs.
Voucher Designs
To use vouchers wisely when shopping for training services, pro-
spective training participants must have enough information to make
an educated choice among alternatives. In particular, a voucher recipi-
ent must be able to appraise the quality and effectiveness of prospec-
tive training providers, while at the same time know whether the
training will match their own skills and abilities (Barnow 2000, p.
227). To help improve the choice environment, WIA Eligible Training
Providers (ETP) are required to be preapproved by the local workforce
development board. Part of the approval process requires posting on
the Internet descriptions of available training and employment success
information for recent participants.
In competitive job training markets, a “free choice” model is
viewed as theoretically ideal. It permits unrestricted expression of cus-
tomer preferences. However, in practical terms it may be wanting. This
model presumes that customers free to express their will could make
choices superior to those possible in consultation with training counse-
lors. A critical assumption is that consumers have accurate and ade-
quate information both about which occupations they are suited for and
which training providers are best. Customers would need to know
which occupations were in demand, and what wages they could expect
when they completed training. Knowledge about which occupations
offered the best long-term career paths would also be useful. For the
free choice model to be superior, customers would need to make
informed and wise decisions.
When configuring vouchers, individuals receiving public training
could be given more or less freedom to choose services compared to
the unlimited flexibility presented by the free choice model. Frontline
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staff in one-stop centers could provide more or less information and
guidance about how to use vouchers. Three models for providing pub-
lic training vouchers emerged following the continuum of the degree of
freedom, information, and guidance (Barnow and Trutko 1999; Perez-
Johnson and Decker 2001; D’Amico et al. 2002).
Informed choice represents the middle ground of the voucher struc-
ture spectrum. It is the closest to the intent of WIA legislation and is
the model most widely adopted by local workforce development
boards due to its low risk nature. This model has four main characteris-
tics. First, assessment and counseling specialists check if available
training is appropriate given customer skills and aptitudes. The special-
ists then check local labor market information (LMI) to ensure ade-
quate occupational demand. Next, training vendors are screened for
value by success of participants and training cost. Then there is joint
decision making between the counselor and the participant, with the
frontline staff acting as a guide or information broker. Finally, the
voucher offer is limited in its cash value and time availability, with a
definite expiration date set. 
Free choice is one extreme of the voucher spectrum and gives the
individual training recipient the most flexibility and responsibility.
Indeed, the role of frontline staff is usually restricted and limited in this
model. Customers judged to require training are offered vouchers, and
they can make use of them with no further guidance from staff.
Voucher recipients are able to make use of LMI, ETP performance
information, and self-assessment tools available at the One-Stop
Career Center. They can use the voucher for training for any occupa-
tion that is not restricted by law, and they can use the voucher to pur-
chase training from any provider on the ETP list.
Directed choice is somewhat similar to informed choice and falls
at the opposite end of the scale compared to the free choice model.
Assessment, LMI, and ETP information are provided, but frontline
workers play a stronger role. Rather than simply providing guidance,
frontline staff use their professional judgment about what program and
training provider to select. Staff use their knowledge about training
programs, training providers, occupational demand and wages, the
skills and aptitudes of customers, and the prospect of successful train-
ing completion. The model can be used to guide customers to more
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cost-effective training choices or to restrict choices that are less likely
to be cost effective. 
Effectiveness of Training Vouchers before WIA 
A review of the prior use of vouchers for public training programs
for disadvantaged and dislocated workers did not yield a success story.
Barnow (2000, p. 234) wrote “there is little evidence that vouchers for
these workers are effective and that they are a better alternative than
other service delivery mechanisms.” The U.S. Department of Labor
(USDOL) reviewed voucher-like programs for low-wage workers
under the Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance Experiments of the
1970s and the evaluation of the Trade Adjustment Assistance program
of the late 1980s, and found neither to have a positive impact. “They
offered non-directive counseling and a wide range of educational
opportunities” (Barnow 2000, p. 236). The inadequate informational
aspects of customer choice were seen as a deficiency. 
Although WIA represents the first federal policy initiating the use
of vouchers, voucher implementation began before WIA’s enactment.
Some individual localities experimented with vouchers on their own.
For example, the Atlanta Regional Commission first used vouchers in
1991 as the means to provide training services to about 13,000 Eastern
Airlines workers when the company went bankrupt. Vouchers were an
expedient forced by the massive size of the dislocation and limitations
on staff available. Atlanta’s experience saw many voucher recipients
making poor training choices, selecting training for occupations with
low wages and poor career development prospects. In response, the
Atlanta Commission began to build its own vendor list and monitor
vendor performance, long before the enactment of WIA (D’Amico et
al. 2002, pp. II-2–3). 
Just before WIA implementation, USDOL performed a formal
evaluation of vouchers under JTPA in nine demonstration sites. Eight
sites had the informed choice voucher design, while the other site used
the free choice model. In all sites, the vouchers were a limited-time
offer (usually two years or less) with a limited dollar value (between
$2,000 and $10,000). Voucher payment by the workforce development
agency was not always contingent upon job placement of the training
participant; however, it was usually contingent upon training comple-
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tion. Eligible training providers were usually prescreened based on past
performance (Barnow 2000).
USDOL began examining the operation of vouchers in the mid
1990s as policy interest grew. Anticipating enactment of ITAs as part
of the new workforce development legislation, USDOL implemented a
Career Management Account (CMA) demonstration. This project was
conducted from 1995 to 1997 in 13 sites (Public Policy Associates
1999). An average of 335 offers was made per site. All vouchers were
targeted to dislocated workers. The average voucher value was $3,292,
with a maximum of $8,500. Participants were permitted free choice in
using their vouchers, but preferred being provided with information by
frontline staff to guide their decisions (D’Amico et al. 2001). 
A number of CMA demonstration sites continued using vouchers
after the demonstration ended in 1995. Metropolitan Portland, Oregon,
initiated an Individual Learning Account (ILA) approach after CMA
under which customers made regular contributions to an account that
can be used to pay for training or education, with contributions matched
by employers and social service agencies. The Baltimore Office of
Employment Development continued the voucher approach after CMA
ended, making case managers into coaches who helped customers make
informed choices and were empowered to make decisions about cus-
tomers with special needs (D’Amico et al. 2002, pp. II-2–II-3). 
Early Evidence from WIA
To gain a better understanding of the new service delivery design
adopted under WIA, and to jump start the use of ITAs and ETPs,
USDOL contracted to have a study of the early implementation of
WIA (D’Amico et al. 2001). Under WIA, ITAs are required for all
types of training except on-the-job and customized training. ITAs are
not required in a limited number of circumstances, such as situations
where there are insufficient numbers of providers or a particular pro-
vider is exemplary for a particular subgroup with multiple barriers to
employment. 
Localities usually set policy for job training delivery, including cri-
teria for training providers to be placed on ETP lists. While most local-
ities do have ETP lists, usually these lists are paper rather than Internet-
based. In some cases, states have created automated ETP lists, such
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that training providers can enter their own initial and subsequent appli-
cations directly into the system. Local WIBs also determine eligibility
and registration procedures and set priorities for selection of ITA recip-
ients. 
Local WIA training funds have usually been a residual budget
item. That is, the amount left after all other WIA services have been
provided. Setting performance levels was not difficult in the first year
(program year 2000) because training providers who were already eli-
gible for Pell grants were not required to submit performance informa-
tion. It was expected that this process would be much more difficult
when training providers have to apply for subsequent eligibility. Con-
ditions for subsequent eligibility were still being developed. 
States have developed fairly similar procedures for establishing
whether an individual was appropriate for training. Individuals deter-
mined eligible developed an employment goal, completed a confirming
assessment, and searched for alternative funding for training programs.
Local sites generally have also set minimum basic education skills
needed before undergoing training.
WIA training delivery arrangements were slow to develop, with
some still incomplete at the end of 2000. Localities have implemented
procedures for administering ITAs. Ongoing case management is prov-
ing difficult, because with ITAs, it is hard to get direct feedback and
reports from training providers. Consequently, local sites are trying to
monitor performance both for themselves and for ITA recipients, by
developing consumer report card systems and by conducting site visits
or hiring independent monitors of training providers.
To accelerate and guide the local implementation of ITAs under
WIA, in March 2000, USDOL selected and funded 13 sites (6 work-
force investment areas and 7 states) for early implementation through
an ITA/ETP Demonstration Project (D’Amico et al. 2002). Twelve of
these demonstration sites mainly used the informed choice model,
though some flexibility was practiced. Only 1 site predominately used
the free choice model. 
The study found that training declined significantly from JTPA
levels during early WIA implementation. The drop in training enroll-
ments probably happened for several reasons. The new WIA obligation
to provide core and intensive employment services and the time lags
associated with satisfying new standards for designating service pro-
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viders as eligible are prime candidates. Given the announced “work
first” emphasis of WIA, cautious local administrators may also have
tried to first assure adequate funding for core and intensive services
before committing funding to training services. The ongoing WIA obli-
gation to provide core and intensive employment services could have
permanently depressed training enrollments; however, training enroll-
ments rose somewhat in program year 2001. Possible causes for this
rebound were rising unemployment and USDOL’s effort to dispel the
original interpretation that WIA was strictly a work-first program. The
characteristics of training participants under WIA remained largely
unchanged from JTPA, with participants being mostly low wage adult
and dislocated workers.
All sites had dollar caps on the ITA amount, varying between
$1,700 and $10,000. Given WIA performance measures, sites had an
interest in having their ITA recipients complete training and find subse-
quent employment. Frontline staff maintained contact with ITA recipi-
ents during their training and tried to help solve problems. Although
the level of staff contact varied, all sites contacted recipients at least
once a month. Among training vendors, proprietary schools were more
proactive in helping trainees complete training and had strong pro-
grams for helping them find jobs after completion. Community col-
leges were less proactive, although they provided counseling and
placement services.
Sites had developed ETP lists and consumer reports systems. The
ETP lists were based on initial eligibility in all states except Texas.
States made it easy for training vendors to appear on the list. Only two
states required vendors to meet performance requirements for initial
eligibility. Most states also tried to automate the ETP lists and the ETP
list application process to make completion of applications easier for
vendors. States expected great difficulty in keeping vendors participat-
ing in WIA training after they implemented their subsequent eligibility
requirements. States had implemented consumer report systems, but
half of them only included WIA vendors on the ETP list.
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TRAINING PROVIDERS UNDER WIA 
Institutional classroom job training under JTPA was provided by a
combination of community colleges, nonprofit, and for-profit training
institutions. Under WIA, new policy has emerged to place increased
emphasis on and encouragement of the key role played by community
colleges.
While continuing to maintain their role in supporting academic stu-
dents planning to transfer to four-year colleges, community colleges in
the 1990s moved strongly into the job training market. This role
expanded along with labor demand during the 1990s, when employers
struggled to fill job openings for skilled workers. Community colleges
increasingly developed alliances with industries to provide customized
training for incumbent workers, and thereby became a principal source
of training for employers. This expanded job training mission of com-
munity colleges in the 1990s was not in response to governmental
funding, but rather a consequence of large increases in formal training
provided for employers in 1980s and the projected continued future
increase (Carnevale and Derochers 1997). 
Nearly all of America’s 1,300 community colleges offer workforce
training and educational courses. They increasingly serve their com-
munities directly and through the workforce development system.1 A
national survey of 10 percent of community colleges and 2,500 busi-
nesses found that 95 percent of businesses that contract out training for
their workers preferred using community colleges. The community
college system is also interested in expanding and improving its capa-
bility to provide workforce education and customized training
(McCabe 1997, pp. 30–32). 
Community colleges are the primary providers of training under
the workforce development system. Coordination between workforce
development agencies and community colleges tends to be close, but
the relationship varies a great deal. In most cases, community colleges
provide much of the training in local areas. Under JTPA, however,
training programs offered by community colleges tended to differ
greatly from training programs offered by other providers. The latter
tend to be shorter in duration and less intensive than the former. Thus,
Public Job Training 299
there was little outright duplication between the two (Grubb 1996, pp.
114–118). 
While community colleges are the most important providers of
workforce development training, this training is a small part of the
business of community colleges. States and local educational institu-
tions frequently provide more of their state workforce development
funds than the workforce development agency. For example, in Texas
in FY 2000, the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board provided
40 percent of all state funds for workforce development, while the
Texas Workforce Commission provided only one-sixth of the state
funds. Similarly, Washington State estimated that community and
vocational technical education contributed 25 percent to workforce
development funding, while the WIA provided only 7 percent (O’Shea
and King 2001).
In recent years there has been close coordination of policy between
the U.S. Departments of Education and Labor to coordinate the 2003
reauthorization of both WIA and the Perkins Act. The goal of this
effort is to accommodate “community colleges as engines for work-
force development in this country [by] examining ways to enhance the
community colleges’ growing role in workforce development [and
reconsidering federal policies that] . . . inadvertently discourage com-
munity college activity in workforce development” (D’Amico 2002, p.
22).
An evaluation of the operations in 13 workforce development areas
found a wide variety of training providers (D’Amico et al. 2002). Com-
munity colleges, available in all sites, offered a wide variety of courses
at low cost, a certificate or a degree, and relatively inflexible time
schedules. Community college courses also tended to be longer and
less suited to the needs of WIA recipients than proprietary schools.
Nontraditional students from the WIA system also found it difficult to
negotiate community colleges because they tend to be so large.
Proprietary schools, by contrast, are more expensive and have
fewer course offerings. They tend to be smaller in size and specialize in
particular areas. They may specialize in serving a particular population
and use particular pedagogical methods to suit that group. However,
proprietary schools tend to be more flexible and are more likely to offer
open entry/open exit programs. They also tend to have shorter, more
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intensive courses that were judged to be more appropriate for WIA par-
ticipants in many cases.
Nonprofit or community-based schools tended to specialize in pro-
viding training to economically disadvantaged workers under JTPA.
Interviews of local board and one-stop center staff indicated concern
that these organizations would not be successful under WIA because
their economic base likely would be eroded with the provision of
greater choice among training providers. Concern was particularly
related to their ability to compete for the broader WIA clientele, and
their financial situation, which may not let them weather the ups and
downs of the flow of trainees.
Choice in using ITAs is limited by the number and variety of train-
ing vendors. This choice is related to the degree of urbanization of a
local area. In 2000, there were numerous job training vendors among
urban sites (number of vendors): Baltimore, Maryland (70 to 80),
Macomb-St. Clair, Michigan (349), and Indianapolis, Indiana (240).
By contrast, the largely rural area of Nebraska had only 100 vendors
statewide. This contrast in range of choice may or may not widen as
vendors move from provisional to regular eligibility status on ETP
lists. In Texas, for example, the only early WIA implementation state
among the 13 studied, the drop-off from provisional to regular ETP
reduced the list of eligible vendors from 8,000 to 1,000. Due to the per-
formance reporting requirements, community colleges were unwilling
to participate in the system and therefore represent a large percentage
of this decline. The number of vendors in Texas, however, returned to
earlier numbers a year later, with aggressive recruitment of vendors
who had initially dropped out of the system. For a more exhaustive
description of the Texas example, refer to Chapter 5 of this book. 
Screening for regular ETP status was expected to primarily affect
community colleges that are concerned about the high cost of collect-
ing reporting performance data. Those colleges view ITAs under WIA
as a small share of their student body. They were also concerned that
their open enrollment policies would hinder their performance reports.
Proprietary schools, being smaller and more selective in their admis-
sions, did not share these concerns.
ITAs did not have a significant effect on the prices of training,
despite the increase in competition under WIA. Prices remained some-
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what lower among community colleges and higher for training by pro-
prietary schools.
JOB TRAINING IN FUTURE WORKFORCE 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEMS
Previous federal workforce programs targeted particular groups
facing serious barriers to employment: unskilled and economically dis-
advantaged adults and youth. The WIA of 1998 reflects a change in
emphasis toward universal access. Specifically, the purpose of WIA is
to provide for workforce investment activities designed to increase the
employment, retention, earnings, and occupational skill attainment of
all job seekers, regardless of their background characteristics. Con-
gress envisioned state and local workforce investment systems seeking
to improve the quality of the workforce, reduce welfare dependency,
and enhance the productivity and competitiveness of the nation. This
expanded role, however, was not matched with increased funding for
workforce development programs authorized under WIA. 
The more than 30 years of searching for ways to reduce poverty
through employment policy has evolved into an approach that shifts
responsibility from the government to the individual and transfers
authority from the federal government to the states. 
States’ initial interpretation of WIA was a work-first approach,
with an emphasis on achieving employment. In this framework, jobs
were viewed as the best training. If a job is not available, then training
was mostly customized to serve employer needs, provide on-the-job
training, and offer short-term training in core skills. The latter was
selected by participants using vouchers with significant frontline staff
guidance. 
USDOL subsequently moved away from the work-first philosophy.
Learning from the gaps in the work-first approach, current WIA
administrators recognize that there is insufficient funding to address
the myriad of workforce development needs. Consequently, policy is
designed to leverage resources at the local level and induce coopera-
tion among programs in One-Stop Career Centers. The concept of a
physical one-stop center for career development services located in
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each major labor market is evolving. Coordinating multiple funding
streams and administrative reporting lines are remaining hurdles to
clear. 
For example, there is no requirement that providers of Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) services be housed in one-stop
centers, but the emphasis of TANF is on independence through work
and the funding has been more substantial than WIA. A future of
autonomous programs is not optimal but is likely to persist at least over
the short term. The political environment of labor market policy in
which strategic decisions cannot be made independent of centralized
planning has persisted over 30 years and will change only gradually.
On the other hand, at the customer level, there has been a significant
evolution from classroom training based primarily on institutional
arrangements towards individual vouchers approved for job skill train-
ing in occupations with local employer demand. 
Job matching that once required the intervention of a placement
specialist is now often provided through self-help employment centers
or Internet-connected state and national job banks accessible from any
computer. Such technology supports the devolution of responsibility
from federal to state and local levels. Furthermore, it helps to accom-
modate the funding limitations, need for continuous training for most
jobs, and the dynamics of today’s labor market. 
Career planning once involved simply finding a well-paying job.
However, the days have passed when high school graduation was
quickly followed by stable and high-paid employment until retirement
at a local manufacturing plant. Young people today can expect many
job changes during a lifetime career process of choosing and experi-
encing different occupations. Earlier days saw job training emphasize
manufacturing occupations such as welding or assembly. Today, train-
ing is dominated by service occupations in health care, food service,
retail, and customer service. 
In the 1960s, training was provided in either classrooms or on-the-
job settings. Now, training often uses computer-based instructional
modules that permit individually customized programs addressing
either the soft or hard skills needed for jobs available locally. 
To address skill deficiencies, federal workforce policy previously
focused on unskilled and low-skilled workers. In recent years, this has
evolved into a focus on the low and medium skilled. This part of the
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workforce development strategy gives equal weight to the needs of pri-
vate sector employers. WIA also reflects this shift in emphasis by
requiring that a majority of seats on workforce development boards be
held by private sector employer representatives. 
Historically, federal job training funds were allocated to programs
serving specific categories of customers. Now, federal funds are used
to leverage state and local funds so as to ensure universal access to all
job seekers. The federal role has changed from one of centralized con-
trol to that of a technical advisor and guidance provider/performance
overseer. 
Some would assert that the federal government has general respon-
sibility to promote national workforce development and a particular
responsibility to help those most in need. However, federal legislation
has continuously moved away from the strong federal involvement in
local affairs exercised under MDTA in the 1960s. Federal policy has
shifted to one which solicits active participation from local employers
to help eradicate poverty through independence. This change reflects a
federal view that local employers’ best know their own training needs
and government resources are most effective as a supplement to private
human resource investments. 
What follows WIA, namely WIA reauthorization, will be influ-
enced greatly by the state of the economy. There is value to the general
marketplace for services offered by one-stop centers; however, a
renewed sense of mission to assist the most vulnerable members of our
communities, such as at-risk youth and individuals with disabilities, is
necessary. We should build upon the past to address the current issues
that we face. Some of the lessons learned include recognizing the value
in programs targeted toward individuals with special needs. For exam-
ple, job placement assistance for some individuals with disabilities and
“crisis” counseling for individuals faced with the emotions of a job loss
can not be satisfied in a one-size-fits-all environment.
A career education system that serves all age groups needs to be
incorporated into our educational system. Elements that have proven
successful, such as mentoring, job shadowing, and teachers who take a
personal interest in the future success of their students, must be empha-
sized. A prerequisite is the ability to identify potential problems early
and ensure adequate resources for appropriate long-term training and
employment assistance services. 
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The future is likely to witness a gradual phasing-in of some com-
ponents and a refinement of others. If school systems are modified in a
way that ensures no child falls behind, it should involve promoting
“healthy behaviors” and commitment to community values for all stu-
dents. This will also mean that both technical and workplace behavior
skills are developed simultaneously, and that there is an alignment of
career aspirations and educational outcomes with economic opportuni-
ties. The workforce system will need to be tied closely with formal
education—kindergarten through twelfth grade and beyond. The rec-
ognition of symbiotic relationships between education, economic
development, government, and the private sector are critical; in other
words, good labor market information, good counseling, and a true
“community” commitment. 
The days of credentials and Internet-based training are just begin-
ning. If all sectors are to be involved, then a common language of stan-
dards needs to be agreed upon. There is a need for a strong federal
presence in attaining the elusive goal of common definitions, reporting,
and outcome measurements. It would be a major accomplishment to
have simplicity and clarity in measurements and accountability. Tech-
nical assistance provided at the federal level could further benefit the
local program operator by facilitating the integration of performance
measurement and results-based management.
“Training” as a share of total employment and training expenditure
was never as prominent, as the titles of MDTA, CETA, and JTPA
implied. Large proportions of appropriations were spent on eligibility
determination, counseling and assessment, supportive services, man-
agement information systems (MIS), administration and reporting,
work experience, and, in the days of CETA, public service employ-
ment. In fact, it could be argued that even some of the programs classi-
fied as training really do not meet such criteria. For example, rather
than providing structured training, on-the-job-training often acts more
as an inducement for employers to hire the unemployed.
Soft skills training, such as self-esteem building, grooming, and
interview techniques is often an essential part of a participant’s
“employability plan,” but these types of programs are often not viewed
as skills training. Human capital development needs to focus on a con-
tinuum ranging from the unskilled to the professionals. Employers of
entry-level employees expect the soft skills to be present and assume
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they are included in any basic training program. Employers should also
know that even their highly skilled employees in technical and profes-
sional occupations require periodic training to maintain a competitive
edge.
It is important to recognize the emerging new classifications of
jobs, as well as the changes in necessary skills required at traditional
jobs, as we look at training for jobs in technology, bio-genetics, robot-
ics, alternative energy sources, virtual assistance, and precision farm-
ing. It is predicted that 60 percent of the new jobs will require skills
possessed by only 20 percent of the young people entering the labor
market unless there are changes in the way our education and training
systems operate in the future. The system should be driven by good
information about the job skills in demand, and it should involve flexi-
ble training methods that can accommodate worker career cycles.
Refinement of LMI, which provides individuals knowledge about
the requisite skills for jobs, is critical. The dynamic nature of labor
markets means that the need for LMI does not end with early exposure,
but continues throughout the working life. Labor shortages should
drive training, as well as vocational and technical education. Our sys-
tems will need to be agile and responsive to changes in skill shortages,
skill surpluses, demographic changes, local economic conditions, and
globalization. LMI will need to be timely, effective, and user-friendly. 
Jobs requiring specialized skills training will increase dramatically
over next decade. The standardization of credentials, particularly at the
local level and supported by local businesses, will be important. Where
skills based credentials have become a reality, it is the result of
employers demanding it. Colleges offer a form of credentials, but the
percentage of jobs requiring a college degree will remain relatively
constant. It is the technical, vocational, and soft skills areas where stan-
dardization and criteria need to develop more fully.
The federal role in employment and training needs to evolve into
one of providing information on “best practices,” supporting pilot pro-
grams, and working toward standardizing the definitions and reporting
systems for both finance and management of federal and state funded
programs. Ideally, at the federal level, a simplified process would be
developed and a clearing house of information would be constructed. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
• Individual Training Accounts (ITAs): Experience to date with
ITAs has largely been restricted to informed choice models. Little
has been learned about how alternative approaches might work.
The ITA Experiment will shed light on how free choice and
directed choice models compare.
• Eligible Training Provider lists (ETPs): States have created
mostly paper ETP lists that include large numbers of training pro-
viders with initial eligibility. Much work still needs to be done to
automate the lists. States have resisted the next step of determin-
ing subsequent eligibility based on performance, fearing a sharp
reduction in eligible providers as was experienced in the state of
Texas.
• USDOL training programs are a small part of workforce develop-
ment training in the United States. WIA ITA requirements relat-
ing to the ETP lists and WIA consumer reports need to be
rethought, given the limited leverage WIA training programs
have with training providers. USDOL probably can not success-
fully require the collection of data that is not required by other
agencies that fund education and training programs.
• ITA recipients will have imperfect information when they make
training choices, regardless of what happens to WIA consumer
reports. Federal, state, and local policy makers should decide
what the proper model for ITA choice is along the continuum
from free choice to directed choice. 
• Community colleges are the primary source of training under
WIA. They are well suited to provide a wide variety of more
intensive training courses to WIA participants. Community col-
leges have been resistant to collecting the data needed to create
the WIA consumer reports, both because of their fear of the
results and because of the cost and effort to collect this data. The
majority of community college students prepare for matriculation
to colleges and universities, while WIA performance measures
emphasize job placement, employment, and earnings. The perfor-
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mance measurement methodology should be modified to recog-
nize the dual role of community colleges.
• Nonprofit and community-based training providers focus on serv-
ing the disadvantaged. They also tend to be small and have lim-
ited financing. These agencies fear that they will not be able to
compete with other training providers after the introduction of
ITAs.
• For-profit training providers seem to have entered the WIA train-
ing market in large numbers. They seem to have the easiest time
collecting WIA consumer report data and reaching the WIA out-
come results. 
Following the history of learning from previous policies and
administrative workforce development structures, future workforce
development service delivery faces challenges stemming from WIA.
Future policy must confront the coordination of multiple funding
streams. Policy will also have to renew the priority of one-stop centers
to serve the most vulnerable populations. Furthermore, new policy
must promote the integration of educational and workforce develop-
ment systems. To facilitate this, a common language and set of defini-
tions must be developed. For the evolution of existing workforce
development policy to occur, new legislation must recognize the
emerging new classifications of jobs as well as corresponding required
job skills. As the complexity of employer skill requirements continues
to increase, the publicly funded workforce development system must
keep pace if it is to remain relevant in the 21st century.
Notes
This chapter reflects the opinions of the authors and does not reflect the policy or posi-
tions of either the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research or the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor.
1. The continuing education program of Montgomery College in Montgomery
County, Maryland, is called Workforce Development and Continuing Education.
Its June–August 2000 course catalog offers a wide variety of courses in areas such
as Certification and Licensure, Computer, Professional and Workforce Develop-
ment, and Technical Trades. These programs served 26,000 people in the prior
year.
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This appendix provides a longitudinal overview of federally funded job
training based on data compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL).
Summary data are given for historical expenditures on the four main federal job
training programs that operated successively since the 1960s. In chronological
order these programs are: Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA),
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), Job Training Partner-
ship Act (JTPA), and Workforce Investment Act (WIA). Descriptive statistics
on the demographic characteristics of participants in the later two programs are
also provided. For these programs data was originally collected by systems for
the JTPA Standardized Program Information Report (JTPA/SPIR) and the
WIA Standardized Record Data (WIASRD). The JTPA/SPIR data spans pro-
gram years (PYs) 1993 through 1999, and the WIASRD data provides an over-
view of job training activity during PY 2000 and 2001. The review of job
training data is presented in five parts. The first briefly describes the data re-
porting system in place for the CETA program, and then summarizes the JTPA/
SPIR and WIASRD data systems. The second presents a 40-year historical per-
spective on national funding levels for the four major federal job training pro-
grams. Part three delves deeper into the JTPA/SPIR data system, and tells the
training story under JTPA for dislocated workers (Title III) and disadvantaged
adults (Title II-A) from PYs 1993–1999. The fourth part of this appendix com-
pares the JTPA/SPIR system to the WIA/WIASRD system. The final part pre-
sents the most recent training picture based on PY 2001 WIASRD data.
TRAINING PROGRAM DATA SYSTEMS
The Continuous Longitudinal Manpower Survey (CLMS) contains quar-
terly information for a randomly selected sample of persons who participated
in CETA programs. CLMS data were compiled from CETA program records,
interviews with participants, and Social Security earnings records. Participants
were initially interviewed soon after CETA enrollment. Information was solic-
ited about themselves, their families, their work experience during the previous
year, and their recent level and sources of income—including whether income
was received as public assistance. Up to three follow-up interviews were con-
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ducted with each participant, with questions asked about experiences in job
training, other CETA programs, any other services, recent employment, and
their postprogram use of public assistance. 
The CLMS data files include information about program eligibility and
termination, participation in employment and training and other program activ-
ities, employment or unemployment spells, wage and job search information,
and labor market entry and exit decisions. In an evaluation of CETA conducted
by Westat Inc., a participant sample was drawn from the CLMS and a compar-
ison group was selected from the Current Population Survey (CPS) using char-
acteristics matching methods. Net program impacts were then estimated
controlling for differences across the two groups in observable characteristics
(gender, race, educational attainment, age, years of labor market experience).
USDOL has archived the CLMS and other data gathered by Westat Inc. for the
evaluation of CETA program activity during the years 1975–1980.
Following the passage of JTPA in 1982, the CLMS survey was replaced.
The new system was called the Job Training Longitudinal Survey (JTLS),
which later became known as the Job Training Quarterly Survey (JTQS). The
JTQS provided a nationally representative sample of terminees from the differ-
ent categories of the JTPA program participants. The JTQS collected informa-
tion on participant characteristics, program participation, and program
outcomes.
Beginning in PY 1993, USDOL departed from the sample survey method-
ologies found in JTQS and CLMS and began to keep individual records on all
program participants and their outcomes in a new system called the JTPA/
SPIR. It was the major reporting system that USDOL used to obtain informa-
tion about the individuals served, services provided, and outcomes obtained
under Title II-A (disadvantaged adults), Title II-C (disadvantaged youth), and
Title III (dislocated workers) of JTPA.1
The JTPA/SPIR includes one record for each person terminated from the
program during the program year and the last quarter of the previous program
year. In addition to individual level files, the participant data is aggregated to
both the service delivery area (SDA) and state levels for each title of JTPA. The
SPIR provides information about individuals across the categories of JTPA
participants. The SPIR data is organized into five parts:
1) identification/characteristics of applicant,
2) characteristics of participant,
3) activity and service record,
4) program terminations and other outcomes, and
5) follow-up information. 
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WIASRD is the major reporting system that USDOL now uses to gather
information about the individuals served, services provided, and outcomes at-
tained under Title I-B of the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). The PY 2000
and 2001 WIASRD file contains information on individuals who exited the
program during PY 2000 (July 1, 2000 – June 30, 2001) and PY 2001 (July 1,
2001 – June 30, 2002). It includes information on individuals served by local
WIA funds, statewide WIA funds, or National Emergency Grants (NEGs). In-
dividuals served only by some particular state-funded programs are not includ-
ed. One record exists for each person leaving the program during a given PY.
The data file is composed of following three sections:
1) individual information,
2) activity and services information record, and
3) program outcomes for adults, dislocated workers, older and younger
youth. 
FEDERAL JOB TRAINING EXPENDITURES 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Table A.1 presents a summary of federal government expenditure on job
training programs in the United States over the past 40 years. The expenditure
figures are expressed in millions of dollars. The GDP figures are listed in bil-
lions of constant 1996 dollars. GDP is included in the summary to put the train-
ing expenditure into perspective. The unemployment rate is included as a
benchmark for the condition of the labor market. It is noteworthy that the fed-
eral budget for training programs peaked in both real and money terms in 1979,
a year when unemployment stood at the relatively modest level of 5.8 percent
of the labor force.2 
TRAINING UNDER THE JOB TRAINING PARTNERSHIP 
ACT (JTPA) PYS 1993–1999
Sample percentages for demographic characteristics of JTPA participants
in Title II-A (disadvantaged adults) programs are reported in Table A.2 and
values for Title III (dislocated workers) participants are reported in Table A.3.
These tables are based on the SPIR data for program years 1993–1999. The ta-
bles show the shares of JTPA participants by gender and race, the type of train-
ing they received, the occupational categories of training, and the occupational
categories of jobs they entered after leaving JTPA program participation. Also
listed is the overall rate at which participants entered employment after leaving
the program. 
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COMPARING JTPA AND WIA
JTPA and WIA both maintained data on program participation and service
delivery through the JTPA/SPIR and WIASRD systems, respectively. Unfor-
tunately, a direct comparison of most WIA data to JTPA data is not possible
because the two systems track different performance measures, and the two
programs were targeted to different groups. 
WIA measures performance of all participants using administrative data
while JTPA used sample surveys, with varying response rates, to track perfor-
mance. JTPA focused heavily on the training of disadvantaged individuals,
while WIA has offered universal accessibility of services, increased self-ser-
vice, and an increased emphasis on work-first. While job training was at the
heart of JTPA, under WIA it is not a real option for job-seekers in some states
until after a period of self-directed job search. In general, participants and the
services they receive are too different to permit direct comparison between the
two programs. 
The one case where a fair direct comparison of JTPA and WIA may be
possible is for dislocated workers. Dislocated workers are defined identically
under both JTPA and WIA. Table A.4 compares the JTPA/SPIR data from PY
1999 to the WIA/WIASRD data from PY 2000.3 
A RECENT PICTURE OF TRAINING: WIASRD FOR PY 2001
Tables A.5 and A.6 summarize the basic demographic characteristics,
types of training, occupation of training, reemployment rates, occupation of re-
employment, and the credential rate for those who received training services
for WIA adults and dislocated workers for PY 2001. In addition to showing job
training participation rates, these tables also show rates of participation in WIA
core only employment services, and combined core and intensive reemploy-
ment services. 
SUMMARY
This appendix provides a brief description of the extent of federal job
training funding over the past 40 years. It describes the characteristics of par-
ticipants in job training for disadvantaged adults and dislocated workers under
the previous Job Training Partnership Act and the current Workforce Invest-
ment Act. The summaries are based on USDOL data from SPIR and WIASRD.
The tables in this appendix summarize the age, gender, and race of those who
participated in training, the type of training services they received, and the de-
gree of labor market success they enjoyed after program participation. This
brief summary provides only a glimpse of the rich data maintained by USDOL
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on federally funded employment training programs. Some investigations that
more fully exploit the data’s potential are summarized by chapter authors in
this volume. 
Notes
1. Information on the JTPA/SPIR system, as well as the WIA/WIASRD system, was
obtained from the documentation and data compiled by SPR Associates and pro-
vided under contract to USDOL.
2. USDOL has CLMS micro-data for the years 1975–1980, SPIR micro-data from
1993–1999, and WIASRD micro data from 2000–2002 available for purchase
through the Employment Research Data Center at the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research (www.upjohninstitute.org/erdc/index.htm). Unfortunately,
micro training data before 1975 (pre-CLMS), and between 1981 and 1992 (JTQS)
have been lost. The Employment Research Data Center adds new and archived
data as they become available.
3. The exiter figures are raw counts inclusive of all states. All other categories are
represented as percentages. Ethnicity figures do not add up to 100% due to the
exclusion of Native Americans and Pacific Islanders from the analysis (<0.1%
representation). Training figures are represented as a percentage of exiters.
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MDTAb 1963 — 4.4 5.7 70 302
MDTA 1964 — 5.8 5.2 130 554
MDTA 1965 — 6.4 4.5 396 1,685
MDTA 1966 — 6.5 3.8 399 1,637
MDTA 1967 — 2.5 3.8 390 1,550
MDTA 1968 — 4.8 3.6 398 1,526
MDTA 1969 — 3.1 3.5 407 1,494
MDTA 1970 2,725 0.2 4.9 1,451 5,055
MDTA 1971 4,283 3.4 5.9 1,516 5,021
MDTA 1972 4,052 5.3 5.6 1,682 5,314
MDTA/ 
CETA
1973 3,853 5.8 4.9 1,549 4,679
CETA 1974 3,520 –0.5 5.6 2,265 6,389
CETA 1975 3,432 –0.2 8.5 2,852 7,316
CETA 1976 3,240 5.3 7.7 2,916 6,977
CETA 1977 3,294 4.6 7.1 5,889 13,072
CETA 1978 3,831 5.6 6.1 3,440 7,150
CETA 1979 3,567 3.2 5.8 6,890 13,278
CETA 1980 3,185 –0.2 7.1 6,508 11,555
CETA 1981 3,247 2.5 7.6 7,245 11,734
CETA 1982 2,525 –1.9 9.7 3,023 4,583
CETA 1983 1,275 4.5 9.6 4,010 5,818
CETA/
JTPA
1984 1,251 7.2 7.5 6,546 9,155
JTPA 1985 1,158 4.1 7.2 3,774 5,112
JTPA 1986 1,815 3.5 7.0 3,337 4,449
JTPA 1987 1,811 3.4 6.2 3,685 4,754
JTPA 1988 1,762 4.1 5.5 3,805 4,751
JTPA 1989 1,852 3.5 5.3 3,831 4,605
JTPA 1990 1,753 1.9 5.6 3,983 4,615
































JTPA 1992 1,730 3.3 7.5 4,029 4,398
JTPA 1993 1,662 2.7 6.9 4,423 4,709
JTPA 1994 1,680 4.0 6.1 5,013 5,221
JTPA 1995 1,520 2.5 5.6 5,455 5,560
JTPA 1996 1,380 3.7 5.4 4,140 4,140
JTPA 1997 1,335 4.5 4.9 4,719 4,640
JTPA 1998 1,378 4.2 4.5 4,982 4,837
JTPA/WIA 1999 1,388 4.5 4.2 5,729 5,490
WIA 2000 1,371 3.7 4.0 5,436 5,133
WIA 2001 1,363 0.5 4.8 5,669 5,249
WIA 2002 1,384 2.2 5.8 5,797 5,261
WIA 2003 1,385 3.1 6.0 5,574 4,960
NOTE: — = data unavailable.
a The Employment and Training Administration (ETA) of USDOL oversees federally
funded training activities. Full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing is the total number of
staff hours worked in a year divided by the hours in a usual full-time work week for
one ETA staff person. FTE data are only available since 1970. 
b MDTA = The Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962.
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Table A.2 JTPA Title II-A Disadvantaged Adult Terminee Data
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Exiters 226,011 312,480 289,734 265,281 255,324 258,451 194,199
Gender (%)
Male 36.1 34.0 32.7 32.1 32.0 32.6 34.6
Female 63.9 66.0 67.3 67.9 68.0 67.4 65.4
Ethnicity (%)
White 52.4 51.5 48.0 45.6 44.4 42.1 42.2
Black 31.0 31.9 33.1 34.0 34.9 35.7 36.3
Hispanic 13.0 13.0 15.2 16.5 16.5 18.0 16.4
Asian   2.2   2.2   2.3   2.4  2.4   2.5   3.0
Training service
received (%)
Basic skills 21.1 23.0 22.7 21.7 19.4 19.0 16.2
Career 
counseling
29.2 27.7 24.1 22.6 22.4 22.4 20.9
Skills training 56.1 58.3 60.8 62.8 64.6 63.8 62.8
OJT 14.1 13.0 11.4 11.3 10.3 9.9 9.8
Skills training 
categories (%)
Managerial   1.5   1.4  1.4  1.5  1.4 1.4 1.4
Technical 15.6 15.0 17.1 16.8 16.3 16.9 18.0
Sales   2.5   2.3   2.1   2.1   2.6   2.3   2.3
Clerical 29.1 30.5 30.2 31.3 30.3 29.5 29.4
Service 20.6 21.8 20.8 20.6 20.6 20.6 19.4
Agriculture   0.7   0.6   0.9   0.6   0.6   0.7   0.7
Production 30.1 28.3 27.5 27.2 28.3 28.5 28.9
Employment 
categories (%)
Managerial   1.5   1.5   1.5   1.5   1.5   1.6   1.7
Technical 12.1 12.7 12.9 13.2 13.4 13.5 13.6
Sales   6.0   6.5   6.6   6.7   7.1   7.2   7.4
Clerical 22.2 22.5 23.6 23.1 22.3 22.1 22.2
Service 25.2 25.9 25.3 24.7 23.7 23.5 23.3
Agriculture   1.1   1.1   0.9   0.9   0.9   0.8   0.8
Production 31.9 29.8 29.2 30.0 31.1 32.1 31.1
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63.8 64.5 66.0 68.1 72.0 71.9 67.9
All others 58.1 59.3 56.6 59.9 66.4 69.2 68.2
NOTE: The JTPA exiter figures are raw counts inclusive of all states. All other catego-
ries are represented as percentages. Ethnicity figures do not add up to 100% due to the
exclusion of Native Americans and Pacific Islanders from the analysis (< 0.1% repre-
sentation).
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Table A.3 JTPA Title III Dislocated Workers Terminee Data
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Exiters 164,826 241,433 328,883 371,893 346,445 314,536 247,638
Gender (%)
Male 55.2 54.7 50.2 47.4 45.9 46.2 46.5
Female 44.8 45.3 49.8 52.6 54.1 53.8 53.5
Ethnicity (%)
White 73.5 72.2 69.9 67.7 65.0 61.9 62.1
Black 15.1 15.8 17.3 18.1 18.8 18.5 18.7
Hispanic   8.0   8.3   9.1 10.4 11.9 15.0 13.6
Asian   2.7   3.0   2.9   3.0   3.2   3.5   4.4
Training service 
received (%)
Basic skills   7.1 10.1 10.1 11 11.5 11.4   6.7
Career 
counseling
23.3 22.2 18.8 18.3 18.0 16.6 15.4
Skills training 43.2 43.6 44.8 47.9 50.1 51.4 52.7
OJT   6.1   5.9   5.0   4.3   4.2   4.1   4.2
Skills training 
categories (%)
Managerial   3.6   4.2   4.4   4.2   4.0   3.6   3.4
Technical 24.7 25.9 25.4 26.2 25.0 25.5 29.6
Sales   2.9   2.6   3.0   2.6   2.6   2.3   2.0
Clerical 24.7 23.7 24.8 27.9 27.3 27.4 28.9
Service   8.2   9.1   8.7   9.2   9.2   8.8   7.8
Agriculture   1.4   1.1   1.2   1.4   1.8   2.1   1.2
Production 34.6 33.5 32.4 28.7 30.1 30.2 27.1
Employment 
categories (%)
Managerial 4.4 5.1 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.2 5.3
Technical 16.9 18.9 18.9 19.7 20.1 20.8 22.4
Sales 6.9 6.7 7.5 7.5 7.1 7.1 6.9
Clerical 20.2 19.1 20.8 22.2 22.5 22.6 22.3
Service 9.6 9.8 9.7 10.2 10.3 10.1 9.6
Agriculture 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8
Production 40.9 39.2 36.5 33.7 33.2 33.4 32.6
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70.2 56.9 73.0 58.8 73.2 74.7 72.7
NOTE: The exiter figures are raw counts inclusive of all states. All other categories are
represented as percentages. Ethnicity figures do not add up to 100% due to the exclu-
sion of Native Americans and Pacific Islanders from the analysis (< 0.1% representa-
tion).
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Table A.4 Comparing JTPA (FY 1999) and WIA (FY 2000) Participants 














Asian   4.4   4.1
Training service received (%)
Basic skills   6.7   5.0










Asian   3.0   2.3
Training service received (%)
Basic skills 16.2   4.0
OJT   9.8 11.0
Occupational 63.0 41.0
NOTE: The exiter figures are raw counts inclusive of all states. All other categories are
represented as percentages. Ethnicity figures do not add up to 100% due to the exclu-
sion of Native Americans and Pacific Islanders from the analysis (< 0.1% representa-
tion). Training figures are represented as a percentage of exiters.
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Exiters 172,366 36,918 59,485 75,963
Age (%)
Under 22 11.3 13.4   9.5 11.7
22–44 67.2 64.4 64.8 70.4
45–54 15.5 16.2 18.4 13.0
55 and over   6.0   6.1   7.3   5.0
Gender (%)
Male 42.9 45.5 43.6 41.0
Female 57.1 54.5 56.4 59.0
Ethnicity (%)
Hispanic 20.9 16.8 24.8 19.9
White 43.6 46.9 37.2 47.1
Black 29.8 31.1 31.7 27.7
Asian   2.9   1.9   3.6   2.8
Training type (%)
Basic skills   5.9   5.9
OJT 12.1 12.1
Occupational 86.6 86.6
ITA established 24.8 54.8
Occupation of training (%)




Farming & construction   0.3
Entered employment (%)
Quarter after program exit 72.2 73.6 69.9 73.5
Employment occupation (%)
Managerial & professional 19.3 16.3 14.3 23.6
Service occupations 25.2 23.5 27.2 24.8
Production occupations 27.7 28.8 25.2 28.7







Farming & construction   0.5   0.5   0.7   0.5
Entered training related 
job
76.8 76.8
Training credential rate (%)
Attained credential 70.2
High school   2.4
College degree   4.7
License or certificate 52.1
Other 11.1
NOTE: The “Core only” WIA exiter number is low because most WIA core partici-
pants are not registered in the WIASRD. Training counts are those exiters receiving
core, intensive, and training services. All exit percentages include both program com-
pleters and dropouts from the WIA program.
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Exiters 129,969 17,777 46,000 66,192
Age (%)
Under 22   2.2   2.5   2.0   2.2
22–44 57.7 55.9 54.4 60.5
45–54 28.7 28.9 30.3 27.5
55 and over 11.4 12.6 13.3   9.8
Gender (%)
Male 50.1 51.2 48.7 50.8
Female 49.9 48.8 59.3 49.2
Ethnicity (%)
Hispanic 16.6 12.8 21.2 14.3
White 63.0 67.9 58.7 64.6
Black 14.7 14.0 14.0 15.3
Asian   3.8   3.2   4.1   3.7
Training type (%)
Basic skills   6.2
OJT   7.2
Occupational 91.2
ITA established 56.2
Occupation of training (%)
Managerial & professional 37.1
Service   8.7
Production 31.2
Sales 22.6
Farming & construction   0.3
Entered employment (%)
Quarter after program exit 79.6 80.2 79.0 79.8
Employment occupation (%)
Managerial & professional 26.1 22.8 25.0 27.6
Service occupations 11.4 11.7 12.8 10.3
Production occupations 33.0 34.2 30.9 34.1
Sales and clerical 29.0 30.8 30.7 27.5
Farming & construction   0.6   0.6   0.6   0.5










High school   2.0
College degree   7.7
License or certificate 51.6
Other
NOTE: Training counts are those receiving core, intensive, and training services. All
percentages include both completers and dropouts from the WIA program.
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